--- Doug Henwood <dhenwood at panix.com> wrote:
> > As Nandigram showed last year, there's not much of
> an electoral
> > alternative to neoliberalism there, eh.
>
> Well that's an interesting story, isn't it? Why, in
> more-or-less
> democracies without death squads has there been so
> little resistance
> to neoliberalism? How'd the ANC get away with it?
> There's a
> tremendous intellectual and rhetorical vacuum on our
> side. Jesson was
> onto something, and not just about NZ.
>
[WS:] That is an interesting question, indeed. However, "intellectual and rhetorical vacuum" does not quite cut it. The Left is using the more or less same intellectual framework for the past hundred or so years. It was extremely successful in the first half the 20th century, so why is not it now? Or looking at it from a slightly different point of view, why was it displaced by a 19th century doctrine that was not very stimulating intellectually to begin with, except for bean counters and sociopaths attracted to the discipline of economics?.
One possible explanation can be found in the concept of elective affinity, outlined by Max Weber in "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" and echoed, inter alia, in the work of the late Charles Tilly ("From Mobilization to a Revolution".) In a nutshell, the argument can be stated as follows:
There are many doctrines, religious beliefs, ideologies etc. out there. Most of the exist in relative obscurity, known mainly to narrow intellectual circles. As such, they have zero political power and popular appeal - they influence is limited to narrow niches and circles of followers.
That, however, changes in the prolonged power struggles among elites (both politcial and economic). The challengers in such power struggle typically face disadvantages vs. the establishment. Therefore, to gain competitive advantage vs other factions in that power struggle, they typically form strategic alliances with outside groups. These groups bring their own ideological "baggage" to the process in the form non-conventional beliefs, ideologies, etc. Sometimes this ideological baggage can be a liability to the party that recruits such an outside group, but sometimes it can be an asset that provides fresh intellectual ammunition - or legitimation - for the politcial or economic agenda advanced by that party. That collusion between ideology and economic or political interests is called "elective affinity."
However, the process does not end with the simple recruitment of a hitherto fringe group to aid the struggle among the elite factions. Two important things follow. First, the ideology of that fringe group receives amplification and legitimation through the mainstream channels of communication that normally are controlled by the elite and reserved mainly to propagate the elite's points of view. Consequently, broader segments of public become familiar with that ideology.
Second, the faction "recruited" to aid the elite struggle does not exist in a social vacuum. It is embedded in its own social networks (professional associations, academic departments, conferences, etc.) These social networks act as conduits for various affilates to get closer to the halls of power (e.g. landing on government jobs, receiving public and private funding for their projects, etc.) That, in turn, is viewed as a success that attracts new followers, students, etc.
In the end, this may lead to what some studends of industrial relations and marketing call a "niche that swallows the industry." What used to be a fringe niche quickly grows in prominence and attracts mass following at the expense of what used to be the "mainstream" market. The popularity of SUVs can be a textbook example. It is a result of three factors: (i)unholy alliance between auto manufacturers and unions to circumvent regulations and boost an ailing industry facing foreign competition; (ii) a clever marketing strategy and (iii) popular demand for a vehicle suitable for a "splashy" suburban life style.
I think that something very similar happened to the growth of neo-liberalism. Throughout most of the 20th century it was basically a narrow niche, confiend to obscure corners of the academia. However, as the investor class started loosing its share of power due to the advancements in the welfare state and stagflation of the 1970s, it formed an unholy alliance with these obscure academics. As their views were received a boost by being disseminated by the mainstream media and receiving funding, they spread - first among the academia and professional circles, then the general public.
There was also an "elective affinity: between that ideology and the broad segmentsa of the public - bettwer eductaed and aspiring to a higher social status. The meritocratic mythology of the free market was particularly appealing to this class - as opposed to a "social stagnation" of an egalitarian society or cronyism associated with institutional promotions. It bascially legitimated their social climbing in an appealing way - portraying it as a fruit of "entrepreneurship" "innovation" and "effort" rathr than the old style cronyism and ass-kissing.
At this pont, neo-liberalism became what Protestantism became afer the Reformation. Initially, it was an ideolgy used to legitimate the position of the merchant/investor class, but evetually it trickled down and became internalized by the masses. In the end, it outgrew its usefulness to the economic elite that initially promoted it, but it lives its own life as a new popular religion. Attacking this religion to fight the socio-political powers that initially created it is like fighting shadows - or windmills.
This is my take on this issue. Happy May Day, everyone.
Wojtek
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