<html> <head> <style> P { margin:0px; padding:0px } body { FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY:Tahoma } </style> </head> <body><div style="text-align: left;">boddi satva wrote: </div> >Forget what *I* think Sharia is, look at the sources. It's a complex question, given various >weightings of Koran and Hadith, but the Koran has extensive and relatively detailed legal >and ethical writings and these are the basis of Sharia. These are so intensely disputed that it is facile and glib to try to deduce a single kind of Islamist polity from them.  They have, in fact, fairly little to say about how a modern society should run, hence the practise of itjihad, hence the vast disparities between different Islamist projects. Evidently, what you think it is informs your claims here. Further: >The first real example of Islamic Revolution was in Iran. It began in 1963 when Ayatollah >Khomeini made a ruling that the Shah was not a legitimate part of the expression of Sharia in >Iranian law. He asserted what is common to all Islamic Republics - that Sharia is a legal >sub-Constitution beneath the Constitutions of Islamic states and that all Constitutions in Islamic >nations get their legitimacy from Sharia. This was a political argument that expressed itself in the language of theology: Ayatollah Naraqi had already stipulated a version of the shari'a that legitimised the Shah, and Khomeini simply reformulated it to say that the Shah was not a legitimate expression of it.  It was not then a programme for a comprehensive Islamist society. >Also many Islamists cast their movement in terms of the French Revolution and Martin Luther. >But that does not make Islamism a modern, enlightenment or democratic movement. This rests on a facile conflation of modernity with democracy, and also a serious confusion about what Enlightenment entailed (you might consider that there is a vast difference between Spinoza and Descartes).  Islamism *can* be democratic, given the examples I have cited.  It has often been democratic *and* illiberal, but sometimes democratic and liberal or revolutionary-left (as per Hanafi and MEK). >All Muslims have the personal responsibility to read the Koran and live by its edicts as written. >Shiites have a clergy which Muslims are permitted to "imitate" because they themselves judge >this clergy to be learned in Koran and Hadith, but Muslims also have the responsibility to stop >imitating or following any Imam whom they find to be preaching things contrary to the Koran. Hence a strong basis for religious believers who wish to pursue democracy and use their independent reasoning. >Even in the Koran itself there is a division of questions which should be decided in a religious >or a practical way. But what is unquestionable is that the Koran is the basis of supreme juridical >authority. Among Shiites there is a great deal of discussion as to what level of subjugation to the >clerics is appropriate. However, the Iranian Revolution was the acceptance of the maximum >authority of the mullahs. The IR was not what you say it was, but I'll come back to this.  It is precisely true as I indicate that the theorising of clerics has been the byproduct of politica-military power, and has in all previous Islamic societies been massively constrained by the superordinate power of effectively monarchical rulers.  The fact of the matter is, if Islamic law had been permitted in those societies, the result would have been a much more liberal and less punitive society, since the burden of proof required by the jurists was extremely high.  (I suggest Zubaida's 'Islam, the People and the State' for more on this discussion). >It has, of course, been the job of Muslim clerics to explain how the secular behavior of their >military and political leaders was Koranically acceptable. But that is EXACTLY what Khomeini >sought to END. Khomeini refused to whitewash the Shah's power and THAT is what made him >an Islamic Revolutionary. Islam allows muslims to get rich and powerful and all kinds of things, but >it always asserts the supreme juridical authority of the Prophet (PBUH) Khomeini might well have sought this, but he neither had the agreement of fellow revolutionaries, clerical or otherwise, nor was he very successful.  There is no getting away from the constraints of actually existing society.  Take, for instance, the Council of Guardians: it could not be more straightforwardly a means of securing the interests of the bazaari class against the democratic organs of the state - specifically turning back land reforms and nationalisations.  The Expediency Council was the ultimate and startling concession to this reality: Khomeini declared that the needs of the Islamic *state* outweighed those of Islamic *law*, even such basic obligations as prayer. The revised constitution that later ensued dramatically reduced the religious authority of the faqih, which none of the main Ayatollahs had accepted. As for his fellow revolutionaries.  Khomeini had indicated that he and his clerics would not rule directly, and kept such phrases as ‘Islamic Government’ out of circulation – they never before or shortly after coming to power referred to vilayet e-faqih. Abdolhasan Bani Sadr, an early ally of Khomeini, said that even privately Khomenei had renounced ideas.  Khomeini did embed the principle of vilayet-e faqih in the consitution, but there was much criticism of it from his supporters, particularly in 1983, after which term disappeared.  (See Nikki Keddie's recent book on 'Modern Iran' for a good analysis here). But then, as Evard Abrahamian argues, (quoted in Chris Harman's The Prophet and the Proletariat), Khomeini's movement was based on "ideological adaptability and intellectual flexibility, with political protests against the established order, and with socio-economic issues that fuel mass opposition to the status quo". The original draft for the constitution, by the way, was far more democratic than the final constitution. It did not mention the vilayet-e faqih, for instance, and gave no formal power to clergy beyond similar constitutional commission to what proposed in 1906-7. Khomeini would have submitted this to referendum, but both secular and religious groups pushed for further discussion – which in fact produced a much less democratic constitution. An 'Assembly of Experts' re-drafted constitution, including vilayet e-faqih. Article 4 says faqih has divine authority to rule and only answerable to God – later articles list those powers, such as control of army and Pasdaran, right to disqualify presidential candidates; power of majles restricted by Guardian Council (six ulama appointed by faqih, six jurists appointed by majles from a list prepared by supreme judicial council which was appointed by faqih. Khomeini was made faqih for life. Policies that the left had pushed for, such as general protections for citizens rights, free education up to middle school, provisions for eradication of poverty, prevention of foreign domination were also included. Thus, the ups and downs of the VEQ reflected the political struggles, but also the class dynamics of Iranian society: the bazaaries had no interest in yet another monarch, and the Iranian workers had to be diverted into an anti-imperialist struggle in order to secure their acquiescence in even the formalisation of Khomeini's claim to rule as faqih.  In this way, your citation of the VEQ relies on taking it fully at its word, rather than examining the actual context of Iranian history, specifically during the IR and after.  I tell you there is a dualism at the heart of the state, and cite a few decent sources, and you once more tell me what the VEQ is *supposed* to mean.  We both know what it is supposed to entail at root: the question is, what happened to it? >This is misleading. The supreme textual basis for Islamism is Sharia. There is just no question about that. So it is misleading to state the fact that the Quran and the Prophetic Tradition avail themselves to multiple interpretations?  Or it is misleading not to state the obvious as you did? >But what all Islamists and especially Al-Sadr believe and are saying is that THEY are the rightful leaders >because THEY and not the present legal authorities are legitimized by SHARIA. With Al-Sadr there's no >question of that as he is an adherent to the Khomeini line of reasoning on the Vilayat-i Faqih. Sadr is not an Islamist in any useable sense of the term, so I'm at a loss to understand why you are being so strident about a topic on which you appear to be all at sea.  I recommend Faleh A Jabar, 'The Shiite Movement  in Iraq', 2002, for a proper assessment of the Shiite political currents in Iraq.  >There is not a "nominal" commitment to the restoration of the caliphate or, to be inclusive, the Ulema. Islamism >is the re-affirmation of the power of the Ulema or what one might conceivably call the new Ulema. Islamism is >the idea that, without the Ulema, a government cannot govern Muslims. You're muddling two things: one a commitment to government in accordance with the Quran and the Prophetic Tradition; the other a commitment in some quarters to revive the historical Caliphate.  Shedding that confusion, we are once more in the territory of the obvious. >And that's the problem. Since Islamism is inseparable from the idea of the supremacy of Sharia and the Ulema, >it MUST be reactionary. The problem for you is that you accept an essentialist interpretation of the shari'a, and do not even acknowledge the anti-reactionary, leftist currents in political Islam.  In other words, cleaving to an unmaterialist account of Political Islam, you credit God with more power on earth than even the Islamists have in practise. >Unless Islam develops a new movement of Ulema, it will be very difficult if not completely impossible for islamism >to move Muslims leftwards. And I doubt VERY much that Marxists are going to have an influence on Muslim clerics. >I suppose it's worth a try, but let's be rational here and accept the facts as they are, not as we would like them to be. The last sentence of yours reverberates with the sound of pots and kettles.  I don't know about Islamism moving Muslims leftwards.  I tend to think the relationship is the converse: the left-radicalisation of Muslims has produced leftist currents in Political Islam.  We in the British antiwar movement have some experience of working with Muslim clerics and also with those who adhere to an integralist version of Political Islam - many of them became members of the new socialist coalition, Respect.  That coalition is as progressive as you could ever wish on social issues like womens' rights, abortion, gay rights and so on.  It is also economically radical as well as being strongly anti-imperialist and pro-Palestine.  Strange to relate, this has been quite a successful enterprise: which goes to show that if you don't assume what Muslims and Islamists can and cannot be, you might be pleasantly surprised by the results. <hr />Be one of the first to try <a href='http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d' target='_new'>Windows Live Mail.</a></body> </html>