Some of this is pretty hilarious coming from a guy who thinks the greatest enemy of the United States is the Russian Orthodox Church.
--- joanna <123hop at comcast.net> wrote:
>
>
> http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/001916.php
>
> SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITEE TESTIMONY --
> ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
>
> February 1, 2007
>
> Mr. Chairman:
>
> Your hearings come at a critical juncture in the
> U.S. war of choice in
> Iraq, and I commend you and Senator Lugar for
> scheduling them.
>
> It is time for the White House to come to terms with
> two central realities:
>
> 1. The war in Iraq is a historic, strategic, and
> moral calamity. Undertaken
> under false assumptions, it is undermining America's
> global legitimacy. Its
> collateral civilian casualties as well as some
> abuses are tarnishing
> America's moral credentials. Driven by Manichean
> impulses and imperial
> hubris, it is intensifying regional instability.
>
> 2. Only a political strategy that is historically
> relevant rather than
> reminiscent of colonial tutelage can provide the
> needed framework for a
> tolerable resolution of both the war in Iraq and the
> intensifying regional
> tensions.
>
> If the United States continues to be bogged down in
> a protracted bloody
> involvement in Iraq, the final destination on this
> downhill track is likely
> to be a head-on conflict with Iran and with much of
> the world of Islam at
> large. A plausible scenario for a military collision
> with Iran involves
> Iraqi failure to meet the benchmarks; followed by
> accusations of Iranian
> responsibility for the failure; then by some
> provocation in Iraq or a
> terrorist act in the U.S. blamed on Iran;
> culminating in a "defensive" U.S.
> military action against Iran that plunges a lonely
> America into a spreading
> and deepening quagmire eventually ranging across
> Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan,
> and Pakistan.
>
> A mythical historical narrative to justify the case
> for such a protracted
> and potentially expanding war is already being
> articulated. Initially
> justified by false claims about WMD's in Iraq, the
> war is now being
> redefined as the "decisive ideological struggle" of
> our time, reminiscent
> of the earlier collisions with Nazism and Stalinism.
> In that context,
> Islamist extremism and al Qaeda are presented as the
> equivalents of the
> threat posed by Nazi Germany and then Soviet Russia,
> and 9/11 as the
> equivalent of the Pearl Harbor attack which
> precipitated America's
> involvement in World War II.
>
> This simplistic and demagogic narrative overlooks
> the fact that Nazism was
> based on the military power of the industrially most
> advanced European
> state; and that Stalinism was able to mobilize not
> only the resources of
> the victorious and militarily powerful Soviet Union
> but also had worldwide
> appeal through its Marxist doctrine. In contrast,
> most Muslims are not
> embracing Islamic fundamentalism; al Qaeda is an
> isolated fundamentalist
> Islamist aberration; most Iraqis are engaged in
> strife because the American
> occupation of Iraq destroyed the Iraqi state; while
> Iran -- though gaining
> in regional influence -- is itself politically
> divided, economically and
> militarily weak. To argue that America is already at
> war in the region with
> a wider Islamic threat, of which Iran is the
> epicenter, is to promote a
> self-fulfilling prophecy.
>
> Deplorably, the Administration's foreign policy in
> the Middle East region
> has lately relied almost entirely on such
> sloganeering. Vague and
> inflammatory talk about "a new strategic context"
> which is based on
> "clarity" and which prompts "the birth pangs of a
> new Middle East" is
> breeding intensifying anti-Americanism and is
> increasing the danger of a
> long-term collision between the United States and
> the Islamic world. Those
> in charge of U.S. diplomacy have also adopted a
> posture of moralistic
> self-ostracism toward Iran strongly reminiscent of
> John Foster Dulles's
> attitude of the early 1950's toward Chinese
> Communist leaders (resulting
> among other things in the well-known episode of the
> refused handshake). It
> took some two decades and a half before another
> Republican president was
> finally able to undo that legacy.
>
> One should note here also that practically no
> country in the world shares
> the Manichean delusions that the Administration so
> passionately
> articulates. The result is growing political
> isolation of, and pervasive
> popular antagonism toward the U.S. global posture.
>
> It is obvious by now that the American national
> interest calls for a
> significant change of direction. There is in fact a
> dominant consensus in
> favor of a change: American public opinion now holds
> that the war was a
> mistake; that it should not be escalated, that a
> regional political process
> should be explored; and that an Israeli-Palestinian
> accommodation is an
> essential element of the needed policy alteration
> and should be actively
> pursued. It is noteworthy that profound reservations
> regarding the
> Administration's policy have been voiced by a number
> of leading
> Republicans. One need only invoke here the expressed
> views of the much
> admired President Gerald Ford, former Secretary of
> State James Baker,
> former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and
> several leading
> Republican senators, John Warner, Chuck Hagel, and
> Gordon Smith among others.
>
> The urgent need today is for a strategy that seeks
> to create a political
> framework for a resolution of the problems posed
> both by the US occupation
> of Iraq and by the ensuing civil and sectarian
> conflict. Ending the
> occupation and shaping a regional security dialogue
> should be the mutually
> reinforcing goals of such a strategy, but both goals
> will take time and
> require a genuinely serious U.S. commitment.
>
> The quest for a political solution for the growing
> chaos in Iraq should
> involve four steps:
>
> 1. The United States should reaffirm explicitly and
> unambiguously its
> determination to leave Iraq in a reasonably short
> period of time.
>
> Ambiguity regarding the duration of the occupation
> in fact encourages
> unwillingness to compromise and intensifies the
> on-going civil strife.
> Moreover, such a public declaration is needed to
> allay fears in the Middle
> East of a new and enduring American imperial
> hegemony. Right or wrong, many
> view the establishment of such a hegemony as the
> primary reason for the
> American intervention in a region only recently free
> of colonial
> domination. That perception should be discredited
> from the highest U.S.
> level. Perhaps the U.S. Congress could do so by a
> joint resolution.
>
> 2. The United States should announce that it is
> undertaking talks with the
> Iraqi leaders to jointly set with them a date by
> which U.S. military
> disengagement should be completed, and the resulting
> setting of such a date
> should be announced as a joint decision. In the
> meantime, the U.S. should
> avoid military escalation.
>
> It is necessary to engage all Iraqi leaders --
> including those who do not
> reside within "the Green Zone" -- in a serious
> discussion regarding the
> proposed and jointly defined date for U.S. military
> disengagement because
> the very dialogue itself will help identify the
> authentic Iraqi leaders
> with the self-confidence and capacity to stand on
> their own legs without
> U.S. military protection. Only Iraqi leaders who can
> exercise real power
> beyond "the Green Zone" can eventually reach a
> genuine Iraqi accommodation.
> The painful reality is that much of the current
> Iraqi regime, characterized
> by the Bush administration as "representative of the
> Iraqi people," defines
> itself largely by its physical location: the 4 sq.
> miles-large U.S.
> fortress within Baghdad, protected by a wall in
> places 15 feet thick,
> manned by heavily armed U.S. military, popularly
> known as "the Green Zone."
>
> 3. The United States should issue jointly with
> appropriate Iraqi leaders,
> or perhaps let the Iraqi leaders issue, an
> invitation to all neighbors of
> Iraq (and perhaps some other Muslim countries such
> as Egypt, Morocco,
> Algeria, and Pakistan) to engage in a dialogue
> regarding how best to
> enhance stability in Iraq in conjunction with U.S.
> military disengagement
> and to participate eventually in a conference
> regarding regional stability.
>
> The United States and the Iraqi leadership need to
> engage Iraq's neighbors
> in serious discussion regarding the region's
> security problems, but such
> discussions cannot be undertaken while the U.S. is
> perceived as an occupier
> for an indefinite duration. Iran and Syria have no
> reason to help the
> United States consolidate a permanent regional
> hegemony. It is ironic,
> however, that both Iran and Syria have lately called
> for a regional
> dialogue, exploiting thereby the self-defeating
> character of the largely
> passive -- and mainly sloganeering -- U.S.
> diplomacy.
>
> A serious regional dialogue, promoted directly or
> indirectly by the U.S.,
> could be buttressed at some point by a wider circle
> of consultations
> involving other powers with a stake in the region's
> stability, such as the
> EU, China, Japan, India, and Russia. Members of this
> Committee might
> consider exploring informally with the states
> mentioned their potential
> interest in such a wider dialogue.
>
> 4. Concurrently, the United States should activate a
> credible and energetic
> effort to finally reach an Israeli-Palestinian
> peace, making it clear in
> the process as to what the basic parameters of such
> a final accommodation
> ought to involve.
>
> The United States needs to convince the region that
> the U.S. is committed
> both to Israel's enduring security and to fairness
> for the Palestinians who
> have waited for more than forty years now for their
> own separate state.
> Only an external and activist intervention can
> promote the long-delayed
> settlement for the record shows that the Israelis
> and the Palestinians will
> never do so on their own. Without such a settlement,
> both nationalist and
> fundamentalist passions in the region will in the
> longer run doom any Arab
> regime which is perceived as supportive of U.S.
> regional hegemony.
>
> After World War II, the United States prevailed in
> the defense of democracy
> in Europe because it successfully pursued a
> long-term political strategy of
> uniting its friends and dividing its enemies, of
> soberly deterring
> aggression without initiating hostilities, all the
> while also exploring the
> possibility of negotiated arrangements. Today,
> America's global leadership
> is being tested in the Middle East. A similarly wise
> strategy of genuinely
> constructive political engagement is now urgently
> needed.
>
> It is also time for the Congress to assert itself.
>
>
>
>
> ___________________________________
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