[lbo-talk] globo & culture

Doug Henwood dhenwood at panix.com
Thu Feb 22 05:58:03 PST 2007


[Lizardo's paper is at <http://www.nd.edu/~olizardo/papers/ globcultsoc.pdf>.]

New York Times - February 22, 2007 <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/22/business/22scene.html>

Some Countries Remain Resistant to American Cultural Exports By TYLER COWEN

American movies and music have done very well in some countries like Sweden and less well in others like India. This may sound like a simple difference in human tastes, but decisions to consume culture have an economic aspect.

Loyalties to cultural goods and services — be it heavy metal music or the opera — are about social networking and choosing an identity and an aspiration. That is, we use culture to connect with other people and to define ourselves; both are, to some extent, economic decisions. The continuing and indeed growing relevance of local economic connections suggests that cultural imperialism will not prove to be the dominant trend.

Local culture commands loyalty when people are involved in networks of status and caste, and they pursue religious and communal markers of identity. Those individuals use local cultural products to signal their place in hierarchies.

An Indian Muslim might listen to religious Qawwali music to set himself apart from local Hindus, or a native of Calcutta might favor songs from Bengali cinema. The Indian music market is 96 percent domestic in origin, in part because India is such a large and multifaceted society. Omar Lizardo, an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Notre Dame, explains this logic in his recent paper "Globalization and Culture: A Sociological Perspective."

Today, economic growth is booming in countries where American popular culture does not dominate, namely India and China. Population growth is strong in many Islamic countries, which typically prefer local music and get their news from sources like the satellite broadcaster Al Jazeera.

The combination of these trends means that American entertainment, for largely economic reasons, will lose relative standing in the global marketplace. In fact, Western culture often creates its own rivals by bringing creative technologies like the recording studio or the printing press to foreign lands.

American popular culture tends to be popular when people interact with others from around the world and seek markers of global identity. My stepdaughter spent last summer studying French in Nice, with students from many other countries. They ate and hung out at McDonald's, a name and symbol they all share, even though it was not everyone's favorite meal.

Globalization is most likely to damage local culture in regions like Scandinavia that are lightly populated, not very hierarchical and looking for new global cultural symbols. But the rest of the world's population is in countries — China and India, of course, but also Brazil, Mexico, Egypt and Indonesia — that do not fit that description.

"American" cultural products rely increasing on non-American talent and international symbols and settings. "Babel," which won this year's Golden Globe for best drama, has a Mexican director, and is set in Morocco, Japan and Mexico, mostly with non-English dialogue.

Hollywood movies are popular in Europe in part because of the successes of European welfare states and of European economic integration. Western Europe has become more equal in its treatment of citizens, it has moved away from an aristocratic class society, and it has strong global connections. All those factors favor an interest in American and global popular culture; Hollywood movies often capture 70 percent or more of a typical European cinematic market. Social democracy, which the Europeans often hold up in opposition to the American model, in fact aided this cultural invasion by making Europe more egalitarian.

Many smaller countries have been less welcoming of cultural imports. It is common in Central America for domestically produced music to command up to 70 percent of market share. In Ghana, domestic music has captured 71 percent of the market, according to Unesco figures. Critics of cultural imperialism charge that rich cultures dominate poor ones. But the data supplied by Professor Lizardo show that the poorer a country, the more likely it will buy and listen to its own domestic music. This makes sense given that music is a form of social networking and the relevant networks are primarily local.

That said, the poorest countries don't produce many of the films they watch. Making a movie costs much more than cutting an album. So as the world becomes richer, the relative market share of Hollywood movies will probably fall more than the relative market share of American popular music. Furthermore, moviegoers are starting to look to Bollywood films, or other Asian productions, rather than Hollywood, for their markers of global identity.

The complaint of "cultural imperialism" is looking increasingly implausible. As I argued in "Creative Destruction: How Globalization Is Changing the World's Cultures," the funk of James Brown helped shape the music of West Africa; Indian authors draw upon Charles Dickens; and Arabic pop is centered in France and Belgium. Western cultural exports are as likely to refresh foreign art forms as to destroy them. Western technologies — from the metal carving knife to acrylic paint to digital filmmaking — have spurred creativity worldwide.

Culture is not a zero-sum game, so the greater reach of one culture does not necessarily mean diminished stature for others. In the broad sweep of history, many different traditions have grown together and flourished. American popular culture will continue to make money, but the 21st century will bring a broad mélange of influences, with no clear world cultural leader.

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Tyler Cowen is a professor of economics at George Mason University and co-author of a blog at www.marginalrevolution.com.



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