> history, particularly as represented by Hegel, recognizes that the
> ostensible and also the really operating motives of men who act in
> history
> are by no means the ultimate causes of historical events; that
> behind these
> motives are other motive powers, which have to be discovered. But
> it does
> not seek these powers in history itself, it imports them rather from
> outside, from philosophical ideology, into history. Hegel, for
> example,
> instead of explaining the history of ancient Greece out of its own
> inner
> interconnections, simply maintains that it is nothing more than the
> working
> out of "forms of beautiful individuality", the realization of a
> "work of
> art" as such. He says much in this connection about the old Greeks
> that is
> fine and profound, but that does not prevent us today from refusing
> to be
> put off with such an explanation, which is a mere manner of speech.
>
> When, therefore, it is a question of investigating the driving
> powers which
> - consciously or unconsciously, and indeed very often unconsciously
> - lie
> behind the motives of men who act in history and which constitute
> the real
> ultimate driving forces of history, then it is not a question so
> much of the
> motives of single individuals, however eminent, as of those motives
> which
> set in motion great masses, whole people, and again whole classes
> of the
> people in each people; and this, too, not merely for an instant,
> like the
> transient flaring up of a straw-fire which quickly dies down, but as a
> lasting action resulting in a great historical transformation. To
> ascertain
> the driving causes which here in the minds of acting masses and their
> leaders - the so-called great men - are reflected as conscious
> motives,
> clearly or unclearly, directly or in an ideological, even
> glorified, form -
> is the only path which can put us on the track of the laws holding
> sway both
> in history as a whole, and at particular periods and in particular
> lands.
> Everything which sets men in motion must go through their minds;
> but what
> form it will take in the mind will depend very much upon the
> circumstances.
> The workers have by no means become reconciled to capitalist machine
> industry, even though they no longer simply break the machines to
> pieces, as
> they still did in 1848 on the Rhine.
This confirms the interpretive claims I make.
Marx and Engels reject the idea, which they attribute to Hegel, that "ideas" rather than persons make history as inconsistent with their idea of human being as the potentially fully self-determined being. Though they reject this idea, they appropriate from Hegel the idea that the "essence" of human being is this potential for "freedom" as self-determination in the sense contained in the ideas (Hegel's) of a "will proper" and a "universal will". Actualized, this "freedom" is "universally developed individuals" - i.e. the fully self-determined individuals - creating and living in a "true realm of freedom" where relations, including relations of production, are relations of mutual recognition.
The actualization of such individuals and such a realm requires a long historical process of "education" consisting of internally related stages. Given Marx's particular understanding (also taken from Hegel) of how the capability for full self-determination develops, the essence of each stage is constituted by its internal relations of production. What develops in this process is the capability for self-determination in the sense I've indicated.
Since the internal social relations required for the full actualization of the human potential for self-determination aren't themselves actualized until the end of this process, human thought, will and action aren't fully self-determined until then either. But, as in Hegel's philosophy of history, this "potential" constitutes the "driving motive" reflected in the "conscious motives" of individuals whose less than fully self-determined thought, will and action in earlier stages produces "results shared in by the community at large". Hegel calls the "conscious motives" of such "world- historical" individuals "passions" to distinguish them from the fully self-determined "conscious motives" they ultimately make possible.
So the answer to the following question:
> Is there a biological component in the unique human capacity to form
> relations of mutual recognition ?
is "no" where, as in the following, you mean by "biological" not self- determined in the above sense.
> The human species name should be _Homo communis_, not _sapiens_.
> "Sapiens"
> softly implies that it is individual brain capacity to reason that
> is the
> evolutionary change to humans. No, it is capacities and
> inclinations of
> individuals to work as a group, to live socially, to live
> communisitically
> that is the _revolutionary_ leap to the species human.
This is also why your view that relations of mutual recognition are found in primal humanity contradicts the view of Hegel and Marx.
"It has been said and may be said that this is precisely the beauty and the greatness of it ['the connection of the individual with all, but at the same time also the independence of this connection from the individual' characteristic of the capitalist 'world market']: this spontaneous interconnection, this material and mental metabolism which is independent of the knowing and willing of individuals, and which presupposes their reciprocal independence and indifference. And, certainly, this objective connection is preferable to the lack of any connection, or to a merely local connection resting on blood ties, or on primeval, natural or master-servant relations. Equally certain is it that individuals cannot gain mastery over their own social interconnections before they have created them. But it is an insipid notion to conceive of this merely objective bond as a spontaneous, natural attribute inherent in individuals and inseparable from their nature (in antithesis to their conscious knowing and willing). This bond is their product. It is a historic product. It belongs to a specific phase of their development. The alien and independent character in which It presently exists vis-à- vis individuals proves only that the latter are still engaged in the creation of the conditions of their social life, and that have not yet begun, on the basis of these conditions, to live it. It is the bond natural to individuals within specific and limited relations of production. Universally developed individuals, whose social relations, as their own communal [gemeinschaftlich] relations, are hence also subordinated to their own communal control, are no product of nature, but of history. The degree and the universality of the development of wealth where this individuality becomes possible supposes production on the basis of exchange values as a prior condition, whose universality produces not only the alienation of the individual from himself and from others, but also the universality and the comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities. In earlier stages of development the single individual seems to be developed more fully, because he has not yet worked out his relationships in their fullness, or erected them as independent social powers and relations opposite himself. It is as ridiculous to yearn for a return to that original fullness as it is to believe that with this complete emptiness history has come to a standstill. The bourgeois viewpoint has never advanced beyond this antithesis between itself and this romantic viewpoint, and therefore the latter will accompany it as legitimate antithesis up to its blessed end." <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ ch03.htm#p156>
One key way in which "universally developed individuals" are created by and required for relations of mutual recognition is spelled out in the following:
"the real intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his real connections. Only then will the separate individuals be liberated from the various national and local barriers, be brought into practical connection with the material and intellectual production of the whole world and be put in a position to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth (the creations of man). All-round dependence, this natural form of the world-historical co-operation of individuals, will be transformed by this communist revolution into the control and conscious mastery of these powers, which, born of the action of men on one another, have till now overawed and governed men as powers completely alien to them. Now this view can be expressed again in speculative-idealistic, i.e. fantastic, terms as “self-generation of the species” ('society as the subject'), and thereby the consecutive series of interrelated individuals connected with each other can be conceived as a single individual, which accomplishes the mystery of generating itself. It is clear here that individuals certainly make one another, physically and mentally, but do not make themselves." <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ ch01a.htm>
This is an appropriation of Kant's idea of the "sensus communis" as the capacity "to think from the standpoint of everyone else" that Kant makes one of the "maxims" of enlightened thinking, the maxim "of enlarged thought". <http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/k/kant/immanuel/k16j/part8a.html>
It's counterpart in Husserl's (as opposed to Heidegger's) phenomenology is "transcendental intersubjectivity".
As these passages indicate, the true "wealth of the individual" is elaborated by Marx as the capabilities of the fully self-determined individual:
"what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc., created through universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming?" <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch09.htm>
Ted