--------------------------------------------------------------------------- This message includes replies to: Andy F, Carrol Cox, Joanna, Dwayne? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Messages in this group
* Re: [lbo-talk] science, objectivity, truth, taste and tolerance
* Re: [lbo-talk] Scientism
* scientism vs elitism
=========== Message 1 =========== Subject: Re: [lbo-talk] science, objectivity, truth, taste
At around 5/10/06 9:36 am, Andy F wrote:
>
> As far as who created or imagined X and use it as a bludgeon, this is
> much of what Albert and Ehrenreich (and Chomsky) take up quite
> explicitly in the reference I posted. They acknowledge the existence
> of X and its utility towards Bad Stuff, but protest that the pomos are
> confusing X and science. They also point out that this is precisedly
> the confusion exploited by the bludgeon-wielders. Similarly, reading
> Feyerabend left me with the impression that he is wrestling with
> whoever came up with X, as opposed to people who work in and think
> about science as it is practiced. That is the crux of his thesis,
> yes?
>
In my reading, Feyerabend is dealing with those who claim to come up with Y (not the X that Chomsky creates, but a different beast that codifies what is science) -- typically these are philosophers of science like his teach Karl Popper or the logical positivists, but sometimes also scientists -- compared to what is actually practised. Once he establishes that what is practised is quite different from the sterile models, he looks at what that says about the model and about activities the model excludes, and how those activities compare to science as it is practised. Often, he finds, the practise of science is more similar to these other human activities, than either are to the models. He concludes (and I am not a PKF scholar so please read with a bag of salt) that opportunism should continue to be the guiding principle in human activities like science (in practise) and that the best check against the errors that this may lead to is a plurality of views, including the devil's advocate approach of maintaining weaker theories or systems. In this analysis he hopes to better at both description and prescription.
A range of philosophers (Lakatos, Hacking, Putnam, etc) have poked holes in Feyerabend's thesis, and I think a lot of it is legitimate. For the purpose of our discussion though, the central question should remain the claim that initiated this debate: that progressives need to argue with folks over the validity of "science" by which is implied (in the following sentences) that this is equivalent to arguing that truth is not relative and science obtains it over something else. The questions I raised in response are aimed at figuring out what exactly is claimed here in the name of science, access to and discovery of objective truth, and how this relates to progressive action.
> One can and should think about the differences between X and science,
> the certainty of scientific findings, science and its relationship to
> truth and beauty, how much and whether *reasonably* *certain*
> scientific findings should be used to justify coercion (such as in
> eminent domain, dictating what is and isn't taught in bio, forcing
> pharmacists to sell birth control), ...
Good. However here science, by which is meant the various activities within laboratories, is employed as a tool. The central argument, it seems to me, is not scientific at all. Say evolution is a better story in terms of its lack of inconsistencies, correspondence to what even non-scientists will agree are valid observations, and its predictive value, than creationism. One might discover this through some tests and experiments -- though there is the valid criticism that the facts one finds in laboratories are theory laden. Now, the question at hand: should a community be forced to teach its children evolutionary theory? Can this question be decided in a scientific way? I believe not, and the key to my belief is that rationality is a larger tradition, science being only one of its users (and I think the argument, in favour of evolution, from "truth" is a much weaker argument than the argument from "utility"). Similarly for homosexuality: activists (at least a section of them) seem intent on demonstrating that the trait is inborn, but I believe this is a dangerous path to commit oneself to. The question of the acceptance of homosexuality is independent of the scientific characterization of it. But I am afraid I am not heeding Dwayne's warning, and letting this drift further and further away from the original intent of my questions.
> But I think you have mashed that all together in suggesting that
> people shouldn't cut down modern astrology (or other beliefs) because
> it comforts decent, humble people and we're quite or at all uncertain
> about it's validity anyway, plus people of power have used the phrase
> "I'm right and you're not" as a means of unjust control when they were
> plainly wrong, or even when they were right. These are all largely
> separate issues.
What of these do you consider separate issues and why? Here is my separated set of thoughts: (a) cutting down is an act of arrogance and is a dangerous tendency that needs opposition. At best, it occurs from confusing the profiteers with the people, (b) if the cutting down is done through claims to truth, then questioning such claims is one way to counter such arrogance, (c) as the [potentially mythical] Euler example (and Zeillberger's description of it as language fights) shows, the inability to prove someone wrong when they are cutting you down does not necessarily arise from once distance from truth or validity. Carrol claims [roughly] that even that which negates a scientific claim comes from science. But this is true only of most intra-scientific activity. The negation of Euler's proof of god (or that offered by other scientists) is not a scientific but a logical or rational one; nor does opposition to such theorizing gain impetus always from within the community (bullshit science, to borrow a word, has been called by non-scientists) (d) that you can cut someone down in this manner using the 'I am right, you are not' argument (as opposed to the 'If we both desire this result, I can show you by accepted reasoning that this works [better]' -- and no this is not a tactical issue), especially in light of the previous points, says something about this cutting down: unjust control, indeed. And isn't that what we as progressives/leftists are fighting against?
The fundamental conceit (which Jerry Monaco wrote beautifully about in his post, by which I do not mean to imply that he is talking about the exact same thing as I am) is that the decent, humble people (of which group we are of course never a part!) use some form of thinking that is devoid of reasoning or rationality. We all make mistakes in our reasoning, of course.
=========== Message 2 =========== Subject: Re: [lbo-talk] Scientism
At around 8/10/06 11:51 am, Carrol Cox wrote:
> The "Lust for Certainty" (who coined that phrase?) in the 20th century
> took/has taken/takes two forms. On the one hand the attitudes (of either
> scientists or non-scientists) which can be labeled "scientism" in that
> they hold that (their version of) science provides such certainty; on
> the other hand those (like ravi) who, finding correctly that science
> does not provide that religious certainty, argue that it doesn't provide
> any certainty at all. The argument, for example, that astrology "might"
> be true shows that religious dogmatism and religious scepticism have the
> same source -- the conviction that unless a proposition is guaranteed by
> the Word of God there is no reason to believe it.
>
You are again quite wrong in your characterisation of my point, restarted about 7 times over now, on this and previous threads. I do not believe that "science does not provide any certainty at all". I think there are very good reasons to believe in this or that thing. I just happen to believe that "truth" (as used, in a grand claim) is not one of them. As for astrology, I started reading a bit about it, and it seems that indeed some of its claims may be true after all, since it seems to have predicted some of the results that are today considered part of astronomy.
What is religious and dogmatic is the need for those under the influence of scientism to have some "one true certainty" that they can worship, and call to their defence, when rational argument seems to fail them. ;-)
=========== Message 3 =========== Subject: scientism vs elitism
Dwayne or AndyF suggested that I drop 'scientism' in favour of 'elitism', but I think that will not do at all.
Joanna has a very interesting anecdote (from her life or perhaps a friend of hers -- I will assume below that it was her direct experience). While canvassing door to door in a poor neighbourhood, trying to get people to attend a [socialist?] gathering, she came across a man in a house that seemed to be falling apart. However, in response to her invitation, the man grew angry, "I am not a communist! I am a capitalist", at which point, surveying the house, she wondered "Well, where is your capital?".
Picking up on one of my posts, Joanna stressed how the attitude and reasoning that I question is indeed found more among non-scientists than scientists. Her anecdote I think offers a good analogy.
I do not think scientists as a group are elitist, and isn't it an accepted mantra among the orthodox left, anyway, that power is not about persons but about the system? My questions are therefore not about scientists. Rather, they are addressed to the equivalent of Joanna's capitalist: a [hypothetical] [and typically] non-scientist who, it seems, sees such things as both a competition and an issue of prestige, and would rather be on the winning side.
In the early 20th century, at the peak of mathematical discovery and knowledge, as Hilbert posed his mighty questions, while Frege and Russell laid the firm foundations, there was an obscure, non-academic clerk (no, not Einstein ;-)) who sent a bunch of crazy claims to the mathematician G.H.Hardy. This man became what Hardy claimed a few years later, jokingly, as the only romantic episode in his life. The amazing results (not all of them correct), claimed Ramanujan, appeared to him in his dreams, as the Goddess Namagiri recited them out to him. Given this certain a source, he probably found Hardy's attempts to prove the results a strange hobby. It was fortunate that Hardy knew to distinguish the insight from the process of proving it.
Surprisingly, as repeated many times over, what Kuhn might call breakthrough or revolutionary science often involves asking the unlikely (and seemingly absurd questions). We spoke of Riemann before. Non-euclidian geometry arose from Lobachevsky, Gauss and Riemann considering the seemingly absurd what-if: what if Euclid's fifth axiom (postulate) were false? That one could draw more than one line through a point, parallel to another line? Which Gauss pondered as the sum of the internal angles of a triangle being less than 180 degrees.
The technique of reductio ad absurdum, typically used in confirming one's certainties and current belief system, turned the tables on the mathematicians, for the negation of the 5th postulate did not produce inconsistencies. In fact, it yielded non-Euclidean geometries that are quite fruitful for certain analyses. And this is not a solitary episode in mathematics. (I have already responded to Carrol's idea that even if true, such are internal developments in science).
In school however, we teach the children that the sum of the angles is 180 degrees -- this is "true", we tell them. We demonstrate the great utility of this fact, we derive powerful new theorems based on it, which we apply to great benefit, all of which in turn convinces us of the certainty of the truth of it. But we have to be cautious that whenever we claim things to be "true", for the sake of expediency, we do not ourselves become believers.
There is nothing to stop us from applying this method or approach at higher planes. That, I will claim, *is* the responsibility of intellectuals. As the quoted text from PKF suggests, the problem with astrology is/was calcification (though 'evolve or die' is occasionally not necessary, for creatures successfully occupy evolutionary niches). Science, in the best sense of that term (the beast of evolution of ideas), is not the scepticism that just doubts everything, but also one that looks at the most improbable 'what-if's (and is thus parallel to progressivism in considering the underdog). Scientism is the ignorance of one's own condition in the quest for the absolute certainty of one's faith. Similar to the state of Joanna's capitalist.
Now it would be utter hypocrisy for me not to consider the what-if -- what if Joanna's fellow is right after all? Perhaps socialism will leave him poorer? Examining the question would be a worthwhile exercise.
--ravi