--- Ted Winslow <egwinslow at rogers.com> wrote:
>
> Keynes's economics is based on a very different idea
> of "rationality"
> and assumes that human feeling, thinking, willing
> and acting in
> general and in capitalism in particular are, on
> average,
> significantly irrational.
>
[WS:] I do not think that I would accept that view (I
am not disputing your representation of Keynes's
argument, but the argument itself.)
I argue that people are fundamentally rational, but that rationality cannot be modeled on a linear, additive contiunuum as the rat choice approach does. By linear additive continuum I mean essentially linear relationship of the type by any unit of increase of X there is a decrease or increases of Y units, pretty much across the entire range of variation.
Instead, a better model of rationality is that of discrete and fuzzy sets. Each set consists of diffrent sets of variables, weights ranges of values which are pre-set so to speak by congitive framing. The framing determines which variables are relevent in a particular situation and which ones are not, what the relative weights of the relevant variables are, what the relvenat rnage of variables on those variables are, which variable are tentative and which ones are firmly set, etc. Then, they solve the problem in a rational way , along the lines of the rat choice models, but only within that particular set or context. In a differnet situation or context, a different rationality applies. Consequently, the relationship between X and Y that is valid in one set, is not valid in another.
Since the rat choice model is also additive i.e. the total is assumed to be the sum of it spart, these discrete "micro rationalities" appear to be irrational, because they cannot be modeled by one general model. The consequence of that is the "false consciousness" fallacy, claimed in one form or another by theoreticians on right and left. False consciousness fallacy is a propostion that people often do not act in accordance with a general model of rationality, hence are deemed irrationnal. I argue, by contrast, that people act in accordance with different rationalities that applyt to diffrent and discrete contexts or situations, and often do not add up to any coherent general model. Consequently, people are fundamentally rational, but their rationality is often modeled by a wrong (general) model.
I write about it in my rarely read book on the sociology of professions in Eastern Europe - unlikely place to present theoretical arguments. Perhaps I should edit the relevant chapter and post it as a stand alone article on a blog - when I finally decide to open one.
Wojtek
____________________________________________________________________________________ Never miss an email again! Yahoo! Toolbar alerts you the instant new Mail arrives. http://tools.search.yahoo.com/toolbar/features/mail/