Aired August 6, 2006 - 10:00 ET
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0608/06/rs.01.html
KURTZ: Tom Ricks, you've covered a number of military conflicts, including Iraq, as I just mentioned. Is civilian casualties increasingly going to be a major media issue? In conflicts where you don't have two standing armies shooting at each other?
THOMAS RICKS, REPORTER, "THE WASHINGTON POST": I think it will be. But I think civilian casualties are also part of the battlefield play for both sides here. One of the things that is going on, according to some U.S. military analysts, is that Israel purposely has left pockets of Hezbollah rockets in Lebanon, because as long as they're being rocketed, they can continue to have a sort of moral equivalency in their operations in Lebanon.
KURTZ: Hold on, you're suggesting that Israel has deliberately allowed Hezbollah to retain some of it's fire power, essentially for PR purposes, because having Israeli civilians killed helps them in the public relations war here?
RICKS: Yes, that's what military analysts have told me.
KURTZ: That's an extraordinary testament to the notion that having people on your own side killed actually works to your benefit in that nobody wants to see your own citizens killed but it works to your benefit in terms of the battle of perceptions here.
RICKS: Exactly. It helps you with the moral high ground problem, because you know your operations in Lebanon are going to be killing civilians as well. (August 6, 2007)
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Then, after Ricks was highly criticized for making these statements, he wrote this letter to the Washington Post Ombudsman:
Ugh. I wish I hadn’t. I’ll attach a transcript at the end. What I said was accurate: that in an off-the-record conversation with military analysts, a couple had suggested that the Israeli strategy involved leaving Hezbellah 'rocket pockets' in place so as to shape public perceptions and give their forces more freedom of maneuver in Lebanon. Such a strategy might be considered logical and even moral, in that while suffering some short-term casualties, it would provide more protection for more Israelis in the long run.
But I've since heard from some smart, well-informed people that while such a strategy might be logical, that the Israeli public just wouldn't stand for it. And they were pretty dismayed that I has passed on the thought.
My comments were based on a long conversation I had with a senior Israeli official a couple of years ago …
Best
Tom -----
Note that there is some discrepancy between his stating that it was US military analysts who told him the information, and in the letter he says it was during "a long conversation I had with a senior Israeli official a couple of years ago."
Being highly cautious of these type of conspiratorial discussions (not that I don't believe things like this go on, but I think we need to be very careful in making sure that there is some substantial evidence when assessing something of this sort, and definitely to bring out Occam's Razor), I didn't pay too much attention to it at the time, but I do find it interesting when considered with Schiff's article today:
------ How the IDF blew chance to destroy short-range rockets By Ze'ev Schiff
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/757743.html
A large number of the short-range rockets fired at Israel from southern Lebanon were launched from permanent positions, the Israel Air Force discovered by chance toward the end of the war. The discovery was made after an air strike burned away vegetation, revealing a dug-in Katyusha position on a permanent launch pad. Additional permanent positions were subsequently discovered.
If the tactical intelligence of the Northern Command was unaware of the existence of hundreds of permanent short-range rocket launching positions in South Lebanon, then this is a major intelligence failure. If the Northern Command knew of them and did not pass on detailed information to the air force, then this is a serious failure in the management of the war.
Short-range rockets were one of the biggest problems in Hezbollah's war of attrition against Israeli civilians. The size of these rockets - sometimes small enough to be carried on the back of a donkey, on a motorcycle or by one or two men - made then difficult to pinpoint.
Hezbollah managed to fire a large number of Katyushas during the war - as many as 240 in one day toward the end of the fighting. The rockets, stored near the launch points in underground shelters or houses, were usually aimed with a direction and trajectory precalculated to hit a specific target in Israel. They were usually set up in orchards by arrangement with the grove owners, who were paid by Hezbollah.
The two-by-three-meter positions consisted of a hydraulic launch pad in a lined pit. The pad could be raised to fire the 122-mm rockets from a launcher at its center, and then lowered and camouflaged with vegetation. The farmers received instructions by cell phone regarding the number of rockets to launch and in what direction and range. They were often provided with thermal blankets to cover the position in order to keep IAF aircraft from detecting the post-shooting heat signature.
If the IAF had had details regarding the permanent positions of these short-range rockets, it is reasonable to assume the results of the struggle against them would have been different at the end of the fighting.
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I wouldn't take this too far, but I think it is worth bringing up and put it out there for contemplation/discussion. Without any more evidence, it is just conjecture obviously, but interesting nonetheless.
Bryan