> Those speak bitterness sessions (and
> _Fanshen_ is illuminating on this) were developed to deal with a very
> specific difficulty: as a rule, peasants mind their own business, keep
> their heads down, and don't turn against their betters. That sort of
> thing only gets them beaten up. But the revolution depended on the
> peasantry; somehow the peasants had to become something more than
> peasants; they had to speak! They had to speak to each other and in
> public, as a public act. (Who coined the expression, "Thorw off the
> muck
> of centuries"? That is what we are dealing with here.) By speaking
> bravely (and at first in such sessions, even in areas the PLA
> controlled, few dared to speak) they could find their courage. Take
> them
> out of that context and "speak bitterness" sessions are apt to be
> pretty
> empty. Peasant caution is not the barrier to revolution in the u.s.
> Similarly with criticism & self-criticism as practiced in China. It
> was
> often pretty brutal and destructive there, but transmitted without
> change to the U.S. and practiced by those who had had their minds
> fucked
> over by Freudianism, and it was an unmitigated disaster.
The implicit assumption here is that peasant individuality can be significantly altered in a positive way by "speak bitterness" sessions created not by peasants themselves but by others with the despotic power required to change conditions in this and other ways e.g. to impose "collectivization."
What evidence is there that this assumption is true?
Where the individuality in question is characterized by paranoid suspiciousness, it can't be made more rational in this way.
One can of course deny the existence of paranoid suspiciousness by, for example, embracing the idea that no rational grounds are available for belief. On this assumption, no grounds are available on which to base reasonable judgments that the beliefs that led say to the Oklahoma City bombing were (a) mistaken and (b) "paranoid" in the sense that the psychology underpinning them made them immune to rational critique.
The idea that there are no rational grounds for belief has, however, absurd implications which those who claim to believe it, e.g. Stanley Fish, avoid through the simple device of giving up on the law of non- contradiction.
Or, one can deny that psychology can influence beliefs in this way so that say mistaken belief in the Jewish blood libel can be corrected by simply pointing to evidence demonstrating that it's mistaken. What evidence is there that this is true?
Paranoid suspiciousness can be demagogically mobilized as a means of distracting individuals from the real sources of their suffering.
Lou Dobbs conducts a nation wide "speak bitterness" session nightly.
Ted