On Oct 28, 2006, at 9:20 PM, Yoshie Furuhashi wrote:
> But you fit into the category well and express its tendency toward the
> politics of fear, depending on topics.
Does the Iranian-American socialist-feminist Val Moghadam count as a western leftist? This all seems very persuasive to me.
<http://iranreview.com/Iran%20Analysis/ on_the_recent_elections_in_iran_.htm>
On the Recent Elections in Iran
Val Moghadam
Iranian elections can be full of surprises - or can they? Was the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad unpredictable or part of a pattern?
Mohammad Khatami's landslide victories in 1997 and 2001 were won on a reformist campaign, and his presidency -- along with a majority reformist parliament -- raised expectations of social transformation and political change. But when the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the Council of Guardians blocked reform, the movement lost its momentum and citizens became disillusioned or angry. Municipal elections brought in a conservative majority, as did the February 2004 parliamentary elections. In the run-up to the recent presidential elections, the reformists' choice had been Mostafa Moin, but he did not receive enough votes in the first round. After that, everyone was sure that former president and "pragmatic conservative" Hashemi Rafsanjani would win. Indeed, many reformists decided to back Rafsanjani, leading to spirited debates among liberals and reformists in Iran and in the diaspora as to whether this was the correct tactic or not. But instead of a victory on the part of the rich and well- connected Rafsanjani with a daughter widely known as a feminist (former parliamentarian Faezeh Hashemi), it was Ahmadinejad who won in the run-off.
Voter turn-out was lower than in the past, and many citizens boycotted the elections altogether. Boycotting elections is one way that Iranian citizens show their lack of confidence in the system - and the Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi announced that she too was joining the boycott. Perhaps close to 40% of eligible voters did not cast their ballots in the recent elections. The feeling for many is that as long as the Council of Guardians remains on the scene to vet candidates, the whole process is compromised, and "Islamic democracy" Iranian-style is either a pipe-dream or a highly managed form of democracy. In the run-off, the choice between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad seemed for many to be far too limited (rather like the choice between a Republican and a Democrat in the United States). And so many citizens who desperately want reform of the system did not vote. Those who did, voted for Ahmadinejad because he put the spotlight on something that both Rafsanjani and reformists have neglected: the country's socio-economic problems, including high unemployment and an absurdly inflated housing market.
This underscores the main deficit in the reform movement: in classic liberal fashion, the emphasis has been placed on civil and political liberties while socio-economic conditions and rights have been marginalized. As important as it is to argue for removal of social restrictions on dress and recreation, these issues may be most pertinent to the well-off in northern Tehran rather than to those who struggle to find jobs and housing. Issues of social justice were never very important to the reform movement, and now they have been hijacked by Ahmadinejad.
In the past, women and youth were Khatami's main constituents and indeed the major social base of the reform movement. They are now the main losers. Iran's feminist movement may have recognized this threat when its leaders organized an historic demonstration outside the gates of Tehran University on 13 June. They were protesting the disqualification of women candidates from the election, but their fundamental grievance is with a constitution that limits their role to that of mothers -- and not as workers or political actors -- and rules out their self-determination. Ahmadinejad may not be the monster that some of the (largely U.S.) press makes him out to be, but he is a religious conservative and a moralist. Whether he can overturn the cultural liberalization of the Khatami era is unclear, but certainly he will not expand it. Whether he can succeed in addressing the country's socio-economic problems is also doubtful, given that he is located squarely within the political establishment, if not its economic elite.
Marxists understand class conflict well (and some of the liberal reformists would have done well to draw on the insights of their past Marxism), but even so, cross-class alliances are possible and desirable, as well as very much part of Iran's collective action repertoire. If Iran's reform movement is to be revived, it needs to develop a platform that includes a holistic agenda for social transformation - one that will resonate with middle-class, working- class, rich and low-income women and men alike. This means that along with our insistence that mandatory hejab be rescinded and family law reformed, that young people be allowed to listen to music and dance, that all political prisoners be released and civil liberties established - we need to establish the concept of the socio-economic rights of citizens, and insist that the redistribution of the country's wealth, through an economic policy based on social justice and human rights, should be the priority of any government.
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Val Moghadam is a former professor of sociology and director of women's studies at Illinois State University who currently works in Paris.