[lbo-talk] Mirror neurons

[Miles Jackson]

Wojtek Sokolowski wrote:
> It suggests - in the light of the
> fact that the parts of brain associated with empathy are evolutionary
> 'early' vis a vis those responsible for 'higher' cognitive functions - that
> humans are probably less empathic than animals.  That is to say, they are
> more able than other animals to "bracket out" empathic feelings and behavior
> motivated by them in favor of more 'rational' and 'detached' ones.  
But we don't know exactly what parts of the brain are responsible for 
the experience of empathy! Claiming that "mirror neurons" are the source 
of the psychological experience of empathy is crude reductionism that 
almost all neurophysiological researchers reject.  A complex 
psychological state is not produced by a specific set of neurons 
firing.  Example: recall of personal memories.  Early researchers 
assumed there was a "memory cortex" where all episodic memories were 
stored, and specific memories would be elicit when specific neurons were 
activated.  Alas, things are much more complex and interesting: recall 
of a specific memory can involve neural activation in completely 
different parts of the brain.  There is no specific set of neurons 
"responsible" for expressing a memory.  In the same way, researchers 
have not discovered any specific area of the brain "responsible" for the 
psychological experience of empathy.  In the same person at different 
times, the experience of empathy involves neural activation in different 
parts of the brain.  Thus it's questionable to claim that the parts of 
the brain associated with empathy are evolutionarily "early".


> I am not trying to moralize here, but I think that Miles, and for that
> matter the scores of other species-centric folk who believe that humans are
> 'special', 'morally superior,' have a 'soul' and the kindred mumbo-jumbo -
> got it all backward.  
>   
I think I'm getting some of the moral outrage about my posts now.  Let 
me be explicit: I don't think humans are intrinsically superior to any 
other species, and I don't think that humans should be the measure of 
all things.  Ironically, it is your argument above, Woj, that reflects 
species-centrism: "humans consider empathy a positive trait, so anyone 
who questions empathy in a species is questioning the species' worth or 
importance".  However, this is only true if you use your human values to 
judge the worth of other forms of life!  I do not think life is any more 
or less valuable if it resembles human life.  This has come up before on 
the list: there is nothing intrinsically better about life that 
resembles humans (e.g., bonobos) than life that doesn't resemble humans 
(e.g., corn).  Perversely, it is the people who say that species deserve 
respect because they have human-like characteristics who display the 
rankest form of species-centrism. 

In my view, there is an amazing diversity of life on the planet; I don't 
need to validate it by arguing how similar it is to human experience.   
Why is it necessary to make humans the measure of all things?

Miles