--------------------------------------------------------------------------- PART 1 of 2 (to meet post size limit) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- This message includes replies to: Jerry Monaco, boddi satva, martin, Andy F, Joel Schalit, jthorn65 at sbcglobal.net ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Messages in this group
* Re: [lbo-talk] Amnesty Report: Hezbollah War Crimes
* Re: [lbo-talk] Amnesty Report: Hezbollah War Crimes
* Re: [lbo-talk] science, objectivity, truth, taste and tolerance
* Re: [lbo-talk] science, objectivity, truth, taste and tolerance
=========== Message 1 =========== Subject: Re: [lbo-talk] Amnesty Report: Hezbollah War Crimes
At around 14/9/06 3:57 pm, Joel Schalit wrote:
> you're still rationalizing the targeting of civilians, ravi - even as an
> act of self-defense.
>
Yes, perhaps, but what is wrong with that? Aren't we supposed to rationalize the world and phenomena, in order to understand and analyse them? I do not even think of it as an act of self-defence. I see it simply as an ineffective reaction. Moral evaluation might show that there are other/better options. But what of the question of "war crimes"? More in my response to Dwayne...
=========== Message 2 =========== Subject: Re: [lbo-talk] Amnesty Report: Hezbollah War Crimes
At around 14/9/06 6:52 pm, martin wrote:
> On Sep 14, 2006, at 11:41 AM, ravi wrote:
>
>> What prevents us from
>> examining that, apart from Jewish Holocaust exceptionalism?
>
> What prevents us from examining Jewish Holocaust exceptionalism?
>
I don't know. Nothing prevents me (though I think that's a different discussion), but for others perhaps its fear of being seen as anti-semitic.
=========== Message 3 =========== Subject: Re: [lbo-talk] science, objectivity, truth, taste
At around 3/10/06 1:43 am, boddi satva wrote:
>> Can you or someone:
>>
>> a) Define "truth"? In such a way that it can be used in common
>> reasoning? (this rules out, I think, such things as the deflationary
>> theory, while leaving intact correspondence theories... you may
>> consider this arguable, and I am willing to pursue that debate if
>> necessary -- in fact it seems to me scientism requires a sort of
>> deflationary approach/faith in science).
>
> Truth is a quality a proposition or set of propositions have to
> greater or lesser degree depending on the extent to which one
> predicts/believes they will not have to be altered to comport with new
> observations. 1+1=2 is true because it has withstood the test of time
> and one anticipates no circumstance in which it may not comport with
> observed reality. 1+1=2 is "true" because, given the evidence, it will
> very, very, very, very probably not be observed to be false.
>
What does evidence have to do with 1+1=2? That 1+1=2 can be deductively established given a certain use of symbols and some basic rules of logic or set theory. If use a different set of symbols, say the binary system, 1+1=2 is meaningless, since 1+1=10.
Your definition of truth as a property is a very interesting one... deflationists for instance do not think of truth as a property at least in the sense above. Describing truth as a degree of adherence to observation is a sort of contingent notion which I doubt most people think of when they think of "truth" (that which cannot be shown to be false, of necessity). Your own example is a good one: 1+1=2 (again given certain language) is true irrespective of observations.
I like the idea of describing truth as you. Then problem then is that it admits all sorts of propositions that a typically scientistic person would like to deny.
> But truth has no binary nature because the universe is not
> deterministic but probabilistic.
See above.
> Truth always has a sense of relativity because to establish truth you
> have to compare the prosposition to reality and reality is always
> changing.
Sounds like a good working notion, but this as noted denies claims to truth of the power they had before: the ability to dismiss other propositions completely. There are multiple reasons for that: first of all there is the highly thorny issue of representing reality. Observational statements do not sort of exist out there -- how does one separate the observational language from the theoretical language? How does one talk about ones and twos without committing to a system of symbols and interpretations? The whole process, if it can be saved, has to be admittedly tentative and provisional. Hardly the sort of thing that inspires the bravado with which alternative propositions are dismissed.
>
>> c) How do you define "superior"? Do you really think that astronomy is
>> superior to astrology (for explaining the nature of the universe) in
>> every sense? How do you expect to demonstrate that conclusively?
>
> Atrology has little or no predictive value. Astrological systems fail
> again and again to predict anything about the universe. The
> propositions of astology do not comport with reality - except by pure
> chance.
>
But perhaps the function of astrology is something else? Perhaps it is superior to astronomy in comforting or entertaining human beings? Or even describing the nature of the universe in a comprehensible way to some? If you want to send a man to the moon, predict tides, or some such, modern astronomy or ancient pre-scientific versions of it, are as of now a better bet (but even here, how can we be sure unless we throw the sort of money at astrology that we throw at astronomy? Of course we cannot throw money at all things and we make decisions -- but as before we are here met with our old friend: uncertainty which behoves a tentative approach and some measure of humility).
> Therefore astronomy is superior to astrology in terms of truth, but
> astrology sells better.
But "in terms of truth", by your own definition, only means in terms of current degree of conformity to some description of reality. There is nowhere the higher-order i.e., meta proof of the guaranteed continuation of this superiority or even degree of conformity.
>> d) What does superiority have to do with truth? Ptolemaic system of
>> planetary motion were probably superior to whatever it replaced. Does
>> that make it "true"? Is Reimann geometry true?
>
> Nature is at it is. Our propositions can only be partly true. At the
> time of Ptolemy, that system was a superior approximation that what
> had come before therefore it was more true. Reimann geometry is more
> true than Ptolemy's system or Newton's.
>
Reimann geometry is a tricky thing. From what I hear it is quite useful in the physics of relativity theory. But when compared to Euclidian geometry it yields all kinds of strange results, which though not inconsistent, describe a very kind of [what you call] reality.
As I note above, "superiority" can be described in terms of "truth" (let us work with the description you have offered), in which case it is possible we may find something else superior tomorrow, or in terms of "purpose" i.e., what are we trying to use this for?
>> e) What is meant by "validity" (of science)? Valid in what sense? In
>> representing "truth"? In being "superior"? Or just in the mundane
>> sense of being more reliable than a few other systems?
>
> What's mundane about being able to predict what Nature will do rather
> than making random guesses? And there really is no system of observing
> the universe but science because science is agnostic to the content of
> its own propositions. It only asks that we measure these propositions
> against Nature.
This puzzles me greatly. Predicting what nature does is what many fields of human activity do. As Andy F points out, my 20 month old does that, as he toddles about, and he is no scientist (which Andy F thinks he is, which is a very good point, to which I will respond).
Mundane in the sense of utility. But below you hit upon what I think is the most important point for those who wish to differentiate science from other forms of human activity:
> Science does rely on mathematics, but mathematics is pure logic, again
> agnostic, other than proposing a few first principles which are still
> arguable and argued about.
Science differs from some other systems of knowledge or prediction in that it uses a formal system, mathematics, for expression. The might of science comes not from science, but from mathematics insofar as mathematics (a) provides the atoms/symbols and (b) underwrites the consistency of the results obtained from their application. As historians of science, I believe, have demonstrated, "real" science does not work in this rigorous fashion at all. And as mathematicians (a lot more sensitive and tolerant, as seen in my previous post) have shown, these rigorous methods are computationally infeasible and do not guarantee answers.
Insofar as science can be rigorously defined as distinct from other human activities, the definition fails the empirical/historical test of what has gone on, while on the other hand, insofar as science has been of benefit it cannot be distinguished as uniquely distinct any more than most other activities are.
>
>> g) When we abandon one system of explanation for another because the
>> latter is more parsimonious or more elegant (easier to work with,
>> etc), is this because the latter is more "true"? Or is it just a
>> matter of "taste? (a preference for parsimony, elegance, etc).
>
> Science constantly abandons systems of explaination, as you know. In
> fact, it is the process of permanent skepticism. Truth simply does not
> exist as a valid concept in science. Something is may be confirmed by
> observation, but that doesn't make it true. Confirmation by
> observation just makes it more likely to be true. New systems can be
> simpler and more complex - it doesn't matter. The only test is whether
> they comport with Nature and mathematics.
>
Sounds fine with me. But as I write above, systems of explanation are replaced not always due to better observational confirmation but due to other factors (elegance, fit with existing explanations, etc). Einstein for instance has recommended that we throw away the data rather than the theory, at times. In his case, quite unexpectedly true, as Eddington "massaged" solar eclipse observational data to confirm relativity theory.
> I really don't think there is any real contest between Science and any
> other system.
Neither do I. You should choose between one or the other, or a mix, depending on what you want to achieve, or whatever else preference you might have. In other words, someone who wishes to believe in astrology over astronomy deserves to be left alone to his beliefs, as long as he doesn't impose them on others. If that sounds libertarian, I can live with that.
=========== Message 4 =========== Subject: Re: [lbo-talk] science, objectivity, truth, taste
At around 3/10/06 1:58 am, boddi satva wrote:
>> Your analogy fails me. Botany is a sub-field of science. Reading tea
>> leaves has nothing to do with it. However the nature of the universe is
>> not an internal term or subject of science. People have been and
>> continue to speculate about the universe before modern science arrived
>> on the scene. Therefore they have a lot to say about the nature of the
>> universe. And what they say is offered in terms of an explanation. For
>> instance, the bible says, I believe, a few words about how the world
>> came about.
>
> That people speculate is not really important. Scientists speculate
> all the time. The difference is how you test your speculations.
> Testing them against mathematics and Nature is just superior if what
> you're after is an approximation of how the Universe actually works.
>
You may be right but not addressing the nature of my response to John Thornton. Let us work on this with as disadvantaged an example as I can construct against science alternatives: Say I tell you "the world is flat" and I believe it is so because my instinct tells me that is true. You respond "come on man, the world is round. Look at the horizon". IOW, you use an observation to back up your claim. Let us further agree that you are indeed correct. This does not in any way make it untrue that my statement was not about the world. It was a wrong statement, but still about the world.
And as you so well noted, we cannot make any final judgements about such things and work only with confidence values based on [our trust in our observational language and] what observations we make.
In truth, note that the guy who offers the statement that the world is flat is not making shit up. He too points to observational data, in this case: look at the ground around you... do you see a curvature?
Also, what is being offered here is a caricature of astrology as some sort random raving. The history of astrology shows otherwise, as folks we now think of as "scientists" worked actively on refuting some parts and refining other parts of astrology, and the debate included observational elements to it.
>>
>> Wikipedia provides this description of 'astrology', which I think is
>> appropriate for our discussion:
>>
>> > Astrology is a group of systems, traditions, and beliefs in which
>> > knowledge of the relative positions of celestial bodies and related
>> > information is held to be useful in understanding, interpreting, and
>> > organizing knowledge about personality, human affairs, and other
>> > terrestrial events.
>>
>> Astrology attempts to use the position of celestial bodies to understand
>> and predict future events. That is what it has to do with explaining
>> something.
>
> No, Astrology does not use the position of celestial bodies to
> understand anything. To do that, it would have to use statistics and
> then it would be Astronomy. Astrology simply tells stories about the
> meaning of celestial bodies without any attempt at understanding. It
> is not an attempt to understand and explain. It's just conjecture.
>
And all science is not conjecture in what way? And how does science not tell stories? And what is 'understanding' here? Understanding does not need the use of statistics. The use of statistics is a device. I understand what you say when you tell me "Please fetch me my cane". I have no need for statistics for that. Interestingly, the mathematician and mathematical historian Morris Kline points out that at some point in the 19 century, the function of mathematics (and the science that grows from it) shifted from physical explanation to mathematical description. Neils Bohr is supposed to have said that there is no way to understand quantum physics. It is what it is because of what the equations tell us. We can describe it mathematically, we can predict things, we can test for consistency, etc, but we do not quite know what it means. We need not resort to quantum physics to address this hermeneutic issue: what is it that we "understand" by gravity that is not self-referential?
>> Now you may believe that it does a poor job of doing that, but I am
>> afraid that would be an entirely different point or question.
>
> It's not that astrology does a bad job. Astrology doesn't attempt to
> do the job at all.
That I am afraid is just your claim.
Part 2 in a few seconds.
--ravi
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