Velayat-e Faqih was indeed Khomeini's new interpretation of Shi'ism, but the practice of empowering clerics to ensure that all laws are in accordance with Islam had a precedent in the Constitution of 1906, which was in the main modelled upon the Belgian constitution:
<blockquote>[The deputies to the National Assembly, 26% of whom were guild elders, 20% clergymen, and 15% merchants, the mostazafin -- the oppressed -- being excluded from the electorate] acknowledged in a number of clauses the importance of religion in general and of the religious leaders in particular. The judicial branch was divided into civil tribunals and ecclesiastical courts with extensive jurisdiction over religious laws. The Twelver doctrine of Shi'ism was declared to be the official religion of Iran. Only Muslims could be appointed as cabinet ministers. The executive undertook the duty of banning "heretical" organizations and publications. And a "supreme committee" of mujtaheds was to scrutinize all bills introduced into parliament to ensure that no law contradicted the shari'a. This committee, comprising at least five members, was to be elected by the deputies from a list of twenty submitted by the 'ulama. The committee would sit until "the appearance of the Mahdi (May God Hasten His Glad Advent)." (Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 87-88, 90)</blockquote>
<blockquote>The constitution [of 1906], and the supplementary laws added to it by the Parliament, sought to appease the ulema by giving Islam a broad role in the new government.[25] Article 1 declared Shi'ism to be the state religion.[26] Article 2 provided for the creation of an ecclesiastical committee, which sought to ensure that all legislation conformed to Islam.[27] Articles 20 and 21 banned all publications and associations that were detrimental to Islam.[28] Lastly, Article 27 established a two-tiered judicial system consisting of: a clergy-administered court to deal with religious issues and a government-administered civil court to deal with secular issues.[29] (Neil Shevlin, "Velayat E Faqih in the Constitution of Iran: the Implementation of Theocracy," University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 1.2, January/February 2000)</blockquote>
In short, the liberal bourgeois Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909, the first of its kind in the Middle East, produced as theocratic a constitution as the Revolution of 1977-1979, made in the name of Islam.
The difference between "a 'supreme committee' of mujtaheds" of the Constitution of 1906 and the Guardian Council today lies in composition and mode of selection: the Guardian Council today "consists of six theologians appointed by the supreme leader and six jurists nominated by the judiciary and approved by parliament," and its members are "elected for six years on a phased basis, so that half the membership changes every three years" (William O. Beeman, "Elections and Governmental Structure in Iran: Reform Lurks under the Flaws," Brown Journal of World Affairs 11.1, Summer/Fall 2004, p. 7 <http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Anthropology/publications/Iranelections.pdf>).
Back to Velayat-e Faqih. Khomeini, before the 1970s, was traditional, both in his thoughts on theology and political economy, according to Ervand Abrahamian ("Khomeini: Fundamentalist or Populist?" New Left Review I.186, March-April 1991, p. 109). As he became radicalized in a populist and republican direction on political economy, he came to radically revise his theological view as well.
How populist and republican? The populist and republican character of Khomeinism may be best illustrated by the Constitution of 1979 drafted by an Assembly of Experts, "most of whom were Khomeini's disciples (Abrahamian, "Khomeini," p. 115):
<blockquote>Its [the Constitution's] central structure was taken straight from the French Fifth Republic, founded on Montesquieu's separation of powers. It divided the state into the Executive, headed by the President supervising a highly centralized state; the Judiciary, with powers to appoint district judges and review their verdicts; and the national Parliament, elected through universal adult suffrage. For years Khomeini had argued that women's suffrage was anti-Islamic. He now argued that to deprive women of the vote was anti-Islamic. . . .
The Constitution also contained much populist rhetoric. It began with the two controversial terms enqelab (revolution) and jomhuri (republic). . . .
The Constitution went on to promise -- 'as a legal obligation' -- to provide all citizens with pensions, social security, unemployment benefits, disability pay, medical services, and free secondary as well as primary-school education. It further promised to eradicate hoarding, usury, monopolies, unemployment, poverty and social deprivation; provide interest-free loans; utilize science and technology; and 'plan the economy in such a way that all individuals would have the time and opportunity to enhance their moral and social development, and participate in the leadership and management of the country.' These clauses seem to have escaped the notice of Western journalists who claim that the Iranian Revolution was carried out in the name of rejecting the material things of this world.37 The Constitution furthermore promised to make Iran totally independent -- culturally, agriculturally and industrially; prevent the economic domination of the country by foreigners; cancel all economic concessions to them; strive for the total unity of all Muslims; and 'help the mostazafin of the world struggle against their oppressors'. (Abrahamian, "Khomeini," pp. 115-116)</blockqutoe>
It must be mentioned that the constitution so drafted, which clearly specified the role of the Supreme Leader, the process to select the next Leader, and the process to revise the laws concerning the Leader's powers, duties, and selection process (see Chapter VIII of the Constitution at <http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch08.php>), was put to a plebiscite, and _a majority of the Iranian people voted for it_ (Beeman, p. 2).
It is often remarked that populist leaders in the developing world -- including Hugo Chavez of Venezuela -- and state socialist leaders (under conditions prior to the dominance of bureaucracy) have relied upon their own charisma and cultivated a cult of personality. Velayat-e Faqih is a theological equivalent of that secular phenomenon, except that, in Iran, the role of the Supreme Leader is explicitly codified, processes of choosing the Leader as well as of defining the powers of the Leader are formalized and publicly revised from time to time, _and the electorate have chances to directly elect the Assembly of Experts who choose and supervise the Leader_, unlike in secular populist and socialist states, where either revolutions often rose and fell with single leaders or founders turned their revolutions into family businesses, as in Cuba and North Korea, the last state socialist countries, without the public having any meaningful opportunity to participate in their selection and supervision.
It is ironic that a theocratic populist state has been more mindful of the rule of law and distrustful of arbitrary authority than secular populist and socialist states. -- Yoshie <http://montages.blogspot.com/> <http://mrzine.org> <http://monthlyreview.org/>