"The third use of history is the sacrifice of the subject of knowledge.
In appearance or, rather, according to the mask it bears, historical
consciousness is neutral, devoid of passions, and committed solely to the
truth. But if it examines itself and if, more generally, it interrogates
the various forms of scientific consciousness in its history, it finds
that all these forms and transformations are aspects to the will to
knowledge: instinct, passion, the inquisitor's devotion, cruel subtlety,
and malice. It discovers the violence of a position that sides against
those who are happy in their ignorance, against the effective illusions
by which humanity protects itself, a position that encourages the dangers
of research and delights in disturbing discoveries. The historical
analysis of this rancorous will to knowledge reveals that All knowledge
rests upon injustice; there is no right, not even in the act of knowing,
to truth or a foundation for truth; and the instinct for knowledge is
*malicious* (something murderous, opposed to the happiness of mankind).
Even in the greatly expanded form it assumes today, the will to knowledge
does not achieve a universal truth; man is not given an exact and serene
mastery of nature. On the contrary, it ceaselessly multiplies the risks,
creates dangers in every area; it breaks down illusory defenses; it
dissolves the unity of the subject...."
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> -Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History"
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It took me a while to tract down the quote, which is at the end of the essay, which is primarily an engagement with Nietzsche's critique of history in The Uses and Abuses of History in Untimely meditations. Nietzsche and Foucault's critique ultimately comes down to the fact that the historian hides the perspectival will to power that is hidden in the will to knowledge. This story that is told of historical inquiry is the story of a will to truth, one that is devoid of passion and disinterested, but that will to truth is not outside the uneven power relations that produce Europe. They are constituted by them and in turn, aid in constituting them. The quote refers to the critique of a particular form of knowledge production, rather than making a timeless commentary on all things. The primary focus of the essay though is a critique of origins and the illusion of mastery. I suspect the thing that makes folks uncomfortable is the fact that Foucault critiques the notion of liberation, the escape from relations of power, which is primarily imagined as repressive and transcendental structure, rather than a productive and immanent structure.
Also, I have serious problems with this term 'postmodernist.' I have never been given an adequate explanation of what it designates, and it seems to be primarily a term of abuse for those who offer a critique of autonomous subject of liberal discourse. If there is another reason why Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, Rawls, etc. are batched together despite their strong disagreements, I certainly am willing to listen, but I would want some analytical explanation of the categorization.
Robert Wood