Not completely. A theory of mind is required for empathy but does not guarantee it.
> However, every reliable and valid measure of empathy relies on
> language and the assumption that a person can reflect upon and report
> their psychological states. This is the methodological problem I have
> with any attempts to demonstrate empathy in entities that cannot talk.
> If my cat brings me a dead bird, should I call that empathy? How
> could I tell whether or not my interpretation is correct?
>
Every reliable and valid measure you find palatable. I can easily name 50 biologists and animal behaviourists who disagree. Not crackpots, but respected researchers. There is not a overwhelming consensus among researchers that your position as stated above is valid. There are plenty who agree, and they are currently the majority but the number who disagree grows monthly and dismissing their arguments is hardly good science. Ask yourself this question. If the scientists who injected acetic acid into mice so they could study their behaviour to assist in forming their opinions as to whether mice feel empathy truly feel that behaviour is evidence of nothing then why run that experiment? Did I miss the outcry from other scientists dismissing the study of mice behaviour as an indicator of empathy?
> I have to say this whole question "Does species X have human
> characteristic Y?" isn't very interesting to me; it really makes no
> practical difference whether or not my cat has empathy--I'll feed her
> and pet her in any case. As I mentioned earlier, given compelling
> data, I'd be happy to say that some particular species has the
> capacity for the human experience of empathy. I have nothing invested
> in the belief that empathy is exclusive to humans.
>
> Miles
As I stated before we do not know that animals experience empathy but we do not know that they don't. Assuming language reports are valid but behaviours are not is just a convenient way of ignoring a big problem that does not have a ready answer. We don't know humans experience empathy but because the being posing the questions feels like they do they incorrectly assume others of their species do as well. Either we require proof or we don't. Using one standard for humans that is easy to understand because we are human and another standard for animals because they are not is a convenience. We know that for the most part the areas of the brain involved in human empathy is located in evolutionarily old parts of the brain. We have no good reason to assume higher animals are incapable of experiencing empathy and with the little knowledge we have we are better off tentatively assuming they do than don't when confronted with a question concerning this ability.
John Thornton