Gulf Times (Qatar) September 8, 2006 Moscow will benefit from nuclear crisis By Oxford Analytica
Russia’s position in the stand-off with Iran will continue to gain importance as the possibility increases that sanctions will be imposed on Tehran. Moscow is unlikely to behave proactively, seeking to strike a delicate balance between the international community and Iran in order to emerge as a mediator in the event that the crisis escalates.
ATTEMPTS by Western diplomats to convince Moscow of the threat posed by a nuclear Iran have been largely unsuccessful. This is because the Kremlin considers the danger to be less dramatic for Russia than the United States, Western Europe and Israel.
Russian mainstream politicians and military strategists believe that the crisis over Iran is the result of Washington’s ill-conceived policies: consistent and strong support for Israel; military invasion of Iraq; and an archaic and inflexible policy towards Iran, predicated on the proclaimed desire to overthrow the country’s Islamic regime.
Russian analysts also argue that Washington is more critical of Iran for its record of religious extremism and lack of democracy than it is of other states in the region where such phenomena are even more apparent.
In the light of this assessment, Russia is reluctant to lend the United States and its close allies unequivocal support in overcoming this "self-inflicted trouble". At the same time, Russia’s co-operation with Iran on the construction of a nuclear reactor at Bushehr, its arms sales and attempts to co-ordinate gas sales policies provide sufficient incentives for Moscow not to jeopardise its bilateral relations with Tehran.
The Kremlin is aware of Tehran’s tactical goal of splitting the UN Security Council (UNSC) and capitalising on disagreements between the negotiating parties.
Russian leaders were annoyed when, late last year, Iran rejected the idea of a Moscow-proposed joint venture on uranium enrichment. In response, Russia toughened its approach as it became convinced that Tehran would not scrap its uranium enrichment capacity.
In July, following Iran’s announcement that it would delay until late August its response to the proposal by the permanent five UNSC members plus Germany, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov endorsed the idea of returning the nuclear dossier to the Security Council. The subsequent passage of Resolution 1696, demanding that Tehran suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities before August 31, was undertaken with Russia’s support.
Russia has a three-step approach with regard to Iran’s nuclear future, which reflects its priorities:
* Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons. President Vladimir Putin has been unambiguous on this point, whatever his tactical calculations.
* Even if Iran is in the process of acquiring nuclear weapons, force must not be used against it. The military establishment has stipulated this position, suggesting that, strategically, a (presumably US-led) military offensive against Iran would leave Russia worse off than a nuclear-armed Iran.
* Russia should prevent the UN Security Council from ruling that Iran’s transgressions are serious enough to warrant the use of force in accordance with Article 42 of the UN Charter. Both Lavrov and the Russian Ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, have consistently defended this point in all public statements.
Moscow is likely to benefit from the unfolding crisis with Iran; however, the extent to which it does so will depend on the course of events:
* The best scenario for Russia would be if Iran were to agree to suspend enrichment as a result of negotiations in which Russia had played an important role and, ideally, had obtained concessions on other issues, such as Russia’s WTO membership. Potentially, the West has more to offer Russia than Iran, and siding with the United States and EU carries the advantage of appearing to stand with the most developed countries in the world. However, taking a more proactive bargaining stance in the crisis would require stronger leverage than Russia currently has over Iran. The Kremlin has made it clear that it would not put the completion of the Bushehr reactor into question. Yet, apart from Bushehr, Russia has no substantial means of influence as far as Iran is concerned.
* The second best scenario for Russia would be to remain a relatively passive observer, while Iran develops its enrichment capacity, and other powers set deadlines and seek to deliver on their warnings. Russia could then offer its good offices as a mediator. Moscow’s current fairly passive stance is not seen as contrary to national interests because, from the security point of view, a nuclear-armed Iran poses less of a threat to Moscow than it does to Washington, London or Paris. It is therefore willing to let other powers pressure Iran and create opportunities for Moscow to emerge as a negotiator when circumstances permit.
* The worst-case scenario for Russia would be a military offensive against Iran. This would have unpredictable consequences for Eurasian security. Yet even then, Russia will not be exposed to greater risks than the United States, Western Europe or the Middle East. Before instability spills over into Russia, it would engulf Iraq, Afghanistan and the South Caucasus. The latter, in particular, will disrupt supplies of oil to international markets through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which has been operational since mid-summer.
Even this worst-case scenario would bring some advantages. A military offensive against Iran would provoke a sharp rise in oil prices, which will benefit Russia. Moreover, an eruption of a large-scale military crisis is unlikely to lead to a quick victory for the United States and its allies. This would increase Russia’s chances of emerging as a high-profile mediator.
Indeed, its bid to negotiate is more likely to be successful in such circumstances than it would be should the crisis drag on and result in only low-key hostilities. Nevertheless, in UN Security Council debates, Russia will continue to oppose the military option.
In an effort to appear in line with the international community on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, Moscow might – after some public display of resistance endorse a UN resolution imposing limited economic sanctions on Tehran. Any such sanctions would profit Russia, as they would most likely lead to an increase in energy prices.
Moscow might even concede to a resolution that, in principle, envisaged the use of force at some point in the future should Iran refuse to stop its enrichment programme. However, it will not endorse a resolution that condemns Iran’s non-compliance and paves the way for military action. If Russia becomes the last key UN Security Council member to oppose the military option, it will feel that it has strong grounds to exercise its right of veto.
Russia will seek to steer a careful course on dealing with Iran, avoiding too active a role in any coercive diplomacy conducted by the West but co-operating enough to be seen as a responsible member of the international community. It will oppose the military option, but its desire to counter Tehran’s tactics and the profit it could reap from rising oil prices would push its position closer to that of other UN Security Council members should the United States insist that they impose economic sanctions. –
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