If Washington had decided not to disband the Iraqi Army after the fall of Saddam Hussein's government and not to de-Ba'athify the administration, it could have conceivably enjoyed as solid a pro-American government as the Vichy regime and might have been able to render resistance in Iraq as generally ineffective as the French Resistance.
As it happened, Washington, unlike the Third Reich, chose to assume the full burden of occupation at first (for it was more ambitous than the Nazis and wanted to totally restructure the occupied country's political economy from the bottom up, building a neoliberal pro-Tel Aviv regime) and then only gradually outsource the occupation to the Iraqis when direct occupation did not work. By then, though, resistance was in full swing, and Washington could never build a strong Iraqi government, though it has succeeded in Iraqifying death, by siding with Shi'is here, siding with Sunnis there, assisted in this endeavor to divide and conquer by sectarian international jihadists of the Al Qaeda tendency.
If resistance in Iraq were like the French Resistance, Washington might have already had a big victory party, a majority of the American public celebrating it, and moved onto Iran and Syria. -- Yoshie <http://montages.blogspot.com/> <http://mrzine.org> <http://monthlyreview.org/>