>
> Jerry Monaco
>
> I basically agree with Jerry Fodor and Julius Moravcsik (and from what
> I
> understand even Heidegger and strangely enough Althusser): Where there
> is
> human intention and human meaning there is no scientific theory.
> "Intention" and "meaning" themselves are paradoxes and in order to
> produce a
> workable theoretical model, it is necessary to exclude them. Theory
> is
> basically anti-humanist or it doesn't work. What we call meaning and
> what
> we call "intention" is inscrutable from the point of view theory.
>
> ^^^
> CB: This is very helpful in specifying the non-Marxist point of view on
> this point. Marx's position is the opposite of this. Science is based
> in discovering necessary connections. Here "necessary" is exactly as in
> the logical _modus ponens_ or "if-then", if p, then q, q is a necessary
> condition of p. In the Realm of Necessity, ( Marx and Engels used the
> term "necessity" here precisely to make the point I am making here)
> there is a science of human conduct based on the things that human must
> do. As Marx and Engels had to explain to "the Germans" in _The German
> Ideology_, humans have physiological necessities. In meeting these,
> there arise scientifically discernable patterns in their behavior ( See
> the theses on materialism I just posted to the list yesterday.
JM: Charles, I wish you won't rely so much on the explication of Marx and Engels and would think through, and in the process help me think better, the actual problems in these positions and the processes of theory creation.
First, I want to insist on something that I hope you will agree with, the process of theory formation is an historical and social process. The emergence of a scientific "thought-world" is also a an historical and social process. But these are processes are not the same. A scientific craft, project, and attitude can be practiced without theory but theory is not possible without the scientific "thought world" that theory emerges from. I think this is basically the historical process and whether one looks at philosophers as your touchstone for understanding this process or you look at historians of science you can come to the same conclusion. I would suggest "The Emergence of Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1210 -1685" by Stephen Gaukroger, which covers the theological synthesis of Aristotle and the social relations that contributed to an increase to "theoreticism" without theory.
The reason I bring this up is that Engels was a fair historian of science and with a lot of time and study would have been a great one I think. His view was different than yours. Both Engels and Marx had a lot more humility of knowledge in some of these matters than you would claim for them. They realized that a scientific practice or "craft" was different from a scientific theory. They realized that theories were special and more limited. They realized that scientific practice and craft, and the "thought-world" behind it, are under the sway of social relations and ideology and what I would like to call the cultural ethos. Further, I think, that if you read the "Anti-Duhring" carefully you will find that Engels thinks that theories are limited and narrow.
All of the above is why Marx did not attempt to develop grand and general theories of humanity, culture, and history. He attempted to develop a specific theory of capitalism, which I believe has some good explanatory power, and might be one of the few theoretical projects in the social sciences worth expanding upon.
But what I want to insist upon, is what Marx and Engels knew, scientific craft and standards can be applied to human history, and one can have what Engels called a "world view" that is materialistic when studying human history, but this does not necessarily mean that there is a scientific theory of human history. So yes, there maybe discernible patterns in human history. (I hope there are because my own work is about a discernible pattern in some Mediterranean city-states.) but those discernible pattern will not necessarily lead to successful theories. We can see real and discernible patterns in many phenomena of our world, but very little of that knowledge gets translated, or can be translated into theory. So you may be able to (partially) define some of the boundaries of necessity for human beings in general or for a particular society without being able to develop a theory that is deep, surprising, etc.
Our knowledge is limited. Theoretical knowledge is even more limited. It is part of our material reality, (in large part our biological existence) that knowledge will be limited. To the extent that Marx and Engels thought that they could develop a theoretical science of human conduct I think they were wrong. The fact is they never tried to develop such a science. Marx limited himself to developing a theory of capitalism.
Jerry