>I am guessing you are already aware of all the arguments about
>suffering, the presence of central nervous systems, some indication of
>avoidance of pain, etc. We have also hashed over the various arguments
>(especially those of Singer(*)) regarding the legitimacy and basis of
>extending ethical considerations across species while still
>differentiating between them. So let me ask you a question that may help
>us get a grip on this: I assume you feel less queasy about kicking a
>leaf (or even better: a rock) rather than a dog. Do you think that is
>just a programmed response or aesthetic issue? Or do you think you are
>acting based on some considered position (apart from pragmatism/logistics)?
I don't really understand the question the way it is expressed, but I don't see any reason that should stop me answering.
It isn't usually a considered position. Simply emotional and behavioral. Dogs are brought up alongside humans and so we tend to treat them as members of the family, hence as humans. Likewise, dogs brought up with humans tend to treat humans as if they were dogs, as members of the pack, often as the leader of the pack.
Objectively of course dogs are not humans and humans are not dogs. But we don't really know how to relate to them as members of a dog pack, we only know how to relate as humans. If we did relate to dogs as members of a dog pack, we'd probably run around the countryside ripping lambs to shreds and fighting over the raw flesh. As for dogs, if they related to people as people, some of them would probably start considering the ethics of eating meat and turn vegetarian, resulting in severe malnutrition (as a dog's short digestive tract would be unable to extract enough nutrition.)
>(*) At the cost of misrepresenting him, I can offer a very simplistic
>summary of Singer's argument: we derive human ethical rules that govern
>our action on the basis of some universalisation (such as the
>categorical imperative). For instance, why do we hold that all else
>equal, kicking another human is wrong? Singer argues that when we flesh
>out these notions we will find that there is no logical basis to reject
>extending such considerations down the hierarchy of animals that share
>similar conditions and therefore the universalisation.
Well, there is the fact that we can express ourselves to other humans with language (the pen is mightier than the boot, so to speak) while we can't really do that with animals.
The trouble with Singer is this assumption of his that animals share "similar conditions" with humans. Which is a bit vague, probably deliberately so, certainly conveniently so. In my view, projecting such human ethical values onto dogs and other animals is something usually done by people who have very little direct experience with real animals. Rather, such people are programmed by a Walt Disney cartoon view of animals, that is animals which are just like people, except they have fur and feather, like Donald Duck and the Beagle Boys. Creatures which feel the same pain as humans and have the same hopes and aspirations.
Its arrant nonsense. Not only is your dog simply a dog, not only does it not share any of your "similar conditions", it isn't even capable of sharing your fantasy. It thinks you are a dog and would not hesitate to tear you to pieces if you were not a member of its own pack and you strayed onto its territory. It would never think this is "wrong" and such notions are quite alien to it.
That, quite simply, is the ethical basis for not extending to animals the same rights as we demand for other humans. That is to say, they have no possible way of understanding, let alone reciprocating. And of course the fundamental reason we want such rights extended to all humans, is that we reason that it is the best way of ensuring that we personally will enjoy such rights. Humans are capable of grasping the concept of reciprocal rights.
Animals can't and won't reciprocate. The whole notion of extending universal human rights to animals is preposterous.
Bill Bartlett Bracknell Tas