>
> In reference to Marx and Marxism, the philosopher
> Allen Wood has argued that for Marx, moral principles
> like justice cannot be applied to modes of production
> or historical epochs as a whole. Hence, according to
> Wood, for Marx it made no sense to complain that
> capitalism is unjust or immoral, although it would
> still make sense to speak of the morality of practices
> within a given mode of production, such as the assertion
> that theft is immoral.
>
> Richard W. Miller in his book, *Analyzing Marx* argued
> that Marxism does not attempt to apply what moral philosophers
> would call the "moral point of view" to social systems
> like capitalism. So therefore while for Miller, Marxism
> does make normative judgments concerning social practices
> and institutions, it does not necessarily make moral
> judgments. The distinction between moral judgments and
> other kinds of normative judgments has been long a fixture
> of certain strands of analytical moral philosophy such
> as reflected in the work of philosophers like Paul W. Taylor,
> Kai Nielsen, Kurt Baier etc. So likewise, it may be
> the case thatwhile Marx and Marxists do make various
> sorts of normative judgments concerning capitalism
> and other social systems, they are not necessarily
> making moral judgments.
>
> Jim Farmelant
> -- Miles Jackson <cqmv at pdx.edu> wrote:
> Philp Pilkington wrote:
> > "and even if interpreted
> > that way is STILL not an ethical principle but a practice dictated by
> > the development of a communist society, a social not an ethical
> > principle, and actually a practice rather than a principle."
> >
> > That seems like linguistic sophistry to me. Social/ethical;
> > practice/principle, these are plays on words. Ethics is always related to
> > the rest of society, its always dialectically grounded in the social
> link,
> > even when it appears otherwise. As for practice and principle it seems
> the
> > same thing, principles never meant anything unless they were practiced...
>
> How about this: ethics is the social practice of justifying existing
> patterns of behavior in a society. (Ethical principles do not "drive"
> individual behavior and social relations; just the opposite.)
>
> Miles
>
>
>
> ____________________________________________________________
> Free information on becoming a Graphic Designer. Click Now!
>
> http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2141/fc/PnY6rw3huISTQlxvQuydZS83SZnUT7eaTrprH5pWLBMEGWLI0HBHn/
>
> ___________________________________
> http://mailman.lbo-talk.org/mailman/listinfo/lbo-talk
>
Richard W. Miller in his book, *Analyzing Marx* argued that Marxism does not attempt to apply what moral philosophers would call the "moral point of view" to social systems like capitalism. So therefore while for Miller, Marxism does make normative judgments concerning social practices and institutions, it does not necessarily make moral judgments. The distinction between moral judgments and other kinds of normative judgments has been long a fixture of certain strands of analytical moral philosophy such as reflected in the work of philosophers like Paul W. Taylor, Kai Nielsen, Kurt Baier etc. So likewise, it may be the case thatwhile Marx and Marxists do make various sorts of normative judgments concerning capitalism and other social systems, they are not necessarily making moral judgments.
Again I'll say that I believe this to be linguistic sophistry on the part of analytic philosophers. They produce a schism between moral and normative judgements without recognising the latters implicit reliance or "debt" to the former. Just look at the dictionary defibition of "normative" and things start to get hairy:
nor⋅ma⋅tive <http://dictionary.reference.com/audio.html/lunaWAV/N02/N0218300> /ˈnɔrmətɪv/ Show Spelled Pronunciation <http://dictionary.reference.com/help/luna/IPA_pron_key.html> [nawr-muh-tiv] Show IPA Pronunciation <http://dictionary.reference.com/help/luna/IPA_pron_key.html> –adjective 1. of or pertaining to a norm, esp. an assumed norm regarded as the standard of correctness in behavior, speech, writing, etc. 2. tending or attempting to establish such a norm, esp. by the prescription of rules: normative grammar. 3. reflecting the assumption of such a norm or favoring its establishment: a normative attitude.
and then moral:
mor⋅al <http://dictionary.reference.com/audio.html/lunaWAV/M06/M0605600> /ˈmɔrəl, ˈmɒr-/ Show Spelled Pronunciation <http://dictionary.reference.com/help/luna/IPA_pron_key.html> [mawr-uhl, mor-] Show IPA Pronunciation <http://dictionary.reference.com/help/luna/IPA_pron_key.html> –adjective 1. of, pertaining to, or concerned with the principles or rules of right conduct or the distinction between right and wrong; ethical: moral attitudes. 2. expressing or conveying truths or counsel as to right conduct, as a speaker or a literary work; moralizing: a moral novel. 3. founded on the fundamental principles of right conduct rather than on legalities, enactment, or custom: moral obligations. 4. capable of conforming to the rules of right conduct: a moral being. 5. conforming to the rules of right conduct (opposed to immoral<http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=immoral&db=luna> ): a moral man. 6. virtuous in sexual matters; chaste. 7. of, pertaining to, or acting on the mind, feelings, will, or character: moral support. 8. resting upon convincing grounds of probability; virtual: a moral certainty.
Similarities anyone?