The relationship between the two sides is the pivotal one in Iraq, on which the fate of the occupation has depended for some time. It can best be described as a standoff. Since the battle of Najaf against the Americans, the Sadrists have risen to become the strongest political and military force in Iraq, but they are not strong enough to expel the Americans by themselves, and the sectarian divide in Iraq has prevented the formation of a united front with the Sunni militias resisting the occupation.
The US, for its part, appears to recognize it can't crush the Mahdi army militarily, but is unwilling to promote a political solution which would effectively hand power to the Iraqi counterpart of Hezbollah. The al-Maliki government, which was brought to power by the Sadrist bloc in the Iraqi parliament and depends on it for continued support, is beset by conflicting pressures from both sides.
The latest US military operation to "secure Baghdad", mostly a PR exercise for the Bush administration to show "progress", reflects the hesitations of the US and Iraqi governments towards the Sadrists. Raids on Sadr City have been feeble and halting, and the Maliki government, which recently provided troops for a combined sweep with the Americans, bizarrely denounced the raid the next day.
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Sadr, a Question Mark Etched in Black
Response to Shiite Cleric's Evolving Role Has Become a Core Challenge for U.S. in Iraq
By Sudarsan Raghavan and Ellen Knickmeyer Washington Post Foreign Service Monday, September 11, 2006; A10
NAJAF, Iraq -- A mother's sad wail pierced the stillness of the Cemetery of the Martyrs, where green and black resistance flags fluttered over the graves of hundreds of Shiite Muslim militiamen. Kneeling on the hot, chalk-like dirt, Abbas Sabah, 17, didn't stir. His mind was focused on his brother Anwar, 29, killed in a clash with U.S. troops, like many of the dead here. He poured water on Anwar's gravestone and gently wiped it clean.
"We want vengeance," said Sabah, who was dressed in the black uniform of the Mahdi Army, the militia of anti-U.S. cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. "I want to fight or die for the cause."
In another neighborhood, Mustafa Yaqoubi, a top Sadr deputy who also lost a brother in a battle with U.S. soldiers, was waging a different kind of war.
"We have entered a political game," said Yaqoubi, who wore a black turban signifying his descent from the prophet Muhammad. "We entered this government to use it as a weapon to make pressure on the occupiers."
Sabah and Yaqoubi embody the dilemma Sadr poses for the Bush administration and Iraq's fragile government. Though Sadr and his followers hold more seats in Iraq's parliament than any other faction, their attitude toward the U.S.-led occupation remains belligerent. They participate in government, but they remain outsiders, keenly aware that their authority is derived from their independence and their opposition to the occupation.
The ongoing evolution of Sadr from populist cleric to guerrilla leader to political kingmaker is emerging as a core challenge to U.S. visions of stability in Iraq. He's a question mark that many analysts say needs to be dealt with immediately and delicately.
"Sadr is a work in progress," said Phebe Marr, a leading expert on Iraqi politics. "He is volatile, an opportunist and dangerous. But he is also popular and has grass-roots support among an important slice of the population. He and his movement need to be dealt with carefully and skillfully before he can take permanent root.
"He is too powerful now to take him on frontally."
Senior U.S. military officials are starting to share this view. Once dismissed by Bush administration officials and U.S. generals as irrelevant to Iraq's future, Sadr is increasingly seen as a man who has the power to either implode Iraq or keep it together, even as his militia continues to defy the authority of the Iraqi government and its U.S. backers. As sectarian violence ravages Baghdad and other parts of the country, Sunni Muslims accuse Sadr's Mahdi Army of operating death squads under the mantle of Islam.
"There's not a military solution in my view to Moqtada al-Sadr," a senior coalition official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "We may be a bit uncomfortable with his position as a legitimate political figure, but he is a legitimate player."
It's a remarkable shift for two enemies whose forces are the most powerful in Iraq and fought some of the deadliest battles since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. But in the fourth year of the occupation, the nature of the Iraqi resistance has changed as politics, religion and war have melded. The guerrilla fighters now control key ministries and derive legitimacy as much from the polls as they do from the battlefield.
Publicly, U.S. officials have declared the Mahdi Army and other militias the biggest threat to Iraq's stability. Privately, their views are now more nuanced.
"We've got to be careful that we don't demonize Jaish al-Mahdi, because look at the polls," the senior coalition official said, using the Arabic name for the Mahdi Army. "Moqtada al-Sadr himself is an enormously popular figure. Why? Because he's thumbing his nose at the coalition. So we do have to be careful that we don't demonize him."
Today, Sadr controls 30 seats in the Iraqi parliament and four ministries. All of Sadr's portfolios revolve around providing key services, such as health and transportation. They give him the ability to funnel resources to supportive constituents and boost his popular base. During the protracted negotiations over who would become prime minister after elections in January, Sadr reluctantly supported Nouri al-Maliki, also a Shiite, to head the government.
"Sadr presents a complex problem," said Vali Nasr, an expert on political Islam with the Council on Foreign Relations. "It is difficult dealing with him politically and militarily without undermining Maliki's government that relies on him."
That predicament was underscored last month when Iraqi soldiers and American military advisers raided Sadr City, the vast slum that is Sadr's Baghdad stronghold, and engaged in a two-hour gun battle. Maliki went on local television the next day to denounce the operation as hindering efforts at national reconciliation, promising Iraqis, "This won't happen again."
The U.S. military, too, has shied away from publicly declaring Sadr and his Mahdi Army a threat to Iraq's stability. But American diplomats have identified Sadr as a threat to the country and have made no overtures to him. In March, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad said in an interview that the United States has had no face-to-face dealings with the cleric.
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Full: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/10/AR2006091000953.html