But the point is that people aren't hardwired a certain way--so acting like they are, that this is "natural" is a fallacy. I suppose in the case of the west/north this is just a technicality at this point, but when economists speak as if it is a given, there is much to contest.
> It's not to the point criticize Hardin., Demsetz, Alchian, Coase, Olson, Hayek, Mises (the latter lot being anti-commons right wing
> economists of different kinds) for merely being a priori and nonempirical. In a capitalist world where self-interested maximization is the
> rule, the tragedy of the commons abounds, there it is every where you look.
I see your point, but it's not yet a completely capitalist world; there are plenty of pockets of pre-capitalism and post-capitalist resistance and the argument for eliminating them is often posed in terms of their being unnatural, etc.. Many international institutions (or the people who populate them) think that expanding the space in which capitalism can feast on what's left of the commons would be good for everyone involved, i.e. they recommend the disease as the cure. This is hardly a rational course unless we see these as arising in human nature. In this case, it seems completely the point to criticize these people on precisely these grounds. They claim to provide universally valid descriptions and prescriptions of human relations. This is the ground on which MacPherson takes down Hobbes and it continues to be valid today, IFAIC.
> Hardin, etc. are merely providing an explanation of a phenomenon which is extremely widespread. Moreover, the explanation is
> substantially accurate.
I just read the article and I was a bit perplexed by how little it actually says about the "tragedy of the commons." Moreover, the ultimate argument is on par with the Deep Ecology people Doug chronicles in /ATNE/: we should put a limit on the breeding of homo sapiens. It is an explicitly Malthusian argument which not only rejects Adam Smith but recommends (or at least approves of) a whole range of state practices that should make the erstwhile advocates of libertarianism cringe: taxes, various forms of coercion, strict limits on pollution, and, of course, limits on the number of children people should have. He also longs for the elimination of advertisements from the public sphere and ends by favorably quoting Hegel as saying, "freedom is the recognition of necessity"--again specifically in relation to breeding ("Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all.") It is true that the tiny portion he devotes to describing the "Tragedy of the Commons" is thinly drawn and ahistorical, but the bigger quandry for me is that it inspired such a following. It is a fairly unremarkable description except to behavioural economists who like to imagine their work transcends the bounds of time and space; not supported by any historical evidence--except, as Michael notes, the pamphlet; entering a debate about English history that is highly contested and contestable; and misdescribing a number of other natural spaces to shoehorn them into an argument that, at its heart, is a biological rendition of what got economics dubbed "The Dismal Science." He doesn't clearly advocate for private property and in several places finds this an inadequate system. In this regard, it would seem that Michael's take down is sufficient, except that it would be good to note that Hardin's use of the TotC allegorical and incidental.
> As the old man said, in ideology, reality is invertede as in a mirror.l It wouldn't grip if it didn't embody a lot of
> truth. The ideology move is saying that things cannot be otherwise, not in accurately describing how and why they are under capitalist
> market conditions.
Fair enough. But doesn't this mean that one should contest the ideology, point out the historical origins of any supporting evidence, and otherwise challenge the idea that these are transhistorical, natural, etc.? I'm all for being against *only* challenging the "phrases" of the world, but I don't think that means we shouldn't challenge the ideology on ideological grounds as well. After all, what was Capital about except an attempt to found a new understanding of present conditions?
> So, I'm sorry Michael, your reported blow-off of Hardin is not an adequate response. We cannot get rid of Hardin and the TotC until we
> create the conditions under which the commons can thrive. That does not promise to be an easy task.
I call bullshit. I see the point you're making here, but Michael's piece defers to Ostrom who, in the literature, seems to have become the go to person for providing evidence that, not only can the commons thrive, but it already does in various places. There are challenges to governing them, but the saying we have to be able to provide some absolute, universal, inspirational model a la Robert Owen in order to even be able to speak about the ridiculousness of the anti-commons argument seems to set the bar a bit too high. In fact, it is basically to buy into the consensus (along with Hardin) that we should content ourselves with Private Property until someone, somewhere invents something better out of whole cloth. Notably, this is exactly in opposition to his own recommendation, which I'll end with:
But we can never do nothing. That which we have done for thousands of years is also action. It also produces evils. Once we are aware that the status quo is action, we can then compare its discoverable advantages and disadvantages with the predicted advantages and disadvantages of the proposed reform, discounting as best we can for our lack of experience. On the basis of such a comparison, we can make a rational decision which will not involve the unworkable assumption that only perfect systems are tolerable. (1247-8)
s