> We don't know what "free will," "self-determination," is when talking
> in terms of scientific theories. We can't even form a proper
> hypothesis to make sense of such notions. This does not mean that
> they don't point to something that I am willing to accept. It only
> means that they cannot as yet, if ever, be a part of "theoretical
> knowledge." They are shrouded in mystery and that is all we can say.
It's true, as I said, that Marx's ontological ideas are logically incompatible with the scientific materialist ontology dominant in science, so you can't make sense of them in terms of the latter ontology.
The "mystery" comes in when, as you do here, you implicitly attribute to yourself the capability of self-determining (in the sense at issue) what you believe, and what you believe is scientific materialism (which you mistakenly identify with "science"). Since, on the ontological premises of that ontology, you have no such capability, you contradict yourself when you make claims that implicitly assume you do have such a capability.
It's not true, by the way, that modern science demonstrates the truth of scientific materialist ontological premises. It's positive results can be sublated within an ontology having logical space for the ontological idea of self-determination. You can find that argument spelled out in Whitehead (e.g. in Modes of Thought, Science and the Modern World and, as a critique of the scientific materialist foundations of orthodox evolutionary theory, in The Function of Reason).
As Whitehead points out, "scientists motivated by the purpose of demonstrating there is no purpose in the universe make an interesting subject for study."
Ted