* * *
McCain, Obama Duel on Russia By GERALD F. SEIB Wall Street Journal August 19, 2008
In the wake of Russia's march into Georgia, much ink has been spilled analyzing the differences between the ways Sen. John McCain and Sen. Barack Obama responded to Moscow's brash move. That's all fine -- and all misses the more important point.
Discussions with top foreign-policy advisers to both candidates suggest that the more intriguing question is what the two candidates would have done before the Russians moved. Whose approach toward Russia -- indeed, toward diplomacy in general -- might have prevented the Georgia move in the first place?
Put simply, would the McCain impulse to confront and isolate an increasingly expansionist Russia have done the trick by sending the right signals of Western resolve? Or would the Obama impulse to engage Russia more deeply have deterred the Russians by giving the Russians enough of a stake in the new international order that they wouldn't risk such a step?
If you're looking for the real difference between the two candidates in instinct and philosophy toward diplomacy, here is where you'll find it.
Instead, of course, debate has focused on how the candidates reacted once disaster struck. In the McCain camp's view, Sen. Obama's response to Russia's invasion was slow and soft. In the Obama camp's view, Sen. McCain's response was belligerent and reckless.
The reality, though, is that the two men have reached similar positions on what happens now: review all aspects of relations with Russia, and push ahead with a plan to open the way for both Georgia and sister former Soviet republic Ukraine into membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, helping shield them from more Russian intrusions.
More revealing are the different paths the candidates might have pursued, say, a year ago.
The McCain view for some time has been that Russia needed a good slap to the side of its head to produce an attitude adjustment. Look back at an article he wrote for Foreign Affairs magazine late last year, a signature statement of his world view:
"Today we see in Russia diminishing political freedoms, a leadership dominated by a clique of former intelligence officers, efforts to bully democratic neighbors, such as Georgia, and attempts to manipulate Europe's dependence on Russian oil and gas. We need a new Western approach to this revanchist Russia."
Sen. McCain argued, in that piece and elsewhere, that Russia should be excluded from the Group of Eight leading nations until it changed its behavior -- indeed, that India and Brazil should be allowed into the group instead, making the affront to Russia even more pointed. Perhaps more provocatively, he argued for making it clear to Russia "that the solidarity of NATO from the Baltic to the Black Sea, is indivisible and that the organization's doors remain open to all democracies committed to the defense of freedom."
He also has pushed for an even broader League of Democracies, uniting democracies from around the world -- and presumably excluding Russia.
He hasn't exactly said that the U.S. was coddling Vladimir Putin's Russia, but he has come close. In that environment, Sen. McCain would argue, Russia had reason to think it could get away with moving into Georgia because the West too readily tolerated its re-emerging nationalist and expansionist impulses.
"I don't think any clear signals were sent to Russia," says Randy Scheunemann, Sen. McCain's top foreign policy adviser.
The Obama camp's view is that the sin committed before Russia's move was more one of omission than of commission. It argues that the Bush administration simply squandered the opportunity in recent years to make Russia into a responsible world player with a well-defined role in the international system that it wouldn't risk by being so reckless as to move into Georgia.
This lack of engagement, in the Obama view, translated into a lack of leverage over the Russians at the crucial hour -- and now translates into a lack of leverage to make Russia retract its move.
When it comes to consultation and communication with Russia, "we've done less of that than we did during the depths of the Cold War," argues Tony Lake, former Clinton national security adviser and a top Obama adviser now. "Which meant that they had less to lose in terms of their relationship with us than they would have otherwise. The fact is that we need all the leverage we can find on them, because their actions are outrageous and they need to pay a price."
In his own article in Foreign Affairs last year -- an early and comprehensive explanation of his worldview -- Sen. Obama explained his view of engaging Russia, albeit on another subject: reining in loose nuclear weapons.
"This will require the active cooperation of Russia," he wrote. "Although we must not shy away from pushing for more democracy and accountability in Russia, we must work with the country in areas of common interest -- above all, in making sure that nuclear weapons and material are secure."
Bluntly stated, the Obama critique of Republican and McCain foreign-policy priorities is that a virtual obsession with fighting the war in Iraq has gotten in the way of engaging Russia in a way that might have produced a different outcome.
More important, though, you have on display here quite different views of the virtues of diplomacy and the advantages of confrontation. They frame an argument well worth having. Moderators of the fall presidential debates, please take note.