For the powerful, just about anything, whether to impute or not to impute responsibility, is an effective tool that they can use to control and punish the powerless, which has nothing to do with the nature of the idea of responsibility but has everything to do with the fact that they have power. In other words, what makes the difference is not the idea of responsibility but power, whether you have it or you don't have it.
Think of Nietzsche as an admirer of master morality, not just as a despiser of slave morality: "The noble type of man regards _himself_ as a determiner of values; he does not require to be approved of; he passes the judgment: What is injurious to me is injurious in itself; he knows that it is he himself only who confers honour on things; he is a _creator of values_" (Beyond Good and Evil). If the key maneuver of slave morality is to elevate powerlessness to "good" and debase power to "evil," the key idea of master morality is honor: "it is he himself only who confers honour on things. . . . He honours whatever he recognizes in himself. . . . The noble man honours in himself the powerful one, him also who has power over himself. . . . It is the powerful who _know_ how to honour, it is their art, their domain for invention" (Beyond Good and Evil).
A Nietzschean Marxist might say that, since "it is the peculiar _right of masters_ to create values" (Beyond Good and Evil), the working class must first become masters, think and act as masters, learn the art of honor, in order to create the values they want to create, of which responsibility may or may not be one, which is the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat. -- Yoshie