[lbo-talk] Sub-prime crisis in Kansas City

Charles Brown charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us
Sun Jan 6 11:34:26 PST 2008


The vultures I'm talking about were just brokers; they'd sell the loan

the next day (no longer my problem) and collect a comission for the sale. They couldn't care less if you default. Likewise even at traditional banks, if you could sell the loan, it's no longer your problem.

It's kind of like musical chairs: when the music stopped, who didn't have a chair? Which gets back to my earlier point, which was that some

of this was caused by your garden-variety sales tactics (yes, John, some of it even because of -- *gasp* -- racism), but the complicit Responsible Parties also failed: traditional lending criteria (and fact-checking from contractors: brokers, appraisers, etc.) went out the

window in a stunning (and ultimately costly to places like Countrywide,

Citibank, and WAMU) reversal of prudence; and who everyone else looks to for guidance -- the ratings folks: Moody's, S&P -- apparently Simply Blew It.

/jordan

^^^^^^ CB: Thanks , Jordan. That helps me think it further.

It does seem like the one's who get stuck with "no chair" when the music stops are Creditors. As you say , it's costly to Countrywide, Citibank and WAMU. The poor people don't end up much poorer than before,and they are not the source of the money made by the vultures - since, obviously poor people don't have much money. The poor people involved got a few months housing.

And you know me. I'm not the type to find the creditor class losing out, and the debtors not much wronged.

I imagine there were a lot of _predatory_ aspects to these "subprime" mortgages.



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