[lbo-talk] more Foucault

Michael Hoover mhhoover at gmail.com
Fri Sep 1 10:15:25 PDT 2006


On 8/31/06, Michael Pollak <mpollak at panix.com> wrote:
> I certainly don't want to excuse Foucault's seemingly blanket indulgence of
> the reactionary mores of the mullahs as detailed in the New Politics article
> you excerpted first. But I think to fair to him we have to realize how
> plausible the above part of what he's saying seemed at the time.
>
> When he was writing, nobody but microspecialists had ever heard of the
> Doctrine of the Jurisprudent -- and even they didn't take it seriously as a
> political institution. It was a complete break with all previous Shiite
> thinking. Foucault's comments here are still pretty true today for all
> Shiites who say they are not Khomenites. They are say they against
> clergyman having institutional roles in government. And theoretically at
> least, I think it was perfectly reasonably to argue, as he did, that any
> outside consultatory role would have be further mitigated by the fact that
> there must always in principle be a multiciplity of Imams, since everyone
> must be free to choose their own. If they weren't formally part of the
> government, and they never had a united position, how could they be
> running things?
>
> Khomenei's Doctrine of the Jurisprudent completely turned this on its head.
> It made a single clergyman to the most powerful man in government and the
> sole interpretive authority. It was hierachy was a vengeance. It changed
> everything. But Foucault can't really be blamed for thinking that
> everything in Shiism pointed the other way. It did.
> Michael
<<<<<>>>>>

if memory serves, i posted below several months ago... mh

I recall that several people I knew went back to Iran after the revolution which had brought together secular leftists, liberal democrats, and religious activists under an Islamic banner. Both political and religious differences were blurred - as they generally tend to be - in the heady of victory. Below the Islamic umbrella, however, were competing agendas and outlooks. Even the religious activists were split; some wanted to stress Iran's culture, traditions,and values, others wanted clerical rule. Clergy themselves differed in their interpretations of Islam and its political applications/implications.

Khomeini's pre-revolutionary criticisms and denunications of the Shah were similar to those made by people across the political and religious spectrum. Better known at the time than Khomeini was Ali Shariati who had forged a left-wing Islamic political ideology and theology of liberation. Influenced by Frantz Fanon and Che Guevara sans their rejecton of religion, Shariati asserted the necessity of reclaiming Iran's religious roots (he died just prior to the revolution of a heart attack in Britain to where he'd been exiled following several years of imprisonment by the Shah, his supporters suspected the SAVAK in his death).

According to several of my Iranian friends who went from being anti-Shah to anti-Khomeini, most people in Iran weren't familiar with the latter's views on the relationship between religion and politics, most specifically, his belief in direct clerical rule and elite guardianship. The politico-religious unity of Khomeini's clerical cohorts and their lay supporters overwhelmed the cacophony of other clerical and lay, religious and secular voices, *all* of whom were subject to so-called "Islamic justice". In the process, they consolidated control over the country's cultural and social institutions.



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