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Yes, and no. In this case the opposition discovered the War on Poverty wasn't a baby. So strangulation was a long protracted struggle. I got in on the tag end of these battles. But in many respects it was already too late. My working experience (I am sure this was true of many others) in our little program radicalized me far more than playing tear-gas hockey with the Alemeda County Sheriffs.
At UCB (1970), we had to get sign-offs from Camus Research and have a dean as official oversight to get the grant. UCB was a state level agency, but quasi-independent of state government. The political trick was to find a sympathetic faculty sponsor and dean, which wasn't all that difficult, obviously.
Here, much of local government was already being turned more liberal than it had been. And the OEO programs also formed a kind of local magnet to politically change city government if like Oakland, it didn't go along or was dragging its feet.
In Berkeley, of course that political process had already started and got moved along with the election of Dellums and others to the city council. Dellums was anti-war, but he was also obviously eager to get more of that federal funding working in Berkeley.
This post is already too long because of the history quote below. But let me say that the idea of using a non-profit corporation to house OEO programs and therefore by-pass state and local government was the whole programmatic basis for how these programs could become more radical than they might have been otherwise. This idea was used later by more community groups to set up their own local social service network. This is the way Berkeley CIL (Center for Independent Living) started. Most of its funding came through RSA. (I might continue this on another post...)
Anyway, here is some more background history:
``Formative Years: 1964 - 1967
The federal OEO was to lead the efforts of the War on Poverty and coordinate related programs of all other federal agencies. So-called community action agencies (CAAs) were created at the local level to fight the War on Poverty "at home."
The EOA also provided for the creation of economic opportunity offices at the state level in order to involve governors in the War on Poverty. While governors were not authorized to give prior approval on OEO grants, they did retain the right to veto any of these they thought inappropriate. Many, especially those in the South, exercised this right, only to be checked by another EOA provision for veto override by the Director of OEO. Indeed, Shriver overrode virtually all vetoes.
CAAs varied from grass-roots, community-controlled groups to those with experienced board members and a highly visible professional staff. Most were incorporated as private nonprofit organizations. A few were city agencies.
Funds were provided through the OEO. The local CAAs determined the use of the funds to meet the problems of the poor as they defined them. These were called "local initiative funds" and were used for a variety of purposes.
One provision of the EOA called for the poor to have "maximum feasible participation" in identifying problems and in developing solutions. Across the nation, CAAs opened neighborhood centers in storefronts, housing projects, and other buildings in low-income areas to identify people who needed help and to determine eligibility.
A new group of community leaders developed out of these neighborhood organizations, voicing the concerns of the poor and insisting on change. The philosophy, the strength, and the personal commitments of community action were formed during this period. It was also during this phase that OEA hired 3,000 new federal employees to manage and monitor all the new programs. Most of these people came from the CAAs, civil rights groups, churches, labor unions, and other activist organizations.
The community action program grew rapidly and poured large amounts of federal funds into communities, leaving some local elected officials concerned over the control of the CAA boards. Unhappy with the new power blocks outside their own political organizations, a few big-city mayors communicated their concerns to Congress and President Johnson. As a result, Congress began to earmark new funds into Congressionally defined National Emphasis Programs that reduced the ability of the CAAs to use the funds for other purposes. The President's enthusiasm began to decline.
Restructuring Phase: 1967 - 1968
In late 1967, Congress passed the Green Amendment, which required that a CAA must be designated as the official CAA for that area by local elected officials in order to operate in that community. After designation, OEO could then recognize the CAA and provide funds. After months of negotiations, over 95 percent of the existing CAAs were designated. In several large cities, the CAA was taken over by the mayor and turned into a public agency.
Congress also passed the Quie Amendment, which required that CAA boards of directors be composed of one-third elected officials appointed by them, at least one third low-income representatives selected by a democratic process, and the balance from the private sector.
By 1968, there were 1,600 CAAs covering 2,300 of the nation's 3,300 counties. OEO also required many small, single-county CAAs to join together into multicounty units. By 1969, about 1,000 CAAs had been designated under the Green Amendment and recognized by OEO, reorganized to meet the Quie Amendment criteria, and consolidated in accordance with OEO policy. Almost all of these CAAs are in existence today and operate the programs.
These amendments had a positive effect on most CAA boards, though the issue of increasing the influence of local elected officials on the board of directors was a significant issue to the leaders of poverty groups which had been operating independently. The formal connection of the political, economic, and community power structures proved to be a tremendous strength. In many places, the CAA's board became the arena for local officials, the business sector, and the poor to reach agreement on the policies, self-help activities, and programs to help the poor in their community.
Transition Years: 1969 - 1974
By 1969, many successful self-help programs had been initiated by OEO and the community action agencies, including Head Start, Family Planning, Community Health Centers, Legal Services, VISTA, Foster Grandparents, Economic Development, Neighborhood Centers, Summer Youth Programs, Adult Basic Education, Senior Centers, Congregate Meal Preparation, and others.
Picking up on the concept of using OEO and CAAs as "innovators and the testing ground" for new programs, and spinning off successful programs to be administered by other federal agencies, President Nixon's Administration saw the transfer of several large programs from OEO to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department of Labor. Along with the program went administrative oversight responsibility for a substantial part of CAA funding.
At the start of his second term in 1973, Nixon did not request any funds for OEO's Community Action Program division. Congress nevertheless provided funds. Nixon appointed Howard Phillips as Director of OEO and told him to dismantle and close the agency, and not to spend the money Congress provided.
After a series of lawsuits, the Federal District Court in Washington, D.C., ruled that the President could not refuse to spend funds that had been appropriated by Congress. Phillips resigned without having been confirmed by the Senate...''
http://www.neoncaa.org/HistoryofCAAs1.html
If you want, read the rest. It's depressing because after the above, the stranglers were definitely going to win.
CG