[lbo-talk] Butler

Ted Winslow egwinslow at rogers.com
Sat Jun 7 14:30:34 PDT 2008


Doug Henwood wrote:


>
> On Jun 7, 2008, at 3:38 PM, shag quoted JB:
>
>> I am not doing away with the category, but trying to relieve the
>> category
>> of its foundatiohalist weight in order to render it as a site of
>> permanent
>> political contest.
>
> That's pretty great. How can anyone resist its charms?
>

It implicitly assumes, doesn't it, that all "knowledge" claims in the sense of claims that rational "foundations" exist for belief must be, as Foucault puts it, “aspects of the will to knowledge,” of a “rancourous”, “malicious”, “murderous” “instinct for knowledge” that Foucault identifies with “violence” and “the inquisitor’s devotion, cruel subtlety, and malice"? If it does, how come you can't "resist its charms"?

One key difference between Husserl's "phenomenology" and Heidegger's is that the former attempts to find "foundations" for rational belief including rational ontological and anthropological beliefs in self- consciousness and therefore seeks to persuade solely by pointing to features of that self-consciousness. Therefore, the only ground available to me on which to base acceptance or rejection of a knowledge claim defended in this way is my own self-consciousness phenomenologically interrogated. All I need do to "contest" it, i.e. reasonably to reject it, is be unable to find confirming evidence for it in my own self-consciousness. Phenomenology in this sense can never reach completion. It is, however, difficult to practice; it requires, for instance, "negative capability."

Knowledge claims provided with "foundations" in this "phenomenological" way are "aspects" of a relation of "mutual recognition" as elaborated by Marx.

So the "knowledge" claim that all "knowledge" claims are "aspects of the will to knowledge" in Foucault's sense isn't true. It may, however, be true of some "knowledge" claims. Foucault, for instance, is implicitly claiming it's true of his "knowledge" claims about all "knowledge" claims.

The idea that we actually do have available rational "foundations" for belief has as one of its implications that it's possible to find rational "foundations" for believing that HIV/AIDS is not caused by witchcraft and, therefore, can't be prevented by murdering "witches." The belief that it is and can be isn't "knowledge."

Ted



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