[lbo-talk] Wanted: A Major Division in the US Power Elite and Ruling Class (was Curiosity)

Yoshie Furuhashi critical.montages at gmail.com
Sun Oct 1 15:57:51 PDT 2006


On 10/1/06, Marvin Gandall <marvgandall at videotron.ca> wrote:
> Yoshie writes:
> >
> > I happen to think that a major division in the US power elite will be
> > very significant, *if* one emerges. For instance, both the Iranian
> > and Sandinista Revolutions happened in part because of Jimmy Carter's
> > wavering foreign policy, which reflected real confusion among the US
> > power elite and ruling class, in the wake of the Vietnam War and its
> > impacts on the home front.
> >
> > That kind of major division, however, does not exist among the US
> > power elite and ruling class yet, for there has been no negative
> > impact on profits -- there has been a positive one! -- and no
> > uprisings at home.
> ===============================
> The Iraq debacle has lost the Bush administration the confidence of a large
> part of the US ruling class (or elite, if you prefer).

I use the term power elite to those members of the ruling class who are actually directly involved in policy making on day-to-day basis.

In any event, where's evidence that the Iraq War has lost the Bush administration the confidence of a large part of the US ruling class? The Iraq War has been a debacle for Iraqis, to be sure, but has it been for the US ruling class, who are richer than in 2000, with the larger share of national income and wealth going to them?


> This is not directly
> apparent in relation to the issue of immediate withdrawal because there is
> bipartisan class unity that the retreat must be must carefully managed so
> that America is not seen to have been routed and its enemies emboldened. > But Iraq has forced Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld to pursue a more
> cautious foreign policy line than they otherwise would have been
> inclined to do towards North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela.
>
> The Iraqi insurgents deserve the primary credit for this, but they have
> conducted their war with US ruling class opinion very much in mind.

So do Hizballah, high oil prices, Iranian diplomacy, Russuian and Chinese geopolitics, and so on.

But they are all external constraints, which don't equal a major division in the US power elite and ruling class.


> Since
> Vietnam, insurgent guerrilla forces have understood they cannot defeat the
> US militarily, and have to do so politically - by fostering splits within
> the US ruling class and its allies. Their military strategies are tailored
> to this end. Such splits at the top also lend legitimacy to and strengthen
> mass opposition from below in relation to both foreign and domestic policy.

It doesn't look to me like Iraqi insurgents have a "military strategy," let alone a political strategy, sophisticated as they are at battles.


> While profits have been strong since 2002, this has been due to factors
> other than the war in Iraq. If anything, there has been concern about the
> tens of billions being spent on the war and the impact on the fiscal
> deficit,

The budget deficit, too, has declined: "The government ends fiscal 2006 tomorrow with a deficit estimated at $260 billion, just under 2 percent of GDP and down from the record $412 billion, or 3.6 percent, reached in 2004," though the decline will be short-lived (Alison Fitzgerald, "Bush Delivers Promised Lower Deficit That May Only Last a Year," 29 September 2006, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aAOV1m_jE7tc&refer=news>).


> and more serious concern yet about how Middle East instability in
> general threatens the oil supply and the economic and homeland security of
> the OECD countries.

If they had a serious concern about Middle East instability, they would not have let Tel Aviv invade Lebanon and they would learn to live with Iran.

-- Yoshie <http://montages.blogspot.com/> <http://mrzine.org> <http://monthlyreview.org/>



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