For the time being, there is no serious movement for US withdrawal from Iraq: the Democrats excised provisions against war on Iran and removed even the deadline for withdrawal of some troops from Iraq from their bill: Carl Hulse, "Democrats Pull Troop Deadline From Iraq Bill," 23 May 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/23/washington/23cong.html>.
There is, however, a "face-saving" way that lets Washington withdraw its troops from Iraq, a Kissingerian way: détente with Iran. Remember it's only _after_ America normalized its relation with China in 1972 that the 1973 Paris Peace Accords and the US withdrawal from Viet Nam came about.
But some in Tehran are ambivalent about détente, and the ambivalence in Tehran is said to be one of the reasons for the unjust detention of Haleh Esfandiari and other recent actions like it, the timing of which, Trita Parsi reasons, appears calculated to derail the 28 May 2007 talk between Tehran and Washington ("Scholars Bear Brunt of Anti-Diplomacy Backlash," 23 May 2007, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=37859>). If Parsi and others who think like him are correct, social liberals in the USA who make a BIG ISSUE out of the Esfandiari case, etc. JUST NOW ironically play into the hands of the most dogmatic anti-Western Islamists in Tehran. :->
Myself, I'd like to see Tehran win détente with Washington, more on Tehran's terms than on Washington's.
If all goes well according to my wish, after US withdrawal, Tehran will help Sadr* establish as nice an Islamist government in Iraq as possible under the circumstances, the kind that defeats jihadists, includes Sunnis, brings law and order, restores power, clean water, sanitation, etc., and starts rebuilding its oil industry.
But détente may not come about (after all, Iran is not in China's league, though external circumstances have strengthened the hands of its rulers, and they have played the cards they are dealt with mostly as well as they can be expected to do so, and much of Washington seem dead set against it), and if it does, it may come more on Washington's terms than Tehran's. In the latter case, the Iraqis, the Lebanese, the Syrians, the Palestinians, etc. will be in trouble. (I had hoped that the "Arab-parast" President of Iran could establish hegemony in Iran and decisively marginalize the Iran-First sell-out camp in Tehran, but that was not to be.) In the former case, Washington won't withdraw from Iraq, and it will escalate its military, economic, and other campaigns against Iran.
* <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=37865> IRAQ: Sunni Resistance Receptive to Sadr Alliance Analysis by Gareth Porter*
WASHINGTON, May 23 (IPS) - Nationalist Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's bid to unite Sunnis and Shiites on the basis of a common demand for withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces, reported last weekend by the Washington Post's Sudarsan Raghavan, seems likely to get a positive response from Sunni armed resistance.
An account given Pentagon officials by a military officer recently returned from Iraq suggests that Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar province, who have generally reflected the views of the Sunni armed resistance there, are open to working with Sadr.
According to Raghavan's report on May 20, talks between Sadr's representatives and Sunni leaders, including leaders of Sunni armed resistance factions, first began in April. A commander of the 1920 Revolution Brigades, Abu Aja Naemi, confirmed to Raghavan that his organisation had been in discussions with Sadr's representatives.
Sadr's aides say he was encouraged to launch the new cross-sectarian initiative by the increasingly violent opposition from nationalist Sunni insurgents to the jihadists aligned with al Qaeda. One of his top aides, Ahmed Shaibani, recalled that the George W. Bush administration was arguing that a timetable was unacceptable because of the danger of al Qaeda taking advantage of a withdrawal. Shaibani told Raghavan that sectarian peace could be advanced if both Sadr's Mahdi Army and Sunni insurgent groups could unite to weaken al Qaeda.
Raghavan reports that the cross-sectarian united front strategy was facilitated by the fact that Shaibani had befriended members of Sunni nationalist insurgent groups while he was held in U.S. detention centres from 2004 through 2006. Now Shaibani, who heads a "reconciliation committee" for Sadr, is well positioned to gain the trust of those Sunni organisations.
The talks with Sunni resistance leaders have been coordinated with a series of other moves by Sadr since early February. Although many members of Sadr's Mahdi Army have been involved in sectarian killings and intimidation of Sunnis in Baghdad, Sadr has taken what appears to be a decisive step to break with those in his movement who have been linked to sectarian violence. Over the past three months, he has expelled at least 600 men from the Mahdi Army who were accused of murder and other violations of Sadr's policy, according to Raghavan.
The massive demonstration against the occupation mounted in Najaf by Sadr's organisation on Apr. 9, which Iraqi and foreign observers estimated at tens or even hundreds of thousands of people, was apparently timed to coincide with his initiative in opening talks with the Sunnis.
The demonstration not only showed that Sadr could mobilise crowds comparable to the largest ever seen in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, but also made clear Sadr's commitment to transcending sectarian interests. The demonstrators carried Iraqi flags instead of pictures of Sadr or other Shiite symbols. It also included a small contingent of members of the Sunni-based Islamic Party of Iraq.
Sadr's decision in mid-April to pull his representatives out of the al-Maliki government also appears to have been aimed in part at clearing the way for an agreement with the Sunni insurgents. Leaders of those organisations have said they would not accept the U.S.-sponsored government in any peace negotiations with the United States.
U.S. officials have been quietly trying to counter Sadr's approach to the Sunni insurgents by discrediting him. Sadr went underground in February, fearing an attempt by U.S. forces to capture or kill him, and the U.S. official line on Sadr since then has been the persistent claim that he has left Iraq to take refuge in Iran. That appears to be an attempt to feed into Sunni suspicions of all Shiite leaders as agents of Iran.
Sadr's aides have repeatedly denied that Sadr has left the country. The speed with which Sadr's strategy has unfolded in recent months suggests that he has remained in close contact with his organisation. Relying on electronic communication with Sadr outside Iraq would be highly risky, given the well- known capability of U.S. intelligence to intercept any such calls.
U.S. officials have long argued that an early withdrawal of U.S. forces would leave Sunnis vulnerable to the Shiite security forces and militias. Media reporting in recent months has portrayed Sunni leaders as not wanting a U.S. military withdrawal any time soon, because of their fear of Shiite repression in the absence of the U.S. troop presence.
But a Navy Seal special operations officer recently returned from eight months in Anbar province, who discussed the situation there with high-ranking Pentagon officials at the end of April, suggests that that the views of Sunni leaders are quite compatible with those of Sadr. A source familiar with the officer's account said the Sunni Sheiks in Anbar have been telling U.S. commanders that the United States must withdraw its troops, and that the Sunnis know how to handle both al Qaeda and the Shiites.
The officer also reported that Sunni tribal sheiks have explicitly disavowed the notion that Sadr is a pawn of the Iranians, insisting instead that he doesn't like either Iran or the newly-renamed Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, which was created in Iran and supported by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
The sheiks have warned their U.S. military contacts against aggressive military actions against Sadr's followers in Sadr City during the troop surge, according to the account given by the special ops officer. They said Sadr hopes such provocative United States actions will ultimately result in a new Shiite resistance war against U.S. forces, and they urge swift withdrawal to avoid that outcome.
Sadr's project for a Sunni-Shiite united front against both al Qaeda and U.S. occupation offers a potential basis for an eventual settlement of the sectarian civil war in Iraq as well as for U.S. withdrawal. But it could also be the basis for a new and more deadly phase of fighting if Sadr returns once more to military resistance.
*Gareth Porter is an historian and national security policy analyst. His latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in June 2005. (END/2007) -- Yoshie