Any country - like RUSSIA, FOR EXAMPLE - that relies on artillery rockets as its main battlefield artillery - which most of the world does - limits itself to imprecise artillery bombardments - like, oh, I don't know, Grozny?
All the Soviet-era weapons are like this - from the Kalashnikov to the RPG to the artillery rockets - cheap, dependable, high-volume, low-accuracy weapons.
Iraq-Iran, you name the conflict, if Soviet-style artillery rockets are what an army has then there are going to be really awful casualties when that army acts. Was Georgia particularly brutal in its targetting practices? I'd certainly believe it, but I haven't seen any evidence of it. Keep in mind that in the very early hours of the conflict, it's very likely that Russians were also blazing away with their less-accurate stuff. With all those munitions flying, it would be hard to tell who destroyed what.
Because this operation was small and Russia was more than ready, Russia was ultimately able to use the best, most-accurate parts of its arsenal - the stuff which is on the level of the more modern armies.These high-accuracy weapons are also the best way to deal with high-volume, low accuracy weapons.
Iraq had a fearsome, death-dealing army when attacking Iran, but the Americans were able to cut through them in a few weeks. Georgia was being well-armed and well-trained but the top level of the Russian forces cut them to pieces within hours. if a force can pick off these high-volume, low-accuracy weapons from outside their effective range, they become worthless.
Conversely, of course, the strategy of using high-volume, low-accuracy weapons (which the Russians basically invented in WW2) relies on the "shock and awe" of massive firepower to confuse the enemy so you can close with them quickly and undermine their accuracy advantage.
So the fact that Georgia was using artillery rockets may seem really appalling - and it is - but it's standard practice for most of the world's armies because these are the weapons and tactics they have available at a price they can afford.
That doesn't make it right, but it does mean that the idea that this was particularly unusual warfare is not valid.
I also think it's naive in the extreme to be satisfied that Russia's actions were purely a "reaction".
Again, I write in my post but it bears repeating: the "why" of Russia's actions is crucial to determine what we can expect going forward and so far the Russian tactics - from pre-conflict statements to "withdrawal" are consistent with a militaristic state pursuing its strategic interests by using force WELL OUTSIDE its borders.
My prediction is that the Ossetian state will be declared and quickly come to be run by a Russian-backed strongman with little or no democracy. Russian short-range ballistic battlefield missiles will be and remain stationed in South Ossetia and Russian "peacekeepers' will occupy Georgia for the foreseeable future.
Why would I think that? Well, other the many, many lines the Russian government is handing and has handed the world to read between: Kokoitny has already dissolved his government. Russia has already moved the missiles in and the Russians have stated that "peacekeepers" will be replacing the "withdrawing' troops.
If it South Ossetia was a "reaction" one would not expect these things. Indeed, one would be surprised that Russia risked as much as it did for South Ossetia. If it was part of a broader strategic plan, one would expect these things. This is why the larger reasons are ultimately more important than the events of August 7.
On Mon, Aug 18, 2008 at 11:02 AM, Wendy Lyon <wendy.lyon at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 18/08/2008, Eric <rayrena at realtime.net> wrote:
>>
>> Two questions: Where do/did you stand on the NATO war in Kosovo?
>
> You mean the war the Russians declined to get involved in, where it
> was merely their allies (not Russian citizens) who were being
> attacked? That war? Against. Why do you ask?
>
>> And where
>> is the evidence of "extreme violence"? Yes, some nasty weaponry was used,
>> but so far the massacre seems to be fictive, as a small percentage of the
>> purported bodies have been accounted for.
>
> I was using "extreme violence" to mean things like indiscriminate
> shelling of civilian targets, as opposed to the kind of (mostly) low
> intensity operations used by the British here. I wasn't thinking in
> terms of a body count.
>
> But, since you brought it up, maybe you could tell us how many bodies
> you think are needed before violence can be described as "extreme".
>
>> Call me skeptical, but when capitalist states claim to go to war for
>> humanitarian purposes, I think it's generally a good idea to assume that
>> their aims lie elsewhere. But again, maybe I'm just cynical.
>
> I haven't ascribed humanitarian motives to the Russians. I don't think
> they give a shit about the Ossetian people either. Doing something
> pursuant to a right or obligation doesn't necessarily imply doing it
> out of the goodness of your heart.
>
>> > I haven't heard anybody
>> > extrapolating that into a position that invasion is ok under any and
>> > all other circumstances.
>>
>> Russia apparently has.
>
> Maybe they have and maybe they haven't. I don't think you can draw
> that conclusion from anything they've done so far. Their reaction may
> have been disproportionate but it was a reaction nonetheless.
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