It's gone? Try the Google cache of it, then: <http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:pTkbDpUFjhUJ:www.cssaame.ilstu.edu/issues/V17-2/VAL.pdf+%22Review+Essay:+Nativism,+Orientalism+and+the+Left%22&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1>.
Moghadam's conclusion (pp. 124-125):
<blockquote>Concluding Thoughts: Can there be a "Good" Nativism?
In my 1987 New Left Review article on the left and the revolution, I emphasized the left's populism and the intersection of its anti-imperialist discourse with the Islamic populism of the clerical-dominated regime. But I ended the article by expressing the hope that a new discourse and politics would arise: ". . . it will be possible for the Left to re-enter the political arena and to define an Iranian practice, an Iranian idiom, an Iranian road to socialism."
Should all nativism be regarded as a negativity? If nativism, especially in its Third World variety, is viewed as a strategy of self-renewal and an essential component of modern nationalist discourses, then it could be viewed sympathetically. And if it includes strategies such as appropriation of historical figures and terms towards the formulation of broad concepts of equality, nation-hood, and justice (say, Mazdak in the Iranian case, or Sandino in the Nicaraguan case), then this too could be a positive rather than a negative form of nativism. One may even argue that such local intellectual endeavors are inevitable, linked as they are to geopolitical or global processes, including neo-colonialist intrusions. In his book on discourse and ideology in Japanese nativism, Harootunian shows how as a reaction to the pervasive influence of Chinese culture on Japan, nativists began in the late-18th century and throughout the 19th century to forge a Japanese sense of difference and identity grounded in folk tradition, agricultural values, and ancient Japanese culture. In his book he treats nativism as a discourse and shows how it functioned ideologically in Japan. However -- and this is where the analogy to Iran is relevant -- Harootunian shows "how in time nativism, conceived as a defense of difference, itself became the site of sameness. With the proclamation of Japanese identity in the name of cultural unity and ethnic homogeneity, what had begun as a visible discourse on the social was transmuted into an invisible ideology devoted to securing a consensual order."
Nativism, therefore, occurs in response or reaction to foreign domination and cultural imperialism, often in the context of nationalism or nation-building, and as an effort to forge an "authentic" or indigenous identity. It represents an attempt by intellectuals who are engaging with Western philosophy and foreign powers to ground themselves in their own history and culture. In and of itself, this is not objectionable and is probably necessary. Indeed, discourses of equality, human rights, and justice are strengthened when grounded in culture and history and shown to be truly universal. Nativism is problematical when it becomes a hegemonic discourse that denies multiple interpretations of the authentic, the indigenous, and the good; or when its "other-ing" becomes dichotomous, binary, and extreme; or when it insists on particularity and difference (as in the case of the Islamic Republic).
Seen in this light, the intellectual enterprise represented by some of the writers Boroujerdi mentions may be regarded as necessary and positive. Indeed, Boroujerdi's sympathetic reading of Soroush would suggest that he, too, is cognizant of the necessity and legitimacy of theorizing and philosophizing that is grounded in historical, cultural, and even religious idioms. Of course, what is interesting about Soroush is that he engages in a critique of fegh-e sonnati armed with knowledge of Islamic theology and Western philosophical thought; moreover, his Islamic modernism is an important counterweight to the hegemony of the "other-ing" Islamic nativists. What is disconcerting, however, is Soroush's apparent avoidance of the topic of women's position in Islam, or in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
What I am suggesting -- albeit somewhat tentatively -- is that perhaps we cannot avoid nativism and should not condemn it. Perhaps, in the end, the ingredients for a secular discourse and a pluralist culture -- in an Iranian idiom that engages with and indeed borrows from Western philosophy -- i.e., in the contributions of, inter alia, Al-e Ahmad, the Tudeh Party, Abdolkarim Soroush, and Shahla Sherkat. As far as I can discern, there is some nativism in them all, in the positive sense.
We should, however, also be able to recognize and condemn distorted discourses that seek to obliterate others, whether the "others" be dissidents, minorities, or the West. And we should be vigorously critical of discourses -- nativist or otherwise -- that ignore "the woman question" and neglect the scholarship and contributions of women.</blockquote>
That's a decent conclusion.
One thing that neither Mehrzad Boroujerdi ("Three Philosophical Debates in Post-Revolutionary Iran," <http://www.seraj.org/borouj.htm>) nor Moghadam (who reviews Boroujerdi's Iranian Intellectuals and the West in Nativism, Orientalism and the Left") addresses in these essays, however, is discourse on political economy. IMHO, Iran needs less a debate between Popperians and Heideggerians than a debate on what kind of political economy Iran should have and what roles women and other subordinated groups play in it.
Nativism and its other Europhilia may predominate in philosophy in Iran, but most of Iran's economists who occupy top political positions, it seems to me, have been ironically trained in the United States: e.g.,
Ebrahim Sheibany, Governor of the Central Bank, has a Ph.D. from Indiana University;
Mohammadreza Shojaeddini, Vice Governor of the Central Bank on Administrative & Training Affairs, has a Ph.D. from Iowa State University and was an advisor to the IMF Director from 1998 to 2001;
Akbar Komijani, Vice Governor on Economic Affairs, has a Ph.D. from University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee;
Mohammad Jafar Mojarrad, Vice Governor on Foreign Exchange Affairs, has a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania;
Parviz Dawoodi, "appointed as the official in charge of implementing Article 44 of the Constitution," i.e., privatization ("First VP Responsible for Execution of Article 44," Fars News Agency, 9 July 2006, <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8504160277>), received his Ph.D. from the University of Iowa in 1981.
With that kind of educational backgrounds of Iran's top economists, I am afraid that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will have a hard time combating the deleterious influence of liberal economy in Iran*.
Ahmadinejad will visit Cuba and Venezuela next week:
<blockquote> President Ahmadinejad to visit Latin America shortly Madrid, Sept 9, IRNA
Iran-President-Latin America President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will pay visits to two Latin American countries, Cuba and Venezuela, next week.
On the first leg of his tour, Ahmadinejad will visit Havana on Thursday to attend the 14th summit of Non-Aligned Movement meeting.
The movement was established in 1961 and now includes 116 member states.
According to the Cuban official reports, more than 100 member countries have accepted to attend the summit. 34 other countries, regional and international bodies will participate in the meeting as guests.
The summit meeting will last for two days.
Presidents of Iran, South Africa, Pakistan, Algeria, Venezuela, Indonesia, Bolivia and prime ministers of India, Malaysia as well as Qatari emir have declared their readiness to participate in the summit, so far.
President Ahmadinejad will then leave for Caracas, capital of Venezuela, to sign many bilateral cooperation agreements.
It would be the first trip of President Ahmadinejad to Latin America after taking office last September.
1391/1771 <http://www.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-22/0609099593192916.htm></blockquote>
I hope that he will meet Cuban and Venezuelan economists.
* "'A student must yell against liberal thoughts and the liberal economy. A student must ask why a secular teacher gives low marks to a student that does not have the same ideas as him,' he [Ahmadinejad] said" (Hiedeh Farmani, "Ahmadinejad Vows to Rid Schools of Liberal Influence," AFP, 5 September 2006, <http://www.metimes.com/articles/normal.php?StoryID=20060905-073114-2591r>). -- Yoshie <http://montages.blogspot.com/> <http://mrzine.org> <http://monthlyreview.org/>