The Democrats, for once, have done the Syrians and the Iranians a favor. Anything that further alienates Turks from Washington is good for Syria and Iran, and the Armenian genocide resolution manages to anger Turks nearly across the political spectrum (rightists object on nationalist grounds, leftists object on anti-imperialist grounds).
The AKP, in any event, has been improving Turkey's relation with Iran and Syria for some time. Ankara, Damascus, and Tehran are united in opposition to the US backing of the Kurds.** The Turks, whose country is a NATO member, have the most freedom among them to threaten the Kurdish guerrillas and terrorists in Iraq, the threat from which Iran and Syria indirectly benefit. The AKP has also deepened Turkey's energy ties with Iran (especially the Nabucco gas pipeline <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nabucco_Pipeline>) and Russia (especially the Blue Stream <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Stream> pipeline and the Blue Stream Two extension), having them compete with each other. By doing so, the AKP has smartly positioned Turkey as the key player in the energy networks that link Europe, Russia and its Central Asian periphery, and Iran.
That all these actions have been taken by a political party strongly backed by not just European but also American ruling classes (as you recall the Western media's largely positive coverage of the AKP during the Turkish elections this year) in a country that has been one of the most important links in the US-led multinational empire in the Middle East, overriding Washington's strong objections, says a lot about the decline of US hegemony.
The Iraq War, as well as the weakening dollar hegemony, is indeed beginning to give birth to a new Middle East -- just not the kind that Trotskyist-turned-neo-conservative revolutionaries had wished for.
* Even before the resolution became an issue, most Turks had become profoundly alienated from the US and the EU:
Turkish feelings toward the United States and European
Union have continued to cool, with warmth toward the
United States dropping from 20 degrees in 2006 to 11 in
2007 on a 100-point thermometer scale, and from 45
degrees to 26 toward the European Union. . . .
Turkish respondents continued to have the most critical
views of U.S. and EU leadership in world affairs, with 74%
of Turkish respondents who viewed U.S. leadership in
world affairs as undesirable, an increase of five
percentage points since 2006. For the first time, a majority
(54%) also viewed EU leadership as undesirable, an
increase of seven percentage points since 2006. Similarly,
only three percent approved of President Bush's handling
of international policies and 83% disapproved.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Turkish support for NATO has continued its decline since
2004, with Turkish respondents divided almost equally:
35% of respondents (–9 percentage points from last year)
agreed that NATO is still essential for their country's
security, while 34% said it is no longer essential, and 31%
did not know or refused to answer. (German Marshall
Fund, Trans Atlantic Trends 2007, pp. 21-22, <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/doc/Transatlantic%20Trends_all_0920.pdf>).
** PEJAK's base area is said to be the same as its sister party PKK's. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Party_for_a_Free_Life_in_Kurdistan#Relation_to_United_States_government_and_military_structures>. -- Yoshie