>
> If there is no "subject," i.e. no being with a capacity for self-
> determination, and no "referentiality of language," i.e. no "language"
> that "refers" to and can embody truths about say the intent and
> premises of others, how, without self-contradiction, can it then be
> implicitly claimed that there is such a "subject," namely one able to
> rationally self-determine ("know") the intent and premises of others,
> "problematically thematize" "those premises," and then express in
> "language" the rationally self-determined truths it has reached about
> the "referent" of this language, i.e. "those premises"?
>
> Ted
C'mon Ted, this is all based on a faulty premise: "Only self-determined agents can generate meaningful knowledge". Sure, you can insist that claims can only be valid if they are generated by self-determined agents, but that's just an arbitrary philosophical assumption.
Try this: social behavior, including academic analysis, shapes and is mutually determined by the social context in which the behavior emerges.
From this viewpoint, saying that academic analysis is tainted or self-contradictory because it is challenges or critiques "self-determination" is incoherent.
This does raises an interesting sociological question: why is "self determination" such an important trope in capitalist societies?
Miles