> Besides, who's your presumed audience?
The readers of LBO-Talk posts.
> You're never going to convince the
> American public, elite or mass, that
> the Iranian regime isn't terrible.
> So if the antiwar position is seen as
> contaminated with an apologetics for
> the Iranian regime, or even an
> unwillingness to criticize it, it will
> lose all credibility. There's a
> substantial portion of the American
> public, elite and mass, that would be
> persuaded by the argument that while
> the Iranian regime sucks, it's not our
> business to fix it - that's an Iranian
> affair. They're especially receptive
> to such an argument after the Iraq
> adventure, based on a pack of lies,
> turned into such a wreck. If the Bush
> admin is fixated on attacking Iran,
> nothing "we" say or do will stop them.
> But if you're hoping to stop it with
> popular agitation, then you have to be
> concerned with your credibility.
I don't think the business of the U.S. left is to sell Iran to the Americans. What the U.S. left should be trying to sell to Americans is a new U.S. foreign policy, respectful of the national sovereignty of Iran (Venezuela, Cuba, China, etc.), because that's in the best interest of the overwhelming majority of Americans, in the best interest of the U.S. working people.
But Americans (workers or not) don't have to love everything the Iranians do. A new U.S. foreign policy doesn't mean lovy-dovy relationships with everybody regardless of their conduct. It only means that Americans (and their agency, their state) are committed (in fact, constrained) to using the most civilized methods to address their differences with the Iranians. If, on top of that, the new foreign policy is in a position to induce the cooperation among workers of all nations, then that'd be further progress.
In all cases, the focus is on changing ourselves -- changing U.S. policies and, ultimately, changing the social conditions that are at the base of such policies. So, the gap that we are concerned with is not the gap between current conditions and some standard of individual, group, or gender freedom in Iran. No, the gap we're mainly concerned about is that between our current foreign policy and *our* immediate and longer-term needs as workers and human beings.
It's not in the interest of the U.S. left to preface each and every call to change our foreign policy with a phrase referring to how the political regimes in those nations don't measure up to some ideal abstract standards. I don't think that the credibility of the U.S. left hinges on its judging how far or close other nations are to the standards of freedom, wellbeing, justice, etc. our own society may believes we exemplify. Our credibility lies in the standards of our own conduct -- including making the right calls, tactical and strategic, which depends on focusing on changing what we can change, when we can change it, etc. How's the "suckiness" of Iran (Venezuela, Cuba, etc.) an issue for Americans?
I guess if individual Americans decided to move to Iran (Venezuela, Cuba, etc.) -- share life and join forces with the people there to change their social conditions (including their political systems), then -- for all practical purposes -- they would be part of the Iranian (Venezuelan, Cuban, etc.) people. They would be doing what they thought was right and facing the consequences as individuals. I mean obviously not your typical ONG, but those who, American in origin, moved there and didn't brandish their passports or appeal (not even by insinuation) to the governments of their country of origin (or other outside forces) to come and help them advance their agenda.
But, if Americans here, remote control, without taking the chances people living in those countries are taking (including the chance of being blown away by a U.S. bomb), decide to center a public debate on the real or imagined flaws of those societies, their political systems, etc., then it's different. Then, regardless of intentions, they are acting as Americans, backed up by the full might of their state. The premise is implicit: how do Americans *as such* advance their interest abroad? Through the policies of their state. (And among those Americans I include Iranians who live in the U.S. like Prof. Dabashi.)
So here (on LBO-Talk) we have Western leftists, not just documenting how Iran conducts its affairs, but -- by selection, emphasis, and overt statement -- *judging* how Iran should conduct those affairs. Gays' and women' rights are not duly respected. Economic policies are erratic or incompetent. Etc. Well, I'm all for informing economic policies with the best technical knowledge available. I'm all for propagandizing the human need of building a global society in which *all* forms of oppression are abolished forever. But we don't get there by merely showing how far a particular society (e.g. Iran) is from the ideals. Sometimes, by doing so we make it harder to get there. Just like a man can ruin his chances with a partner by calling too much attention to how sexually starved he's been. Only little kids and lunatics speak their minds without care of context or consequence.
I don't argue that the mistreatment of gays and women in Iran is not factual. I don't claim that Iran's economic policies are technically sound or politically reasonable. That's not my beef. I'm not in a position to change anything in Iran. I'd rather focus on the mistreatment of gays, women, blacks, migrant workers, etc. here. But if the premise is that we, Western leftists, can tell the Iranians how to lead their lives, then I contend that -- in principle -- it is not unreasonable for the Iranians to *subordinate* the struggle for gays' and women's rights to more urgent tasks. After all, they set their priorities with their own actions (and omissions).
Along that, I argue that it's not true that our stance doesn't make a difference in the outcome of the conflict. It does. Marv says that I exaggerate the importance gay and women issues may have in the conflict. Well, I don't know for sure how big a role those issues may play. But, if history is any guide, any possible division among those who resist imperialism (there and here) will be exploited. Do I need to give examples?
Finally, I argue that we cannot (for the time being) change the terms of the conflict between U.S. imperialism and Iran, that we cannot escape the immediate dilemma it poses by invoking abstract alternatives and opposing them to the dilemma. We're dealing with a hardened social reality. I believe that in the short to medium term, the U.S. left could (and should) leverage its tactical strength to make it much more costly for future U.S. governments to pursue imperialistic policies. That'd be a tremendous contribution to global human progress. But for the time being, this is just a possibility (albeit a concrete one).
Finally, in reply to Marv, I will say that I entirely agree with the idea of having the broadest possible movement in opposition to U.S. threats and aggression against Iran. Not everybody will oppose them on the same basis. I understand we need to be tolerant with those whose opposition to U.S. imperialism arises from a different premise. Indeed. But I don't think we'll disagree if I say that tolerance doesn't mean suppressing one's own views on what the (perhaps unintended) effects of emphasizing the "suckiness" of the other side may be or on what the proper basis for opposition to U.S. aggression should be. (So, in this spirit, I admit that my previous judgment of Prof. Dabashi's piece may have been a bit too harsh in the form.)
Just to clear the waters, when I say that every possible stance vis-a-vis the conflict will be forced into a binary choice, regardless of our wishes, I don't mean to say that only those who oppose the attack on Iran because they fully agree with Iran's policies will effectively help the correct side. Neither do I mean that only those who oppose the attack on Iran on the basis of full agreement with a new, non-imperialist U.S. foreign policy count. Again, the premise of my previous replies was different.
As far as building opposition to U.S. imperialist aggression against Iranians What matters to us (as opposed to the Iranians, who indeed must negotiate internally and in their terms the conditions of their unity against the imperialist threat) is how strongly we oppose the aggression with our actions, not how much we like the Iranian leadership.