Sure, why not!
> It isn't usually a considered position. Simply emotional and behavioral.
> Dogs are brought up alongside humans and so we tend to treat them as
> members of the family, hence as humans. Likewise, dogs brought up with
> humans tend to treat humans as if they were dogs, as members of the
> pack, often as the leader of the pack.
I think my use of 'dog' has led the argument astray. Substitute 'dog' with some other animal, one that you may not have lived with.
>> (*) At the cost of misrepresenting him, I can offer a very simplistic
>> summary of Singer's argument: we derive human ethical rules that govern
>> our action on the basis of some universalisation (such as the
>> categorical imperative). For instance, why do we hold that all else
>> equal, kicking another human is wrong? Singer argues that when we flesh
>> out these notions we will find that there is no logical basis to reject
>> extending such considerations down the hierarchy of animals that share
>> similar conditions and therefore the universalisation.
>
> Well, there is the fact that we can express ourselves to other humans
> with language (the pen is mightier than the boot, so to speak) while we
> can't really do that with animals.
True. So there is some hierarchy perhaps that you could use... more below... in fact that would be the point... that we can use language, dogs can emote, trees have life, rocks are lifeless (unless you are animist).
> The trouble with Singer is this assumption of his that animals share
> "similar conditions" with humans. Which is a bit vague, probably
> deliberately so, certainly conveniently so.
Not at all, for if you read my post carefully you will note I wrote that I am offering a simplistic summary of Singer which quite probably runs the risk of misrepresenting him. The use of the term "similar conditions" is my choice, not Singer's.
> In my view, projecting such
> human ethical values onto dogs and other animals is something usually
> done by people who have very little direct experience with real animals.
> Rather, such people are programmed by a Walt Disney cartoon view of
> animals, that is animals which are just like people, except they have
> fur and feather, like Donald Duck and the Beagle Boys. Creatures which
> feel the same pain as humans and have the same hopes and aspirations.
The first part of the above is quite off the mark in two senses: 1) in the description of the ethical aspect of our treatment of animals as "projecting human ethical values onto dogs" (we are not asking dogs to be ethical here), and 2) in the speculation about the people who hold such positions on animal ethics. I do hold such a position and I have had direct experience with real animals. And not in the sense of domesticating them or putting them to my use, but in sharing the world with them. Thinking in terms of Donald Duck or Beagle Boys is a sort of anglo-centrism, don't you think?
As for same pains and hopes and aspirations... why would you think that a rabbit or chimpanzee does not feel pain similar to us (we have fairly similar biological systems in that regard)? And they share the hope/aspiration of survival with us.
> That, quite simply, is the ethical basis for not extending to animals
> the same rights as we demand for other humans. That is to say, they have
> no possible way of understanding, let alone reciprocating. And of course
> the fundamental reason we want such rights extended to all humans, is
> that we reason that it is the best way of ensuring that we personally
> will enjoy such rights. Humans are capable of grasping the concept of
> reciprocal rights.
Fundamental reason in terms of folk psychology or in terms of an ethical epistemology? From a folk psychological view, I am not sure this is the case... at least not on a pairwise basis. There are various ethical acts we perform, it seems to me, that are not carried out in anticipation of reciprocal treatment, except that implicit in participation in a law-abiding universe that aggregates such acts and allows the possibility of future reward i.e., reciprocal benefit is probably a good story on the evolutionary basis of altruistic acts, but I do not think it is the mechanism by which (the same evolutionary forces have shaped) our brains (to) reason about our acts.
There are human beings incapable of understanding or reciprocating, but I am sure you would extend your ethical considerations to them, yes? So, it is not so much what the animal can do for us, but what is consistent with the reasoning we use to justify what we can and cannot do (to other human beings, as currently used).
On a personal note:
I have a suspicion that you lump any form of thinking about animals into a single monolithic animal issues ("rights" if you wish) group. As a person who maintains a farm and interacts with animals (including perhaps having to slaughter them) you figure you have grip on reality that the city slickers do not... and you are quite probably right about a subsection of the group you are thinking of (and possibly your fellow Aussie's philosophical extremes are distasteful to you). You also wrote eloquently about the details of your troubles and triumphs with your animals, IIRC last season. As an animal issues person, I found that interesting and edifying, and not an opportunity for political activism. In a recent post, you expressed frustration with unnecessary intellectual rhetoric. I think I responded to that post in agreement. The same is true in this case. To make a meaningful impact today, we need not address the broad intellectual ethical connundrums, force people to become vegetarians (hence the smiley in the subject), and so on. We have a broad range of prescriptions we would (I am willing to bet) agree on, such as animal abuse involved in cosmetic product testing (where it still happens), and so on.
--ravi