You have said many times that you have no particular interest in internal politics in Iran (e.g., at <http://mailman.lbo-talk.org/pipermail/lbo-talk/Week-of-Mon-20070910/016989.html>).
Intelligent criticism of anything, let alone politics of a country little understood in the West, requires serious efforts to understand objective and subjective conditions of it, and such efforts in turn can't be made without first taking interest in it. But you seem to assume that you already know everything that needs to be known about Iran without taking deep interest in it or making much efforts to learn about it. In that case, all you can say about it is basically the same as what just about everyone thinks he or she already knows, in short, reproduction of doxa.
As for the political economy of Iran and Venezuela, you are assuming a lot without studying either.
Mark Weisbrot and Luis Sandoval write in "The Venezuelan Economy in the Chávez Years" : "As can be seen in Table 1, the private sector has grown faster than the public sector over the last 8 years, and therefore the private sector is a bigger share of the economy in 2007 than it was before President Chávez took office" (July 2007, <http://cepr.net/documents/publications/venezuela_2007_07.pdf>, p. 6).
That surely stands in contrast to the experience of the Iranian Revolution -- one neoliberal critic of Iran put it disapprovingly: "Semi-official estimates put the private-sector share of the national economy at between 15 to 20 percent. This made the Islamic state a mixed capitalist-socialist economy predominantly under clerical control" (Akbar Karbassian, "Islamic Revolution and the Management of the Iranian Economy," Social Research, Summer 2000, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2267/is_2_67/ai_63787346/print>) -- but not in a way that suggests that the Bolivarian process is more anti-capitalist than the Iranian revolution.
I rather think that the best way to understand the Bolivarian process, as it stands now, is to see it as first and foremost a national-democratic revolution practicing populist economics, some of whose leadership take inspiration from certain Marxist ideas but (correctly, in my opinion) reject others, and affirm it as such, rather than expecting it to be "anti-capitalist."
On 9/10/07, ravi <ravi at platosbeard.org> wrote:
> But this is not about intellectual honesty regarding facts but rather
> one about, should I say, obligations... or maybe intellectual
> decency. What is it that we are obliged to say, if we are to speak of
> Iran? Perhaps it would be best if we did not speak at all.
>
> Our own government is the greatest danger facing the Iranian people,
> and all the options they have attempted to protect themselves from us
> (including liberal democracy) seem to have failed, for all groups,
> whether they be women or workers.
>
> So, are we obliged to acknowledge that the Iranian state is run by
> authoritarian mullahs? Setting aside the consideration of whether
> such a statement is true (i.e., assuming it is), what is the value
> (or purpose) of such an acknowledgement? It doesn't help the Iranian
> people, does it? (I believe it doesn't since it adds, even if
> unintentionally, to the drumbeat for war). So, given our record, but
> also our philosophy, I think we are obliged not to say anything
> critical of the people and their choices, **right now**.
Strange as it may seem, those who are reluctant to criticize Iran, such as yourself, are likely to be in a much better position to do so than those who are repelled by its culture and eager to attack its government. Think of comparing respective experiences of Iran after the Shah and India after independence. It will be very illuminating: the virtues of Iran will clarify the vices of India and vice versa. -- Yoshie