If we allow America to get to _that_ point, which is to say the eve of a major planned invasion of Iran, _we will have already failed the people of Iran_, for by then it will be _too late_ to stop it. What we need to do is to educate Americans to counter _what Washington is already doing_ -- economic sanctions, covert actions, "democracy assistance," and media propaganda -- so we will never get to the point of no return.
It is in this context that Iranian-American and other Western leftists should think twice before declaring that Iran's government is "increasingly illegitimate" and Ahmadinejad "misrepresents" the people of Iran (to use the terms employed by Hamid Dabashi in "Of Banality and Burden," Al-Ahram Weekly 866, 11-17 October 2007 <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2007/866/focus.htm>).
It is _not_ Iranian-American leftists _but_ Ahmadienajd that a majority of the people of Iran elected. Iran's Islamic government, whoever is its President, enjoys more legitimacy from the point of view of Iranians than any school of leftists in the Iranian diaspora, which is the reason why Iranian leftists, _unable to win over people to themselves and to defeat the government_, live here in the West, not in Iran. They should never forget that. When they forget that, they, even while making a case against imperialist intervention, unwittingly help Bushes and Bollingers make a case to Americans that Iran's government is illegitimate in the eyes of the Iranian people; it is a dictatorship, not a democracy; and therefore the empire's economic sanctions, covert actions, "democracy assistance," and media propaganda against Iran's government _serve_ the interests of the Iranian people who are opposed to the "regime" that does _nothing but_ oppress them.
Moreover, by making it appear that Iran's government never serves the people of Iran, leftist propaganda against it helps the cause of ideologues of the empire who would have Americans believe that Iran's leaders are irrational. That is so _because only irrational leaders rely upon repression as the only tool of social control_. It goes without saying that no one believes that insane fanatics running a dictatorship should be allowed to pursue any nuclear program. I certainly don't.
On 10/13/07, Doug Henwood <dhenwood at panix.com> wrote:
> He's also Iranian
<snip>
> left Iranians like him
What were the causes of Iranian leftists' failure to win the hearts and minds of the Iranian people? Among the most important is their tendency toward sectarianism, mistaking their sectarian interests for national interests of Iran and sentiments of a majority of Iranians.
See, for instance, Maziar Behrooz, Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1999). Pp.. 1-34 of Chapter 1 "Defeat and Revival: the Great Defeat of the Left (1953-70)" of the book is especially relevant. Here are two short excerpts:
"From this point [September 1944, when the USSR asked Iran for Soviet exploration of Iran's northern oil fields] on until one year before the coup, the nationalists and the Tudeh went their separate ways on the oil question. . . . From the very beginning, when oil nationalization became a household term in Iran, the Tudeh denounced it as imperialist, and suggested that only nationalization of the southern oil was appropriate. . . . Even Mossadeq's rejection of the American offer of compromise, put forward by Averel Harriman in July 1951, failed to convince the party of the genuinely patriotic nature of the movement. To sum up, the Tudeh's position between the start of the second round of the oil debate in the summer of 1950 and mid-1952 was one of antagonism toward the authors of the movement.
Ironically, while the party's policy on the oil nationalization question was implemented with Soviet interests in mind, this did not mean it mirrored Soviet policy on the subject. The Soviets, while not doing much to help Iran at a time when it was under a British embargo, did recognize the importance of the nationalization act. The Soviet media supported nationalization and gave positive coverage to Mossadeq and the National Front. The Tudeh was acting on its own perception of what its international duties (ie Soviet interests) were" (pp. 5, 9-10)
"The two groups around [Khalil] Maleki and [Mozzafar] Baqa'i actually made up the two wings of the Toilers' Party, with the former Tudeh members constituting the left wing. The union between the two groups came to an end after the July 1952 uprising and Mossadeq's return to power. The root of differences lay in how to react to Mossadeq, the left wing proposing complete support, the right wing finding itself increasingly alienated from Mossadeq. The right wing, a minority on the party central committee, persisted in its opposition to Mossadeq, and this accentuated the differences. . . . The split materialized in late summer 1952 when Maleki's group, under the name The Toilers Party of the People of Iran (Third Force), closed ranks with Mossadeq and Baqa'i's group joined the anti-Mossadeq forces under the original party name" (p. 33) -- Yoshie