Louis,
I just want to say that you are not at all arguing against me here. I have never made the arguments that you seemingly attribute to me. In note of my writings anywhere can any implication be made that I think of human beings as not being social animals acting cooperatively. Nowhere do I say that human beings don't make their history cooperatively. Just the opposite. That was my original point about the usefulness of Kropotkin's critique. But what does this have to do with Ted's version of Marx's ontology?
I am not talking about patterned and predictable behavior. I suppose that bonobos, bees and human beings act in patterned and predictable ways. I suppose that the vast amount of behaviour of bonobos, bees and human beings is not and will not be predictable through theoretical models. I would guess that chimps and bonobos make "choices," in the (human) sense in which we use that vague term. I would guess that the range of possibilities of individual choice-making and cooperative choice-making is much greater among homo sapiens sapiens than among the australopithicenes who in many ways seem to have been simply erect chimps. These are just guesses about "choice," "free will," "self-determination," and the ability to self-consciously socially cooperate for making choices. I just don't know how we would use this notion in a theoretical context. I would also guess that there is something "indeterminate" though probably not self-determinate in bee behavior. These are all just guesses. There is no way that I can do much more than say that they are a matter of rational faith. We have not advanced much in the last 300 years in these matters, except to realize how much we do not know. Again, I would guess that this is because these issues tell us something about the limits of our knowledge. I am not sure what other conclusions can be drawn.
There are no real arguments, as far as I can see, that Ted or you or anyone else can offer for these beliefs of ours. They seem reasonable but so do arguments for hard determinism. In fact as many philosophers have shown (Paul Edwards, Galen Strawson who I can quote if you wish) the arguments for hard determinism are more coherent and the arguments for self-determination are inherently self-contradictory and paradoxical. (Who is the self that determines whom? etc.) This does not mean that my "choice" is to have some rational faith that we humans are self-determined.
But what does this have to do with what I said about Kropotkin's critique of Huxley. I am frankly perplexed.
My only original points were: 1) Sociobiology and evolutionary psychology are good biological hypotheses; 2) They do not preclude ideas of cooperative democracy, socialism, anarchism, or "progressive" politics - a term I never used. (While I'm at it, assume scare quotes around all these terms, since they are only meant to indicate my sympathies, the tradition I assume). Kropotkins writings on the subject, with all of its mistakes, is still a good place to begin, if you wish to see a sociobiological argument that evolution and cooperation are compatible in surprising ways. (See original post.) There has certainly been much work on these issues since Kropotkin's and Huxley's time but I still think Kropotkin is interesting. 3) Sociobiology and evolutionary psychology are only good guesses but claims made that they have developed theoretical models of human behavior, institutions, societal development, or even many basic family relations are greatly exaggerated as explained by Fodor, Orr, and even as netcasted on this list by Ravi and Carroll in some places.
What Ted's ontological notions have to do with these statements about sociobiology and Kropotkin, neither he, nor you, have yet to explain to me.
On 5/30/06, Louis Kontos < lkontos at mac.com> wrote:
> Jerry,
> sure monkeys are capable of making decisions. If you give them a
> banana and tofu, they will choose the banana every time. People are
> like that too, in that much of their 'behavior' is self-referred,
> patterned and predictable. At the same time, most of what we call
> human behavior has the quality of social action, in that it is
> ritualistic, oriented toward the expectations and judgments of
> others, and full of surprises. It is surprising, for instance, that
> people take up any struggle against great odds. What makes them want
> to do that? What makes them think they might succeed? What accounts
> for idealism, passion, good and bad faith, etc.? Exactly what Ted is
> talking about -- namely the embodiment of the 'universal' in the
> particular, the fact that the most central concepts, beliefs, ideals,
> etc., of any society, transcend immediate situations.
> Moreover, not only is it impossible for people to engage in monkey
> type behavior without appearing anti-social (try eating as you please
> next time you have dinner with someone), but any recognizably social
> behavior, even deviant behavior (in most cases), involves concepts,
> ideas, even theories, that transcend their immediate situation.
Again, as far as I can see, this has nothing to do with how the ontological problems Ted is referring to impact on the matter. Neither does it relate to Kropotkin's critique of Huxley. As far as the ontological issues, one can either assume them one way or another, or think of them absurd but none of these three initial choices necessarily determines impacts on ones hope for a cooperative, socialist and democratic future or how we should get there. Except for one thing. In my limited experience, people who spend a lot of time on these ontological issues and have a deep belief that they matter, tend to make distinctions that feel very much to me like religious distinctions. I mean no insult to Ted, Chris or Ravi here. I just don't see how these issues necessarily impact on any of the issues of science or politics.
All in all, I don't particularly know why you are writing this to me. Stripped of its philosophical rhetoric I mostly agree with you. I would just try to put it some other way. Again, nothing Ted or you write is a critique of sociobiology in a broad sense or of Kropotkin's critique of Huxley's soft social Darwinism or a critique of my view of the present scope and narrow limits of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology.
Let me say again. I think that we can "illustrate" or "show" choice. We do this in the stories we tell, the novels we write, etc. Some of these stories may be delusional in some way for all I know. But I think some of these stories communicate understanding about what the content and contexts of human choice can be. They illustrate our individual and social contingency, if you will.
But as of yet we have no way to develop a theoretical model of choice or even to explain it in a coherent non-contradictory way.
I am sorry I have to argue for our lack of knowledge on these issues but that is what I am doing.
> How to engage people as social actors, as members of society, rather
> than monkeys, or atomized 'individuals', or mere producers or
> consumers, that's a real question for 'progressives'. Such engagement
> can't possibly have anything to do with 'sociobiology' (this most
> recent version of extreme reductionism and determinism).
> Religion, mythology, practically anything besides sociobiology, has
> more relevance to progressive projects than sociobiology. (By the
> way, the term 'progressive' itself is meaningless and, alternatively,
> reactionary, in my view, but I'm using it in keeping with previous
> posts, as something intended to resolve 'social problems' through
> 'social change' -- none of which amounts to hill of beans, in my
> view, without a real passion for socialism.)
> Louis Kontos
>
Again I don't disagree with you, except in the terms you use. I am again perplexed where in anything I wrote that you might assume that I think that sociobiology is more relevant than say Religion or mythology. Relevant to what? Radicalizing people? Revolution? There is nothing I wrote that can lead you to the criticism you are making of me or my views on sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, or Kropotkin's views on evolution.
I obviously think that chimps and bonobos have much more complex social relations / kinship relations than you do. I think to a small extent they construct culture, etc. I think that chimps and bonobos should be classified as part of the hominid line beginning with our common ancestor Pan. If you don't have as high valuation of the ability of chimps and bonobos to make choices that is o.k. I may be wrong about this evaluation of chimp and bonobo "free will" and about my rejiggering of the hominid line. But none of these are essential to any arguments I have made. Just don't grab the monkey by the tail and throw her at me as if I think that human societies and chimp societies are equivalent in their "determinism" or that either society are about atomized individuals. Nowhere have I ever written this and again I am perplexed how what you are writing relate to what I wrote.
Oh, well.
Jerry
> Universality is contained therein -- in that people can only justify
> and/or explain their actions as instances of something else, e.g.,
> work, relaxation, acts of love, sacrifice, etc. All these 'concepts'
> are transcendental and universal (thus providing a basis of appeal
> for Marxist theory, which is a form of 'immanent' critique, not only
> a theory of society, social relations, dynamics, economic and
> 'structural' forces, etc.). The 'contradictions' Marxism deals with
There are species universals, for instance erect stance, and language are universals of homo sapiens. There also philosophical talk about universals and such talk can be evaluated in context of philosophical talk. Such concepts as universal, concrete, transcendental, are useful, but vague notions.. For the most part as far as I can see we can't be anything but vague in these areas. But I never referred to any of these notions or ideas and I think they do not at all relate to my limited statements about evolutionary biology.
For the record here, I consider myself in the same tradition as Marx, and think he had great insight into many aspects of history and human society. I think that many of his premises are correct.
But, please comrades don't be shocked, I don't think that what he wrote reaches the level of a good theoretical model. Mainly for some of the same reasons that I am skeptical of sociobiology. In fact I think many of the arguments against sociobiology can be rejiggered and applied to what is called Marxism. I don't want to argue about whether Marxism provides us with the kind of narrow theoretical knowledge provided by a few scientific theories or not. I am just saying this as a matter of full disclosure. (Just as with Ted I was really making the Catholic School remark as a matter of full disclosure of what I thought about arguing about what Marx said when, and not as a tweak. Too many Jesuits in my youth.)
Jerry
I was over posted and sent a different version of this off-list yesterday....