> So you're conceding that claiming Foucault said individuals have an
> instinct to violence is a misreading?
How can there be "misreadings" given that "knowledge needs a conceptual framework in order to be produced"?
The "knowledge" that:
"all these forms and transformations are aspects of the will to knowledge: instinct, passion, the inquisitor's devotion, cruel subtlety, and malice."
and that:
"the instinct for knowledge is malicious (something murderous opposed to the happiness of mankind)."
and that:
"Knowledge does not slowly detach itself from its empirical roots, the initial needs from which it arose, to become pure speculation subject only to the demands of reason; its development is not tied to the constitution and affirmation of a free subject; rather, it creates a progressive enslavement to its instinctive violence.”
also "needs a conceptual framework in order to be produced," doesn't it?
Taken together, these passages derive "knowledge's" "instinctive violence" from an "instinct for knowledge," a "will to knowledge" identified with "instinct, passion, the inquisitor's devotion, cruel subtlety, and malice."
Given that this "instinct," this "will," isn't the instinct/will of individuals, whose instinct/will is it?
Does it ultimately derive, for instance, from the "essential character" of "Being" as "the violent" with "humanity" as what "gathers what holds sway ['the violent'] and lets it enter into openness"?
Given that it's possible to figure out what they mean in themselves, what grounds are there for believing that the claims are "knowledge" in the sense of true claims about the nature of reality as it is in itself?
Ted