The problem is that there is no significant force within the USA that opposes economic sanctions, covert actions, and so-called "democracy assistance," which together constitute the USA's "regime change" campaign. American liberals are in favor of economic sanctions and "democracy assistance." Most American leftists are either chasing the phantom menace of imminent war alone or (on the far left end, especially among expatriate Iranian leftists) futilely campaigning for their own "regime change" in Iran out of a delusion that propagandizing for socialism on the Net would incline Iranians to favor socialism over Islamic republic. This lack of opposition to regime change is unlikely to change any time soon, if ever.
> One of the ways sanctions would be racheted up this time would include the
> designation of the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist group, and Farideh
> has several interesting things to say about that too -- she provides a
> detailed model of some of the ways sanctions like this drive Iran to the
> right (in this case by forcing the left to pledge allegiance to the
> institution under attack).
Those Iranians whom American and expatriate Iranian liberals and leftists think of as "left-wing" aren't left-wing, nor are those whom they think of as "right-wing" necessarily right-wing. Terms like left and right are more or less irrelevant to politics in Iran. The divide, if anything, is between liberal Westernizers and populist anti-imperialists, with Ali Khamenei serving as the arbiter among contending factions.
On 9/3/07, James Heartfield <Heartfield at blueyonder.co.uk> wrote:
> Are we to take seriously the implication that the Iranian government could
> act as champion of the oppressed masses of the Middle East? The Iranian
> elite seem a lot more interested in making money, and establishing political
> room to manouevre than liberating anyone else. Does anyone seriously doubt
> the Iranian government's willingness to make an alliance with the West, were
> that to suit its interests?
Only parties with roughly equal powers can enter into an alliance. Washington's demand is not that Tehran be its ally, which is why it rejected the overtures from Tehran during the Khatami era. Washington's logic is the same as that of Athens in the Melian debate.
On 9/2/07, Carrol Cox <cbcox at ilstu.edu> wrote:
> > Informed Comment Global Affairs
> >
> > Group blog on Current Events
> >
> > conciliatory moves towards the United States
> > either in relation to Iraq or more significantly in relation to Iran's
> > nuclear file) are of no use since US policy objectives in Iran are not
> > behavior change but regime change.
>
> 1) Of course these _are_ u.s. goals. And make no mistake they are _u.s._
> goals, not merely Bush administration or neo-conservative goals -- as
> just as they were during the Eisenhower administration, and will be
> under a Obama, Clinton, or Edwards administration.
Iran's populist anti-imperialists have a more accurate grasp of what Washington is up to than its liberal Westernizers. Washington just doesn't behave the way the latter want it to behave.
> 2) And it is to the interests of humanity that Iran achieve nuclear
> weapons. That and only that would make peace in the Middle East
> probable.
I would not be opposed to Iran having nuclear weapons, but nuclear weapons are irrelevant to the task of defending the nation from a campaign of regime change consisting of economic sanctions, covert actions, and "democracy assistance." Only national unity can protect Iran from going the way of Yugoslavia and other nations (including Iran itself in the Mossadegh era) done in by similar campaigns. Those Iranians who elevate their individual or sectoral interests above their nation's survival indeed can endanger their country. Remember the costs of failing to support Mossadegh. -- Yoshie