YaleGlobal Online
China Gets Tough With North Korea
10/28/2006
- By Susan L. Shirk
YaleGlobal, 26 October 2006
San Diego: In mid October the US secretary of state visited China and South Korea, two states that hold the key to an international solution to the North Korea nuclear crisis. Economic lifelines from China and South Korea can keep the repressive regime afloat even if every other country cuts North Korea off.
Surprisingly, Communist China, North Korea's traditional ally, showed greater willingness to squeeze it than did America's ally, South Korea.
The North Korean nuclear test forced China's leaders to choose between North Korea and an international coalition led by the US. Their decision to stand with the world instead of with its communist little brother is the silver lining of the crisis and ultimately may be more significant than whatever the North Koreans do. In future years, people may point to the North Korean nuclear crisis as a turning point that brought China on the same side as the US and Japan instead of creating two hostile blocs in Asia.
To keep China onboard, the Bush administration must convince Beijing along with Pyongyang of its good faith - that it uses sanctions to pull North Korea back to the negotiating table and not put a noose around its neck.
The conventional wisdom was that Beijing would never pressure North Korea for two reasons: It is more afraid of destabilizing its neighbor and driving thousands of refugees across the border into Northeast China - a region already troubled by massive unemployment and labor unrest - than it is of a North Korea armed with nuclear weapons, and it wants to prevent Korean reunification under a government led by Seoul that could place US armed forces right on China's border.
This time, however, China, defied expectations. It voted "yes" on a muscular UN Security Council resolution that, while ruling out the use of force for the time being, is much stronger than anything that China - a long-time opponent of sanctions especially in its own neighborhood - has been willing to swallow in the past. China's ambassador to the UN was misquoted by the press to say that China would not enforce inspections of North Korean freight as required by the resolution. But in fact, he only ruled out interdicting ships at sea, a dangerous mission that even gives the US military pause. Trucks carrying cargo from North Korea are inspected at the Chinese border.
The Chinese government has gone beyond the resolution's requirements to order at least some banks to halt transactions with North Korea, a stern measure that devastates the nation's ability to conduct foreign trade. Chinese banking regulators have been queasy about handling money from North Korea ever since the US identified a bank in Macao, the former Portuguese colony now part of the People's Republic of China, as a conduit allegedly used by Pyongyang to launder counterfeit US dollars.
The Chinese entrepreneurs who invested money in North Korean mines and factories don't need an explicit order from the government to put their projects on ice. Beijing has signaled a clear change in attitude, and the risks of doing business in North Korea drastically increased as a result.
Even before North Korea's nuclear blast, China had raised the price it charged Pyongyang for oil. If North Korea refuses to return to talks or tests again, China may close the pipeline temporarily as it did in 2003. Meanwhile, China's propaganda authorities allow Chinese tabloids and internet news sites to criticize North Korea's actions freely, a sure sign that they are building popular support for a tough response.
China's own interests motivate the tough stance with its erstwhile ally: For one thing, China's pride is involved. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il violated minimum standards of the traditional friendship between the two communist countries last summer when he refused to meet with a high-level Chinese envoy sent to Pyongyang to discuss the missile tests or with Mao Zedong's son during an annual visit to the grave of his brother killed during the 1950-1953 Korean War.
Beijing sees the timing of the nuclear test - during the Chinese Communist Party's most important annual meeting, the day after the new Japanese prime minister visited President Hu Jintao, and just following its week-long National Day holiday - as a deliberate slap in the face. The government's statement following the test was the most sharply worded of any country's, reflecting genuine anger.
Moreover, China is more concerned about its own international reputation than it used to be. It took pride in the Six Party Talks, its unprecedented effort to mediate the conflict that Pyongyang now has spoiled. Beijing seeks to show the world that it is a responsible power by distancing itself from North Korea's roguish violation of international norms. China also has an interest in preserving the global non-proliferation regime, teetering on the brink of collapse, and not seeing its status as a member of the elite club of acknowledged nuclear powers diluted.
Although Americans may not yet recognize it, the newest and most important factor driving China's response is its relationship with Japan. China's highest foreign-policy priority in Asia is repairing its troubled relations with Japan, and the Chinese realize that the North Korean nuclear crisis can help them do that. A common enemy can unite even countries that don't like each other much.
Public opinion in China and Japan had grown mutually hostile as Chinese leaders pumped up nationalism as a way to bolster support for the Communist Party. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japanese martyrs from World War II, including 14 convicted war criminals, outraged Chinese citizens. Student protests against Japan erupted in 25 cities in spring 2005.
Chinese politicians didn't dare invite Koizumi to China or meet with him outside the country. Hu and Koizumi never picked up the telephone to call each other after North Korea tested missiles this summer, although each man consulted with leaders of every other country in the region. Their territorial dispute over the possibly oil-rich waters in the East China Sea intensified. Most worrisome from the standpoint of the Chinese politicians was the possibility of patriotic students taking to the streets against their own weak-kneed government the next time a Japanese prime minister visited Yasukuni.
Many of the Chinese political elite blame the dangerous deterioration of relations with Japan on former President Jiang Zemin, whose Patriotic Education Campaign had stirred historical memories of Japan's occupation of China during the 1930s and '40s. Jiang's harping on history to senior officials, even the emperor, when he visited Japan in 1998 further estranged the Japanese public and its politicians.
Hu is eager to contrast his diplomatic skills with those of his predecessor. His administration worked out a pragmatic understanding with incoming Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to get relations back on track. China announced an "agreement to eliminate the political obstacle" while Abe remained publicly noncommittal about whether he intended to visit Yasukuni. Abe made Beijing rather than Washington the destination of his first foreign trip. The diplomatic breakthrough was a triumph for Hu - until North Korea spoiled it.
Showing backbone against North Korea also discourages Tokyo from following Pyongyang down the nuclear path. From the Chinese perspective, a nuclear Japan is a nightmare more horrifying than a nuclear North Korea. The Japanese, directly threatened by North Korean missiles, are more likely to open the question if they see the Chinese passively accept North Korea's nuclear weapons.
The North Korean nuclear test, by driving China to become part of the solution and averting conflict between China and Japan, shifted strategic ground in Northeast Asia. Paradoxically, it may have made Northeast Asia less dangerous, not more so.
Susan Shirk is professor in the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, and director of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation/ She is author of the forthcoming book "China: Fragile Superpower" (Oxford UP, Spring 2007) and was deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for China from 1997 to 2000.
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