> "Rational" does not mean "right," but "reasoned and
> logically consistent." (You certainly aren't going to
> find a solution to the virus-witch problem through
> phenomenology, given that it is a highly sophisticated
> form of introspection for which the existence of an
> objective reality is meaningless in both Husserl's and
> Heidegger's formulations.) Actually given the
> assumptions of people who do believe in witches, the
> witch theory is perfectly rational. They are almost
> certainly wrong, but that is not the point.
This misses the point which was that the claim that there are no rational foundations for belief implies that it's not possible to find rational foundations for believing that HIV/AIDS is not caused by witchcraft and, therefore, can't be prevented by murdering "witches," i.e. it implies that there are no rational foundations on which to base the conclusion that the belief that it is and can be is mistaken.
There are also no rational foundations on which to base the conclusion that it's irrational which, as you say, is different from the conclusion that it's mistaken.
In fact, on this assumption no "knowledge" in the sense of rationally grounded belief is possible. So claims to "know," in this sense, that other people exist and believe in witchcraft contradict the assumption.
It's not true, however, that consistency with assumptions makes a conclusion "rational." "Solipsism of the present moment" isn't a "rational" conclusion.
Husserl's phenomenology isn't a "form of introspection for which the existence of an objective reality is meaningless." This misinterprets and misrepresents the idea of "bracketing."
"Bracketing" is putting in question all interpretive frameworks, This includes the interpretive framework that makes "intelligible" the conclusion that experience is so constituted that "bracketing" in this sense is impossible. Leaving this interpretive framework unquestioned is failing to "bracket" it and so isn't "phenomenology" in the sense of Husserl.
Putting it in question, "contesting" it, is very difficult, however, It's very difficult to "resist its charms."
This difficulty is linked to the misidentification of "rationality" with "remorseless logic"
It's also linked to the difficulty of putting in question the belief that "all" “forms of scientific consciousness" are “aspects of the will to knowledge,” of a “rancourous”, “malicious”, “murderous” “instinct for knowledge.”
It's also linked to absurd belief in the "inner truth and greatness" of National Socialism.
Ted