[lbo-talk] NYT Op-Ed: Claw back the Paulson Plan's dividends

Michael Pollak mpollak at panix.com
Tue Oct 21 04:05:55 PDT 2008


http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/21/opinion/21stein.html

The New York Times

October 21, 2008

Op-Ed Contributor

This Bailout Doesnt Pay Dividends

By DAVID S. SCHARFSTEIN and JEREMY C. STEIN

Cambridge, Mass.

<snip>

Although there are many things to like about the government's plan, the

failure to suspend dividends is not one of them. These dividends, if

they are paid at current levels, will redirect more than $25 billion of

the $125 billion to shareholders in the next year alone. Taxpayers have

been told that their money is required because of an urgent need to

rebuild bank capital, yet a significant fraction of this money will

wind up in shareholders' pockets -- and thus be unavailable to plug the

large capital hole on the banks' balance sheets.

Moreover, given their own equity stakes, the officers and directors of

the nine banks will be among the leading beneficiaries of the dividend

payout. We estimate that their personal take of the dividends will

amount to approximately $250 million in the first year.

Bank executives may argue that it is necessary for them to maintain

dividend payments to support their stock prices and to make further

capital-raising possible. This argument is dubious. In recent years,

the fraction of American public companies that pay dividends has fallen

drastically, to a level of around 20 percent. The ranks of the

companies that do not pay dividends include some of the most profitable

and (until recently) best-performing market darlings, like Google.

These companies have come to recognize what finance academics have been

preaching for decades: for financially healthy firms, there is no

particular imperative to pay dividends every quarter, because retained

cash can always be paid out to shareholders later, or used to

repurchase stock.

So why would the banks want to maintain large dividend payouts when

they've had such a hard time borrowing, are starved of cash, and the

credit markets believe that they run a significant risk of defaulting?

Shouldn't these distressed banks be marshalling all of the financial

resources available to them to ensure their viability?

Although dividends should be a matter of near indifference to

shareholders of healthy companies, when companies are financially

distressed there is a conflict of interest between shareholders and

bondholders that leads shareholders to prefer immediate payouts.

Here's why: Each dollar paid out as a dividend today is a dollar that

cannot be seized by creditors in the event of bankruptcy. For a

distressed company, dividends are not in the interest of the enterprise

as a whole (shareholders and lenders taken together), but only in the

interest of shareholders. They are an attempt by shareholders to beat

creditors out the door.

The government should close the door by putting an immediate stop to

the dividend payouts of any banks receiving direct federal support. The

purpose is not just to be fair or to avoid unsavory appearances, but to

improve the health of the banks and the economy.

There is ample precedent for such a move by the government. When

Chrysler was bailed out with government loan guarantees in 1979, the

legislation explicitly prohibited Chrysler from making any dividend

payments. All dividends on its common shares were suspended from 1980

to 1983.

If the government is unwilling to take this step, then the boards of

the banks should take it upon themselves to do the right thing. They

may even have a legal obligation to do so, because courts have ruled

that directors of financially distressed firms have a fiduciary duty to

creditors as well as to shareholders.

The creditors of the banks include not just those who have already lent

them money, but also American taxpayers who put their money on the line

by guaranteeing the banks' debts. From the perspective of this broader

set of stakeholders, it is best to end dividend payments until the

banks have returned to health.

David S. Scharfstein is a professor of finance at Harvard Business

School. Jeremy C. Stein is a professor of economics at Harvard.



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