> In writing this I don't mean to devalue Hanson's contribution to the
> philosophy and history of the sciences. His book "The Concept of
> Position"
> was formative for me when I read it as an undergrad. It is a brilliant
> book. But where he saw the power of theory he did not see its limits and
> its historical thinness. In other words what happens to all of that
> knowledge that is simply pre-theoretical? Where does that come from? Why
> is
> it that scientific theories are late historical developments and in fact
> are
> even late scientific developments? If you argue that observations that
> are
> "pre-theoretical" are also "theory-laden", then what you are arguing is
> that
> "world view" or "way of thinking" or what I am calling "assumptions of
> thought" are all "theories." Then in effect "theories" are multitude in
> this
> sense.
I'm not terribly sure what you mean by 'pre-theoretical" knowledge, but it seems that it is indicating one is producing knowledge from a conceptual framework that one either does not recognize or has somehow obfuscated from oneself. But that knowledge needs a conceptual framework in order to be produced. This could be called common sense in the Gramscian sense. It is also 'theoretical' in the sense that it unknowingly engages in the production and reproduction of concepts. Probably the difference between what is consciously called theory and what is not, is that the 'theoretical' critically engages in those conceptual frameworks (either positively in the sense of what is X's conceptual framework or negatively, in the sense of what are the flaws in X's conceptual framework).
Ultimately, I feel that this 'scepticism' is ultimately an investment in the reification of language. Loosely speaking, the concept of 'critical theory' goes back to Kant or Hegel in their attempt to produce a philosophy that operates in the post-Newtonian universe. It is an attempt to produce a more rigorous and critical set of tools to produce concepts of the social. In this sense, the term theory acts as a rough analogue to the processes in science. Since then it has taken on its own density and weight as a concept.
The 'theory' of the various modes of critical theory has taken a life its own. I'm not sure what the problem is with that.
There is also a question of language here. I know that the German 'Wissenschaft' and the French 'Science' have different meanings than the English 'science'. I would be curious if the analogues to theory have variances as well.
Ultimately, I would be curious if it precisely the undercutting of the liberal humanist I that is making you so uncomfortable.
robert wood