On Sat, 12 Apr 2008, Doug posted a link to Foreign Affairs
> http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87305/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge.html>
> The Price of the Surge
> How U.S. Strategy Is Hastening Iraq's Demise
> Steven Simon
> From Foreign Affairs, May / June 2008
which is very good on many levels. The overall argument as to why the surge made things worse is excellent. But among other things, it also has a great description of where the Awakening movement came from and what the relation is between Iraqi Sunnis and al-Qaeda Sunnis. I never realized exactly where this guy Sattar fit in; this explains it:
<quote>
After the U.S. invasion, the Sunni groups that would go on to make up
the insurgency arrived at a marriage of convenience with the foreign
and local jihadists who made up al Qaeda in Iraq. The two shared a
common goal: to reverse the triumph of the Shiites and restore the
Sunnis to their lost position of power. For the Sunni insurgents, the
presence of foreign jihadists also helped divert the attention of U.S.
forces. Up to a point, therefore, al Qaeda's excesses -- such as its
attempt to impose strict Wahhabi-style rule by banning music and
satellite dishes and compelling women to cover themselves entirely --
were to be tolerated.
But for al Qaeda, the link with the insurgents was supposed to serve
two additional purposes that went well beyond the shared goal of
chipping away at Shiite predominance -- and ultimately went against the
interests of the Iraqi Sunnis themselves. The first was to establish an
al Qaeda-dominated ministate as a base for carrying out jihad against
enemies outside of Iraq. (The November 2005 attack against three
Western tourist hotels in Amman, Jordan, allegedly ordered by Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, then the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, was a harbinger of
this wider strategy.) The second was to seize a leading position within
the insurgency and thereby block a power-sharing arrangement between
Baghdad and the Sunni nationalists, an arrangement that would entail
the selling out of al Qaeda by the Sunnis.
The Iraqi Sunnis' enthusiasm for the alliance waned as al Qaeda
increasingly attempted to assert its leadership. In October 2006, al
Qaeda declared the formation of an Islamic state in Iraq, demanding
that Sunni insurgent leaders pledge allegiance to the new (and many
believed fictional) jihadist commander Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, whose name
was supposed to signify an authentically Iraqi origin. To the
nationalist insurgents, accepting the declaration of a separate state
and ceding leadership to al Qaeda made little sense. Doing so would
have fueled the process of decentralization, emboldened those Kurds and
Shiites who sought their own fiefdoms, and, crucially, further
distanced the Sunnis from eventual access to Iraq's potentially massive
oil revenues. Moreover, despite the spectacular successes that had been
attributed to al Qaeda, it was the nationalist Sunnis who provided the
backbone of the insurgency and had done most of the killing and dying.
Some tribes had also grown increasingly resentful of al Qaeda's efforts
to seize control of resources. The Albu Risha tribe, for example, had
lost control over portions of the road from Baghdad to Amman,
undermining its ability to raise revenue by taxing or extorting traders
and travelers. When the Albu Rishas' leaders protested, the chieftain,
Sheik Bazi al-Rishawi, was killed along with one of his sons, and two
more of his sons were abducted. In response, Rishawi's fourth son,
Sheik Abdul Sattar, assembled a small group of tribal figures (with the
help of funds from the local U.S. military commander) under the banner
of the Anbar Salvation Council to roll back al Qaeda's influence. The
bodies of al Qaeda personnel soon began turning up in alleyways.
This strategic schism might have been papered over had the jihadists
not overreacted to the opposition of other insurgent groups. In 2007,
there was a wave of sensational killings of Sunni leaders by al Qaeda,
including Abdul Sattar (who had met with President Bush two weeks
before his death). The assassinations of Sunni leaders warranted
retaliation under the prevailing tribal code, opening the door to more
systematic cooperation between the tribes and U.S. forces. In the wake
of Abdul Sattar's death, a Sunni leader complained that al Qaeda's
assassinations had "left resistance groups with two options: either to
fight al Qaeda and negotiate with the Americans or fight the Americans
and join the Islamic State of Iraq, which divides Iraq. Both options
are bitter." After their defeat in the battle of Baghdad -- thanks to
the entrenched power of Sadr's Shiite Mahdi Army and the arrival of
additional U.S. troops -- the Iraqi Sunnis went decisively with the
first option, marking the start of the Sunni Awakening groups. The
United States, for its part, had its own incentive to cooperate with
the insurgents: June 2007, with 126 troop deaths, was the second-worst
month for the U.S. military in Iraq, and General David Petraeus, the
U.S. ground commander, was facing pressure to reduce casualties
quickly. The most efficient way to do so was to strike deals with the
newly pliable insurgents.
The deals were mediated by tribal leaders and consisted of payments of
$360 per month per combatant in exchange for allegiance and
cooperation. Initially referred to by the United States as "concerned
local citizens," the former insurgents are now known as the Sons of
Iraq. The total number across Iraq is estimated at over 90,000.
Although the insurgents turned allies generally come well armed, at
least one unit leader, Abu al-Abd, commander of the Islamic Army in
Iraq, who controls Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, has said that he
receives weapons as well as logistical support from U.S. units. His
arrangement is probably typical. In November 2007, he agreed to a
three-month pact, open to extension.
This strategy has combined with other developments -- especially the
fact that so much ethnic cleansing has already occurred and that
violence in civil wars tends to ebb and flow, as the contending sides
work to consolidate gains and replenish losses -- to bring about the
current drop in violence. The Sunni sheiks, meanwhile, are getting rich
from the surge. The United States has budgeted $150 million to pay
Sunni tribal groups this year, and the sheiks take as much as 20
percent of every payment to a former insurgent -- which means that
commanding 200 fighters can be worth well over a hundred thousand
dollars a year for a tribal chief.
<end excerpt>
Michael