[lbo-talk] Become a vegetarian or rot in hell!!! ;-)

ravi ravi.bulk at gmail.com
Sat Nov 4 20:18:40 PST 2006


--------------------------------------------------------------------------- This message includes replies to: Bill Bartlett, Miles Jackson, Carrol Cox ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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* Re: [lbo-talk] Become a vegetarian or rot in hell!!! ;-)

* Re: [lbo-talk] Become a vegetarian or rot in hell!!! ;-)

* Re: [lbo-talk] Become a vegetarian or rot in hell!!! ;-)

* Re: [lbo-talk] Become a vegetarian or rot in hell!!! ;-)

=========== Message 1 =========== Subject: Re: [lbo-talk] Become a vegetarian or rot...

At around 3/11/06 8:40 am, Carrol Cox wrote:
> ravi wrote:
>> At around 2/11/06 7:49 pm, Carrol Cox wrote:
>>> If we reject vegetarianism as an ethical imperative out of hand, as I
>>> do ... I believe Rosa Luxemberg (who would have sneered at
>>> PETA)...
>
> Well, this is one matter on which I'm with the majority.
>

Which perhaps should make you suspicious but I think even this may not be true. What sort of majority? Including which populations?

As a leftist, one is both used to being in the minority and being sneered at... as in the quote attributed to Gandhi which summarises the stages of response ranging from ridicule to acceptance.


> Most people
> simply don't think meat-eating raises any ethical questions -- and they
> think so "out of hand," as I do. In other words, I don't even think it a
> question worth debating, and neither do very many people.

The word for that I am afraid is 'wilful ignorance'. We do not accept it from the majority in other instances (such as in devaluing Iraqi lives over American ones). But more importantly: (a) the subject line is in jest: the options are not complete vegetarianism (or veganism) or rotting in hell. The real issue in such debates is (b) the ethical treatment of animals.

This discussion turned to vegetarianism based on Chuck's thoughts on what motivates vegetarians: "saving the planet" as he wondered, or "ethical reasons" as I offered. It does not matter that some may choose to dismiss the ethical considerations out of hand. The majority dismisses evolutionary theory as out of hand, so the correctness of these considerations is independent of such opinion. Further, the motivation is independent of the correctness of the belief. So, vegetarians could indeed be driven by ethical considerations, which may, on further analysis, turn out to be incomplete or incorrect.


> I of course have no objection whatever to people practicing
> vegetarianism. I don't judge people's private consumption practices, and
> I ignore judgments of _my_ private consumption practices.

This can be easily resolved by removing the hackle-raising term "judgement" from the discussion, thus avoiding veering off into psychology and individualism.

=========== Message 2 =========== Subject: Re: [lbo-talk] Become a vegetarian or rot in ...

At around 2/11/06 5:23 pm, Bill Bartlett wrote:
>
>> As for same pains and hopes and aspirations... why would you think that
>> a rabbit or chimpanzee does not feel pain similar to us (we have fairly
>> similar biological systems in that regard)? And they share the
>> hope/aspiration of survival with us.
>
> I just think it would be odd if they felt pain the same as us. What
> makes you think they would?
>

The fact that they share the same physiological structure/development as us? Or by "feel" do you mean the mental interpretation?


> Actual physical pain is, in any event, a rather minor small thing. We
> humans tend to exaggerate it. The bigger problem is anticipation of pain
> and disability, rather than the momentary pain of an injury. Animal
> suffer the ill-effects of anticipated injury as well of course, but in a
> totally different way from humans because their brains are wired
> differently.

Let us ignore the brain wiring differences for a bit, since we seem to have a point of agreement here: if animals do suffer from the anticipation of pain, why can we not extend ethical considerations based on fear anticipation in humans, to animals?


>
>> From a folk psychological view, I am not sure this is the
>> case... at least not on a pairwise basis. There are various ethical acts
>> we perform, it seems to me, that are not carried out in anticipation of
>> reciprocal treatment,
>
> Of course, most of the time we behave ethically simply out of habit.
> That is the way we were brought up to behave and it doesn't occur to us
> to act outside the norms.
>
> But that isn't the point, the real issue is - how did that get to be the
> "ethical" way to behave, how in other words did it get to be the way we
> were brought up to behave.
>
> This idea people have that some ethics are somehow genetically
> programmed is quite weird.
>

How we are programmed can be safely ignored... whether it is genetic or cultural, we act in some ways that we call ethical. These actions could have emerged in some sort of game theoretic / evolutionary way as the best chance of survival or highest pay-off. Contrary to what you say, "how we got there" is important not in itself but only in the context of what it can say about the legitimacy of the norms:

The question of relevance is how do we justify ethical prescriptions? If we do so using the historical development argument (mentioned above) then there is the possibility that those conditions are no longer relevant (the imperative is no longer categorical ;-)). But do we even do so? I am guessing not. We make appeal to such abstractions as "rights" (inalienable, natural, etc) and "freedoms", in conjunction with some rules. More below...


>> So,
>> it is not so much what the animal can do for us, but what is consistent
>> with the reasoning we use to justify what we can and cannot do (to other
>> human beings, as currently used).
>
> You don't get it at all. It has nothing to do with what that individual
> can do for you. It is that what anyone can do to that human being, can
> also be done to me and my friends and family. By proscribing the doing
> of it to complete strangers, me and mine are protected as well.
>

This is a good point (which I do "get" because I have touched on it my previous responses). But it still leaves open the possibility of finessing ethical rules to permit certain kinds of discrimination by making it clear that they exclude you and yours. In fact, this is the very reasoning used by the Bush govt with respect to their rights violations.


> There's plenty of other examples, on both sides of the argument. But its
> no use us starting off with some idealised notion that animals are the
> same as people and we shouldn't exploit them or do anything to them that
> we wouldn't allow with other people.

So, at least in this debate, nobody is doing that: suggesting that animals are the same as people. In fact, I think it is a bit irrelevant.

What is required is not rote rules (such as: do not do to animals what you would not do to people: I wouldn't want to kick an animal in the arse though there are many humans that I would -- if I weren't a pacifist ;-)), but to compare our ethical systems of reasoning with the way we treat animals and modify, if necessary, one or the other (or both)... this does not imply that it is dismissed "out of hand" (a term I can borrow from Carrol to use in the opposite sense) that we might conclude that our ethical reasoning is consistent without any extension whatsoever to animals.

=========== Message 3 =========== Subject: Re: [lbo-talk] Become a vegetarian or rot in ...

At around 3/11/06 11:48 am, Miles Jackson wrote:
> ravi wrote:
>
>> So, it seems to me from what you write above that your answer is that it
>> is a sort of programmed response? There are things that we (you too I
>> assume) have dropped that used to make you queasy, because at some point
>> you discovered that it is just some sort of received prejudice or
>> programmed behaviour. For example, for some people it is their attitude
>> towards homosexuality. There is a need to not discriminate against
>> homosexuality, but realising that aversion to kissing one's cousin is a
>> cultural practice, does not compel one to start kissing them ;-). By
>> which I mean I am not suggesting that should you realise that your
>> differential attitude towards animals and rocks is programmed,
>> unexamined, arbitrary (pick one or more or use less loaded terms if you
>> find them loaded) you can or should start treating animals as you do
>> rocks. You may choose to retain your attitude for some reason or other.
>> I am curious about that reason if any.
>>
>> The other option (mentioned in the question) is that you have arrived at
>> your attitude through some thought process, in which case I am curious
>> once again as to what that process is.
>
> This is a false dichotomy. There are not some things that are
> "programmed" and other things that are due to "individual thought
> processes"; any pattern of complex behavior and thought in people is due
> to the confluence and interaction of a variety of sociocultural,
> biological, and psychological factors, as I mentioned in the previous
> post. So when you say, "is it programmed or did you arrive at your
> attitude through some thought process?", the only reasonable response is
> "yes".
>

This is not a false dichotomy -- it is a couple of options I can broadly describe. Try this instead: if you have a position today, you arrived at it through some complex set of influences which you are able to enumerate, analyse, describe and evaluate in a rational manner to someone who does not share such influences. Or you are unable to do so. If you are able to, what is the language you choose and what is the evaluation you offer?


>> If I gave you $50 to throw a rabbit across the room and $30 to throw a
>> rock, you may choose to do neither, or I am guessing you will throw the
>> rock. If so, why?
>>
> Let me bring us back to my original question: why is it morally
> defensible to you to eat some living things but not others? I don't
> care about rocks. To restate your question: do you think it's okay to
> rip the heads off a broccoli plant but not a chicken? If so, why?

How about we both agree to answer each of these questions? I will answer yours gladly.


> I have to say I don't follow your argument at all. Whether or not I
> arrived at some conclusion by reasoning has no impact on whether or not
> animals actually suffer. If you say, "I reasoned that animals suffer;
> therefore they do" that's like saying "if I arrived at my belief in God
> via reasoning, then God exists!"

Sure, what is wrong with the last part? Isn't that the basis of most rational beliefs? I believe in evolutionary theory because I can independently arrive at its conclusions via reasoning?

The point behind trying to make explicit your reasoning is to avoid having to rehash what we have covered many times over: the issues of consistent application of ethical rules, the foundations of such rules, the questions of what animals feel or do not, the consideration of plants, etc.


> It doesn't matter how you got to the
> claim "animals suffer and plants don't"; what I'm interested in is,
> "What is evidence for the claim that all animals suffer and all plants
> don't?"

Well, there is the obvious evidence: an animal shows a clear response in attempting to avoid pain. We use that as a metric in making calls on how to act towards individuals. The presence of a central nervous system in certain animals and significant genetic similarity with higher apes suggests similar biological responses to ours. There is a reason that we test everything from cancer drugs to the effect of shampoo on the eye on animals. But the flip is of interest too: if it cannot be unambiguously demonstrated that plants do not suffer, does that imply the rejection of animal welfare? The point behind my question on the differential treatment of rocks and animals is to make explicit these norms and the possible rational positions behind them.


>> Ok, what are the measurements you use to figure out if someone (whom you
>> cannot directly communicate with) is suffering? As I mentioned in my
>> response to someone else (Bill?) we share our biological systems to a
>> large extent with many creatures, so there may be clues there.
>
> Okay, this is getting to my point. There are no reliable physiological
> indicators that can be used across all species to determine whether or
> not a being is "suffering". Suffering is a psychological condition;
> it's not an organic condition. This is why I don't understand your
> position: sure, according to common sense, animals suffer and plants
> don't. However, it is possible that plants "suffer" in different ways
> than animals;

But the relevant question in that sense is: do animals suffer in a manner similar to humans, in the context in which suffering is defined in ethical reasoning.

My definition of suffering for this purpose may be different from yours. The question is: can you (the hypothetical average person) construct a definition (more importantly an ethical system) that retains current ethical rules considered worth retaining while rejecting extension of one or more of them to animals. I am yet to see one such system (well, that's not entirely true: the philosopher Bernard Williams has offered some criticisms of animal welfare which I am still trying to come to grips with).


> thus, according to your ethical position on animals, we
> shouldn't eat them.

Actually, that is not my ethical position on animals. The subject line, as noted many times, is a joke based on the original thread initiated by Chuck. In fact, the point of that smiley is to illustrate the very point that in animal welfare issues it is not all or nothing... especially when it comes to eating. You could address 90% of animal welfare issues (IMO) while still being a meat-eater.

I mentioned the need of an ethical system above... I think I can in fact construct one that permits eating of animals at least in certain contexts.


> --Note here that I'm just using your own argument
> about how we should recognize and reduce suffering among nonhuman species!
> Here's the dilemma: (a) you can consistently support the idea that the
> human concept of suffering is applicable to nonhuman species, in which
> case it is immoral to eat anything; or (b) you can create a hierarchy of
> living things that are okay to eat and those that are not, in which case
> you're doing the same thing that a person who eats chicken or beef does.

Right, so let's go with your (b). So we both are using hierarchies. The big issue is: are they the same... if they are, then I could use some shared notion of a modified principle of least harm to show that my position/actions are preferable to his, even if neither of ours is ethically perfect. But if his hierarchy is such that it is not a hierarchy at all, but an exceptionalism (human beings vs all else) at worst (or a very different type of argument, such as the one offered by Bill).

=========== Message 4 =========== Subject: Re: [lbo-talk] Become a vegetarian or rot in ...

[text re-ordered]

At around 3/11/06 2:25 pm, Miles Jackson wrote:
> Chris Doss wrote:
>
>> P1. Suffering should be minimized. I think this
>> premise is accepted by just about everyone.
>
> The existence of life on this planet depends on things eating each
> other. That's just the way the ecosystem works. If killing =
> suffering, then the existence of life on this planet requires lots and
> lots of suffering. --That's what I call a "no brainer"!
>
>> C. Therefore, killing of animals should be minimized.
>
> No, the killing of animals is an absolutely necessary element of any
> functioning ecosystem.
>

No why? The absolute necessity (even if true) does not contradict the recommendation that killing should be minimized! Similarly for suffering.


>> P2. Killing animals causes them to suffer (I think
>> things like "how do we know they suffer?" is silly.
>> That's like asking "how do I know there are other
>> minds?" Obviously, I don't KNOW it, but as long as
>> people continue to act like they have minds, and as
>> long as animals continue to act like they suffer, I
>> will assume as a matter of practice that they do.)
>
> Humans are incredibly adept at anthropomorphizing animals: we love to
> impose human feelings and emotions on animals, and especially pets.
>

This is getting it backwards... what is being attempted is to see if human ethical reasoning excludes (or inversely is applicable to) animals, based on how we define/describe the terms and empirical data. Solipsism as far as I can tell is a consistent position except it gets you nowhere. Instead, it makes sense to assume certain things based on what I see. Considering we share a large part of our biological basis and developmental history with a large class of animals, it makes sense to make similar assumptions in their case.

--ravi



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