Marx said in the Communist Manifesto: "All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind."
He was wrong, or, rather, only half right. Endless development of capitalism has melted many things that were once solid, and religion, including fundamentalist varieties of it, has indeed been profaned, but it has not compelled people to face with sober senses their real conditions of life, and their relations with their kind, and it never will. People have fought, and will always fight, all social struggles, including class struggles, in and through ideology, of which religion is one variety and Marxism is another.
To the chagrin of many a secular leftist, however, capitalism has more effectively melted down secular institutions on the Left, from state socialism to trade unions, than religious ones, and profane illusions, such as individualism, today make people more passive than sacred ones. That is an accident of history -- the Left lost, sometimes because it was defeated by the Right, but more often than not because it dissolved itself -- but it will be a fact of life, to which we must come to terms, in the foreseeable future in many parts of the world.
That said, the term "religious fundamentalism" has often been used to obscure the nature of religious political currents in the Middle East, especially currents such as Khomeinism, which Ervand Abrahamian has argued is not at all the same thing as politicized Protestant fundamentalism on the Right in the USA (Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic, Berkeley: University of California, 1993, <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft6c6006wp/>, pp 14-17, 37-38):
Despite the widespread use of the label, I would like to
argue that the transference of a term invented by early
twentieth-century Protestants in North America to a
political movement in the contemporary Middle East is
not only confusing but also misleading and even
downright wrong, for the following reasons.
First, if fundamentalism means the acceptance of one's
scriptural text as free of human error, then all Muslim
believers would have to be considered fundamentalists,
for, after all, it is an essential article of Islam that the
Koran is the absolute Word of God. By this definition,
all Middle Eastern politicians who have appealed to
Islam would have to be defined as fundamentalist:
President Sadat of Egypt, King Hasan of Morocco,
Saddam Hosayn of Iraq, Mohammad Reza Shah of Iran,
not to mention the Muslim Brotherhood, the Wahhabis,
the Iranian Mojahedin, and the Afghan Mojahedin.
Second, if the term implies that the believer can grasp
the true meaning of the religion by going directly to the
essential text, bypassing the clergy and their scholarship,
then few Muslim theologians would qualify -- Khomeini
certainly would not be among the few. He would be the
first to stress the importance of the Shii traditions and
clerical scholarship. As a senior member of the Usuli
School of Shiism, Khomeini opposed the Akhbari
dissenters of the previous centuries, who had argued
that believers could understand Islam by relying mainly
on the Koran and the Shii imams. Khomeini, on the
contrary, insisted that the Koran was too complex for the
vast majority and that even Archangel Gabriel, who had
brought the Koran to Mohammad, had not been able to
understand the "inner meanings" of what he conveyed.
Khomeini frequently argued that these "inner layers"
could be grasped only by those who were familiar with
Arabic, knew the teachings of the Twelve Shii Imams,
had studied the ancient and contemporary works of the
clerical scholars, and, most nebulous of all, had somehow
been endowed with c erfan (gnostic knowledge).[1] Only
the most learned clerics who had reached the highest level
of mystic consciousness could comprehend the true
essence of Islam. In short, the Truth was not accessible
to everyone, especially to the layperson.
Third, if fundamentalism means finding inspiration in a
Golden Age of early Islam, then of course all believing
Muslims would qualify. If it means striving to re-create this
Golden Age, Khomeini by no means qualifies. It is true that
in his earlier years he implied that Mohammad's Mecca and
Imam Ali's caliphate were the models to replicate. But it is
also true that in later years he argued that even the Prophet
and Imam Ali had not been able to surmount the horrendous
problems of their societies.[2] What is more, in the euphoria
of revolutionary success, he boasted that the Islamic
Republic of Iran had surpassed all previous Muslim societies,
including that of the Prophet, in implementing true religion
"in all spheres of life, particularly in the material and the
spiritual spheres."[3] In short, the Islamic Republic of Iran had
supplanted Mohammad's Mecca and Imam Ali's caliphate as
the Muslim Golden Age. This claim no doubt raised eyebrows
among real fundamentalists.
Fourth, if fundamentalism implies the rejection of the modern
nation-state and contemporary state boundaries, then Khomeini
does not qualify.[4] Although at times he claimed imperialism
had divided the Islamic community (ummat ) into rival states
and nations, he both implicitly and explicitly accepted the
existence of the territorial nation-state. He increasingly spoke
of the Iranian fatherland, the Iranian nation, the Iranian patriot,
and the honorable people of Iran. He even disqualified one of
his staunch supporters from entering the 1980 presidential
elections on the grounds that his father had been born in
Afghanistan. The nationalistic language, together with the use
of exclusively Shii symbols and imagery, helps explain why
the Khomeinists have had limited success in exporting their
revolution.
Fifth, if fundamentalism suggests the strict implementation of
the laws and institutions found in the basic religious texts, then
Khomeini again was no fundamentalist. Many of Khomeini's
most rigid laws, including those concerning the veil, are found
not in the Koran but in later traditions -- some of them with
non-Muslim antecedents. Similarly, the whole constitutional
structure of the Islamic Republic was modeled less on the early
caliphate than on de Gaulle's Fifth Republic. When
parliamentary deputies questioned the Islamic precedents of
some tax laws, Hojjat al-Islam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,
one of Khomeini's closest disciples and the future president of
the Islamic Republic, retorted in exasperation: "Where in
Islamic history do you find Parliament, President, Prime
Minister, and Cabinet of Ministers? In fact, eighty per cent of
what we now do has no precedent in Islamic history."[5]
Khomeini's break with tradition is glaringly obvious in a realm
close to his own heart -- that of Islamic law. Before the
revolution, he categorically insisted that the sacred law
(shari c a ) could be implemented only if the religious judges
(fuqaha ) were entirely free of all state intervention,
especially of the cumbersome judicial-review process.[6]
After the revolution, however, he found it expedient to retain
a centralized judicial structure, including an elaborate review
process, both to provide some semblance of uniformity and to
retain ultimate control over local judges.[7] In fact, the new
constitution guaranteed citizens the right of judicial appeal.
Sixth, if fundamentalism means a dogmatic adherence to
tradition and a rejection of modern society, then Khomeini
does not qualify. He frequently stressed that Muslims needed
to import such essentials as technology, industrial plants, and
modern civilization (tamaddon-e jadid). His closest disciples
often mocked the "traditionalists" (sunnati) for being
"old-fashioned" (kohaniperast). They accused them of
obsessing over ritual purity; preventing their daughters from
going to school; insisting that young girls should always be
veiled, even when no men were present; denouncing such
intellectual pursuits as art, music, and chess-playing; and,
worst of all, refusing to take advantage of newspapers,
electricity, cars, airplanes, telephones, radios, and televisions.[8]
In the words of Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Javad
Hojjati-Kermani, another Khomeini disciple: "These
traditionalists should be labeled reactionary [ertejayi ] for they
want us to return to the age of the donkey. What we need is
not the worship of the past but a genuine renasans [literal
transliteration of the word 'Renaissance']."[9] The concepts,
not to mention the terminology, make mockery of the
Orientalist claim that Khomeinism is merely another
recurrence of the old traditionalist "epidemic" that has plagued
Islam from its very early days.[10]
Seventh, the term "fundamentalism," because of its origins
in early twentieth-century American Protestantism, has
distinct conservative political connotations. American
fundamentalists, reacting against contemporary "social
gospel" preachers, argued that the goal of true religion was
not to change society but to "save souls" by preserving the
literal interpretation of the Bible -- especially on such
doctrinal issues as Creation, Judgment Day, and the Virgin
Birth. Khomeinism, in contrast, while by no means oblivious to
doctrinal matters, is predominantly and primarily concerned
with sociopolitical issues -- with revolution against the royalist
elite, expulsion of the Western imperialists, and mobilization of
what it terms the mostazafin (oppressed) against the
mostakberin (oppressors). In fact, Khomeini succeeded in
gaining power mainly because his public pronouncements
carefully avoided esoteric doctrinal issues. Instead, they
hammered away at the regime on its most visible political,
social, and economic shortcomings.
Finally, the term "fundamentalist" conjures up the image of
inflexible orthodoxy, strict adherence to tradition, and
rejection of intellectual novelty, especially from outside. In the
political arena, however, Khomeini, despite his own denials,
was highly flexible, remarkably innovative, and cavalier toward
hallowed traditions. He is important precisely because he
discarded many Shii concepts and borrowed ideas, words, and
slogans from the non-Muslim world. In doing so, he formulated
a brand-new Shii interpretation of state and society. The final
product has less in common with conventional fundamentalism
than with Third World populism, especially in Latin America.
The term "populism" needs some elaboration. By it I mean a
movement of the propertied middle class that mobilizes the
lower classes, especially the urban poor, with radical rhetoric
directed against imperialism, foreign capitalism, and the political
establishment. In mobilizing the "common people," populist
movements use charismatic figures and symbols, imagery, and
language that have potent value in the mass culture. Populist
movements promise to drastically raise the standard of living
and make the country fully independent of outside powers.
Even more important, in attacking the status quo with radical
rhetoric, they intentionally stop short of threatening the petty
bourgeoisie and the whole principle of private property.
Populist movements, thus, inevitably emphasize the importance,
not of economic-social revolution, but of cultural, national, and
political reconstruction.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Khomeinism, despite its religious dimension, in many ways
resembles Latin American populism. This is not surprising,
because Pahlavi Iran had much in common with Latin America:
an informal rather than formal dependence on the West; an
upper class that included a comprador bourgeoisie; an
anti-imperialist middle class; an urban working class unorganized
by the Left; and a recent influx of rural migrants into urban shantytowns.
Khomeinism, like Latin American populism, was mainly a
middle-class movement that mobilized the masses with
radicalsounding rhetoric against the external powers and the
entrenched power-holding classes, including the comprador
bourgeoisie. In attacking the establishment, however, it was
careful to respect private property and avoid concrete proposals
that would undermine the petty bourgeoisie. These movements
had vague aspirations and no precise programs. Their rhetoric
was more important than their programs and blueprints. They
used the language of class against the ruling elite, but once the
old order was swept aside, they stressed the need for communal
solidarity and national unity. They turned out to be more
interested in changing cultural and educational institutions than
in overthrowing the modes of production and distribution. They
were Janus-faced: revolutionary against the old regimes and
conservative once the new order was set up. The revolutionary
aspect accounted for the initial endorsement from the Left.
Religious fundamentalism could never have won this type of
support.
Khomeinism, like Latin American populism, claimed to be a
return to "native roots" and a means for eradicating
"cosmopolitan ideas" and charting a noncapitalist, noncommunist
"third way" toward development. In actual fact, however, many of
the slogans and key concepts were borrowed from the outside
world, especially from Europe. Khomeinism used organizations
and plebiscitary politics to mobilize the masses, but at the same
time it distrusted any form of political pluralism, liberalism, and
grass-roots democracy. Khomeinism developed ambiguous and
contradictory attitudes toward the state. On the one hand, it
wanted to protect middle-class property. On the other hand, it
wanted to strengthen the state by extending its reach throughout
society and providing social benefits to the lower classes.
Khomeinism, strikingly like other populisms, elevated its leader
into a demigod towering above the people and embodying their
historical roots, future destiny, and revolutionary martyrs.
Despite all the talk about the people, power emanated down
from the leader, not up from the masses. Thus the title of imam
should be seen not as purely religious but as the Shii-Iranian
version of the Latin American El Lider, El Conductor, Jefe Maximo
(Chief Boss), and O Paid do Povo (Father of the Poor).
In short, it is important for us to understand all religious currents, especially consequential ones in the Middle East, in historical materialist terms, not idealist terms. Then, we can see that Khomeinism and other Islamic currents that have similar class bases and political orientations resemble Latin American populism, not right-wing Protestant fundamentalism in the USA. -- Yoshie