The Dawn, Pakistan
A litany of disasters
By Irfan Husain
ADD yet another feather to the army's cap: the still- unexplained killing of a brave and honourable man. Over the years, I might have opposed many of the things that Nawab Akbar Bugti stood for. But I have defended his right to demand a just settlement for his province.
Apart from his occasional (and brief) stints in government, Bugti was a thorn in the side of many governments. His articulate attacks and his colourful personality made him a figure foreign journalists loved to interview. And what he said about our leaders did not exactly flatter them. So when the current bout of violence was triggered in Balochistan, it was natural that he should become its most vocal and visible symbol.
But this is in no sense Nawab Bugti's political obituary: my aim is to discuss what his brutal end might mean for the country, and the role the army has played in other disasters this country has suffered. After nearly seven years of experience in politics, you might think President Musharraf would have learned the ropes by now. Unfortunately, he continues to think and act like the soldier that he is. While this might have been an asset on the battlefield or in the barracks, it's a disaster in the role he has chosen to play after staging his coup in
1999.
This should come as no surprise as he has never wasted any opportunity to express his contempt for politicians. When the situation in Balochistan began to deteriorate, Musharraf threatened to "sort them out so fast, they wouldn't know what hit them". He also made it clear "this was not 1974", a reference to the earlier uprising in the province. This then was his mindset. Although cooler heads persuaded him to try the political route, he was never convinced that negotiations were a
proper substitute for army action.
But this is what our military academies teach young cadets. Problems are analysed, and solutions found, in terms of clear objectives and chain of command. In politics, factors like egos, personalities and pride come into play. To get from point A to point B, you often have to take a long detour via point C. More often than not, you get only half of what you wanted, and not losing can count as a victory. Unfortunately, these are skills that no military academy teaches. Although, given the frequency of army takeovers in Pakistan, perhaps they should.
Looking back at what successive army dictators have bequeathed us, we can only marvel at the fact that somehow, Pakistan is still in existence. The self-appointed field marshal Ayub Khan tossed the 1956 constitution into the rubbish bin, thus ensuring that East Pakistan would go its own way, and then expedited the process by taking the country to war against India in 1965. His successor, Yahya Khan, duly presided over the break- up of Pakistan in 1971.
Gen Zia then proceeded to initiate an Afghan policy that flooded the country with millions of Afghan refugees, hundreds of thousands of weapons, and tons of heroin. Earlier, he directed the judicial murder of an elected prime minister. And to add to this list of achievements, he financed the creation of the sectarian militias that are creating such havoc today, not just in Pakistan, but around the world.
Compared to his illustrious predecessors, Musharraf has not (yet) inflicted the kind of harm they did. But it's early days still: he wants at least another five years in office, and who knows what kind of legacy he will leave behind. And by eliminating secular politicians from the field, he has virtually ensured the dominance of the religious right. It is too early to tell what impact his mishandling of Balochistan, and the assassination of Akbar Bugti will have on the unity of Pakistan. But clearly, this death will haunt us long after Musharraf has departed.
Despite this long list of political and military fiascos Pakistani dictators are responsible for, it is politicians who get blamed for the country's woes. It is certainly true that they have much to answer for. But their sins of omission and commission pale into insignificance when compared to what our generals have done to us over the years.
While we can hold politicians accountable for personal corruption and gross incompetence from time to time, they are not guilty of formulating our disastrous Afghan and Kashmir policies, leave alone the wars of 1965 and 1971, or the disastrous Kargil misadventure. And nor were they in power at the time of the civil war in East Pakistan. And as we know all too well, the incidence of corruption does not fall under military regimes: it just doesn't get the same coverage in the media.
Thus, any reasonably accurate balance sheet would show that our dictators have not only been in power far longer, but have also cost us far more in blood and treasure than our politicians. But nevertheless, Pakistan is full of educated, well-placed people who shudder at the prospect of the unlikely return of democracy. Any conversation on the subject begins and ends with a shrill denunciation of the two Bhuttos who governed Pakistan, albeit briefly, as well as of Nawaz Sharif.
The point to consider here is that for all their faults, they would never have led us into the disasters our generals have. It is true that Nawaz Sharif was prime minister when Kargil was launched. But all the indications are that he was misled about the scale and implications of the attack. We can argue that being prime minister, it should have been his business to find out more. But for those of us who are aware of the power of the military establishment in Pakistan, it is clear that even when an elected leader is in power, too often it is GHQ that calls the shots. This is especially true for Kashmir, Afghanistan and India.
If ever proof was required that military intelligence is a contradiction in terms, the government's handling of the Bugti killing should be sufficient. Initially, we were told that the army had no idea that he was in the cave where he died. Now the head of the ISPR, no less, is talking about a "mysterious explosion" that caused the cave to collapse after officers entered to "negotiate" with Bugti.
But these are mere footnotes in what I fear is going to be a long and bloody chapter in our short but violent history.